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Abstract 
 
Army in the 21st Century (A21) and Restructuring the Army (RTA) were two related force 
structure initiatives undertaken by the Australian Army in the 1990s. A21 radically proposed 
to abolish traditional divisional/corps structures, fielding instead independent task forces with 
embedded combat arms. The RTA trials tested A21 concepts over several years; yet 
A21/RTA was abandoned in 1999. What happened, why, and what lessons does A21/RTA 
offer? 
 
This retrospective appraisal of A21/RTA is a case study of attempted transformational change 
in the Australian Army. The sub-thesis’ methodology features interviews with over thirty 
senior military, public service, academic and political leaders of this era; and applies 
organisational theory to interpret internal/external dynamics. 
 
A21/RTA faced formidable strategy, resourcing and cultural challenges. However A21/RTA 
failed to achieve critical elements of successful change management, including: a clear, 
shared, credible vision; achieving early successes; providing enablers (e.g. time and 
resources) and supporting efforts for change; senior leadership buy-in; and political 
sponsorship. A21/RTA failed in technical feasibility and cultural sensitivity terms. However, 
A21/RTA successfully developed an evidence-based approach, an enduring legacy 
supporting Army’s capability resourcing in Defence’s contested budget environment. Lessons 
for future restructures focus leadership attention to elements critical for successful 
organisational change, emphasising culture. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In the 1990s, the Australian Army attempted its most ambitious restructure since the 1960s. 
The Army in the 21st Century review (A21) proposed transformational change by abolishing 
the traditional divisional/corps structure in favour of independent task forces, with combat 
arms (armour, artillery and engineers) embedded within infantry units. Yet following several 
years of associated trials rebadged as Restructuring the Army (RTA), A21/RTA was 
abandoned and Army returned structurally to status quo ante. 
 
This sub-thesis presents a case study in military change management, the first detailed 
academic description and evaluation of A21/RTA. The sub-thesis asks: (1) Did A21/RTA 
fail? (2) What are A21/RTA’s legacies? (3) What lessons does A21/RTA offer for 
contemporary force restructuring initiatives? 
 
The sub-thesis reveals A21/RTA’s transformational change journey. Chapter 2 (Literature 
Review and Methods) provides a framework for the sub-thesis, based on organisational 
theory and critical elements for successful organisational change. One element of such 
success is compelling drivers, and Chapter 3 shows A21/RTA was Army’s defensive 
response to compelling strategic and budgetary drivers. A21/RTA’s force design needed to 
conform with Defence-of-Australia (DoA) strategic guidance; and justify Army’s budget. But 
A21/RTA faced major challenges from the outset. First, confining Army to continental 
defence against low-level threats fundamentally clashed with Army’s expeditionary and 
conventional warfighting culture; and questioned its traditional divisional/corps structure. 
Second, the strategic guidance was itself ambiguous, masking renewed Government interest 
in expeditionary capabilities despite its declared DoA focus.  
 
Chapter 4 presents Army’s response to these drivers. A21/RTA was an ambitious ‘capability 
game’ – while appearing to conform with DoA, A21/RTA’s radical and muscular force was 
designed to win increased resources for Army (including for higher threat levels and non-
DoA tasks) within Defence’s contested budget environment. A21/RTA was also a ‘bold and 
innovative’ reform, proposing new concepts for modern warfare. However, A21/RTA’s 
capability game was not transparent, threatened existing interests, and employed a directive 
leadership approach, resulting in significant internal cultural resistance despite A21/RTA’s 
net capability gains. Chief of Army Lieutenant General John Sanderson did not create a clear, 
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shared, credible vision, or senior leadership buy-in; and he achieved only qualified political 
sponsorship externally. A massive trials program (RTA) was conceived out of this 
scepticism; designed to defer investment, build a credible evidence base, and hedge risk. 
 
Chapter 5 describes the RTA trials. Undertaken with the Defence Science and Technology 
Organisation, the trials’ real value lay in generating evidence supporting increased Army 
capability resources. However, several A21 concepts failed for technical reasons in the trials, 
including embedding; and disruptions elsewhere in Army hardened cultural resistance. 
Failure to achieve early successes in these respects undermined confidence in the reform; and 
ultimately led to leadership change.  
 
Chapter 6 traces A21/RTA’s outcomes through contrasting the approach of Sanderson’s 
successor as Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Frank Hickling. Hickling’s vision for Army 
was an expeditionary redux; he resolved the lingering strategic ambiguity by ceasing the 
A21/RTA trials and achieving a ‘clean break’ from DoA, establishing an expeditionary role 
for Army within Government’s revised ‘maritime concept’ of strategy. While Hickling’s 
transparency, directness and intellectual tools conferred credibility on his vision, he was 
significantly aided by his alignment with Army’s traditional culture, and by evolving 
strategic circumstances (e.g. East Timor, 1999). The RTA trials generated two immediate 
legacies. First, results were used to justify Army’s departure from DoA and return to 
conventional warfighting. Second, Army discovered the power of an evidence-based 
approach to influence Government. 
 
Chapter 7 considers A21/RTA’s lessons and legacies. Did A21/RTA fail? The sub-thesis 
argues that as a transformational change initiative, A21/RTA faced formidable barriers of 
strategic ambiguity, resourcing and culture. However A21/RTA failed to achieve critical 
elements of successful change management, including: creating a clear, shared, credible 
vision; achieving early successes; providing key enablers (e.g. time and resources) and 
supporting efforts for change; senior leadership buy-in; and political sponsorship. While 
change drivers were compelling, Army’s ambitions exceeded them and hamstrung 
transparent communication. This suggests ‘provider capture’ (divergent interests of Army (as 
agent) and Government (as principal)) undermined civil-military relations. Internally, 
A21/RTA failed the technical feasibility and cultural sensitivity tests. 
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A21/RTA succeeded in one change management element: evaluation and improvement. 
A21/RTA’s evidence-based approach matured into an enduring legacy of experimentation to 
inform force modernisation, capability development, and compete for resources within 
Defence’s contested budget environment. 
 
A21/RTA’s lesson for future military transformation initiatives is for leadership to address all 
elements of successful change management, to deliver well-founded reforms that address 
both technical feasibility and institutional culture. 
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Annex 1-A: A21/RTA Key Events 
 
Serial: Date: Event: 
1 1986 Dibb Review provides force structural basis for Defence-of-Australia (DoA) 
2 1987 Defence White Paper 1987 published: first declaratory strategic guidance articulating DoA as the principal force structure determinant 
3 1991 Force Structure Review 1991: Army retains divisional structure despite severe budget/personnel cuts, ‘hollowing out’ the force 
4 Jul 1994 Chiefs of Service Committee (COSC) directs internal review of Army 
5 Nov 1994 Defence White Paper 1994 reinforces DoA; mentions expeditionary capability ‘at the margins’ and announces the A21 Review 
6 Jul 1995 Lieutenant General John Sanderson becomes Chief of the General Staff (CGS); establishes the A21 Working Group led by Brigadier Peter Dunn 
7 Nov 1995 Dunn tables A21 Final Report in the CGS’s Advisory Committee 
8 Dec 1995 Concepts and Capability Committee endorses A21 
9 Feb 1996 COSC endorses A21 
10 Mar 1996 Coalition wins federal election: Change-of-Government 
11 Jun 1996 Blackhawk disaster kills 18 soldiers on exercise near Townsville 
12 Oct 1996 • Minister for Defence (MINDEF) Ian McLachlan announces RTA and the Defence Efficiency Review in the same Ministerial Statement 
• Sanderson publishes An Army for the 21st Century 
13 Dec 1996 Sanderson issues the first CGS Directive for A21 Task Force Trials 
14 Feb 1997 
• MINDEF McLachlan publishes Restructuring the Army 
• RTA trials commence in 1st Brigade 
• CGS title rebadged to Chief of Army (CA) 
15 Jul 1997 Army Headquarters rationalised under the Defence Reform Program (DRP); Land Warfare Studies Centre (LWSC) established 
16 Oct 1997 Sanderson issues second CA Directive for RTA Trials Master Plan 
17 Dec 1997 MINDEF McLachlan publishes new strategic guidance,  Australia’s Strategic Policy 1997 (ASP97): articulates a ‘maritime concept of strategy’ 
18 May 1998 Height of the Asian Financial Crisis undermines assumptions of regional stability as Indonesian President Suharto steps down 
19 Jun 1998 • Sanderson issues third CA Directive for RTA Trials Master Plan, revised to include ‘offshore tasks’ 
• Lieutenant General Frank Hickling becomes CA 
20 Sep 1998 Dr Michael Evans publishes Role of the Australian Army in a Maritime Concept of Strategy from the LWSC 
21 Oct 1998 • Coalition wins re-election: new MINDEF John Moore 
• Hickling signals departure from A21/RTA and embrace of ASP97’s maritime strategy in senior officer’s address 
22 Late 1998 Hickling publishes revised capstone doctrine: Fundamentals of Land Warfare, emphasising Army’s ‘manoeuvre in a littoral environment’ 
23 Feb 1999 • Hickling suspends RTA trials: Army returns to a divisional structure  
• Hickling places elements of the 1st Armoured Regiment on reduced notice in response to escalating tensions in East Timor  
24 Apr 1999 Hickling delivers National Press Club Address, unilaterally announcing Army’s resumption of a conventional warfighting focus; and embrace of maritime strategy. Hickling makes a direct public appeal for increased Army resourcing 
25 May 1999 MINDEF Moore commissions a parliamentary inquiry into the ‘Suitability of the Australian Army for peacetime, peacekeeping and war’ 
26 Sep 1999 ADF military intervention in East Timor 
27 Oct 1999 Lieutenant Colonel Greg de Somer publishes The Capacity of the Australian Army to Conduct and Sustain Land Force Operations from the LWSC, to underpin Army’s submission to the parliamentary inquiry 
28 2
nd Quarter 
2000 
Hickling and Colonel Justin Kelly deliver final A21/RTA Outbrief to MINDEF Moore, highlighting the technical failures of A21, and justifying return to conventional warfighting 
29 Sep 2000 Parliamentary inquiry tables final report: criticises Government for poor strategic guidance and inadequate resourcing of Army 
30 Dec 2000 Defence White Paper 2000 published: substantial increase in Army resourcing 
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Annex 1-B: Key Leaders 1994-2000 
 
 
 
Legend: MINDEF = Minister for Defence; SECDEF = Secretary of Defence; CDF = Chief of the Defence Force; CGS/CA = Chief of the 
General Staff/Chief of Army (the title changed on 19 Feb 1997); ALP = Australian Labor Party; LNP = Liberal/National Party; LTGEN = 
Lieutenant General. 
CGS/CA
CDF
SECDEF
MINDEF Senator Robert Ray (ALP) 04 Apr 1990-11 Mar 1996 
Ian McLachlan (LNP) 
11 Mar 1996-21 Oct 1998 
John Moore (LNP) 
21 Oct 1998-30 Jan 2001 
Tony Ayers 
01 Aug 1988-05 Feb 1998 
Paul Barratt 
06 Feb 1998-31 Aug 1999 
Dr Hugh White 
01 Sep-20 Oct 1999 
Dr Allan Hawke 
21 Oct 1999-20 Oct 2002 
General John Baker 
07 Jul 1995-03 Jul 1998 
Admiral Chris Barrie 
04 Jul 1998-03 Jul 2002 
LTGEN John Grey 
01 May 1992-07 Jul 1995 
LTGEN John Sanderson 
08 Jul 1995-23 Jun 1998 
LTGEN Francis Hickling 
24 Jun 1998 - 15 Jul 2000 
LTGEN Peter Cosgrove 
16 Jul 2000-27 Jun 2002 
Admiral Alan Beaumont 
17 Apr 1993 - 06 Jul 1995 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Methods 
 
Introduction 
In the 1990s the Australian Army embarked upon the most ambitious force restructure since 
the 1960s. Triggered by 1994’s Defence White Paper, Army in the 21st Century (A21) was 
Army’s first substantial response to the Defence-of-Australia (DoA) strategy. A21 proposed 
to abolish World War Two-vintage divisional and corps1 structures, replacing these with 
seven highly mobile Task Forces, with unit-level embedding of combat arms. The Task 
Forces were allocated operational areas in northern Australia, under DoA’s threat scenario of 
low-level contingencies. A trials program was conducted to develop and test A21’s concepts: 
this was the Restructuring the Army (RTA) initiative. However, in early 1999 the trials were 
abandoned as Army prepared for escalating tensions in East Timor. Army reverted to its 
original force structure, striving for relevance in the new ‘maritime concept’ advocated in 
1997’s Australia’s Strategic Policy. While Army used the East Timor deployment to renew 
an expeditionary focus and transcend DoA, the A21/RTA experiment helped justify a return 
to conventional2 warfighting. In terms of structure and expeditionary, conventional 
warfighting focus, this period’s outcome was a return to status quo ante. 
 
This part of Australia’s military history has not been well-documented and academically 
analysed, beyond light descriptive treatment within the broader historical works of Palazzo,3 
Blaxland4 and Grey;5 and Evans’6 analysis in a doctrinal context. This sub-thesis aims to fill 
this gap by describing and evaluating A21/RTA as a change management case study. This 
                                                 
1 Throughout this sub-thesis, ‘corps’ refers to branch of specialisation (e.g. infantry, armour, artillery, 
engineers). The Australian Army defines ‘corps’ in this sense as follows: ‘a corps is a large formation or an 
administrative grouping of troops within an armed force with a common function. The many corps of the 
Australian Army perform specific combat, combat support or combat service support roles that have shaped 
their growth, development and the generation of esprit de corps that characterises each and is a source of pride 
to the members of that corps.’ http://www.army.gov.au/Our-people/Corps, accessed 13 Jun 2016. This sense of 
‘corps’ is distinguished from the structural unit larger than a division, also labelled ‘corps’. 
2 Throughout this sub-thesis, ‘conventional’ is used in the sense of traditional combined arms warfighting 
structure, capabilities, doctrine and tactics, involving infantry, armour, artillery, engineers etc. ‘Conventional’ is 
also used here to distinguish traditional warfighting operations from peacekeeping and unconventional (special) 
operations. 
3 Albert Palazzo, The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation, 1901-2001, (South Melbourne, VIC, 
Australia: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 362-367. 
4 John Blaxland, The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard, (Port Melbourne, VIC, Australia: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), p. 124-126. 
5 Jeffrey Grey, The Australian Army: A History, (South Melbourne, VIC, Australia: Oxford University Press, 
2001), p. 253-255. 
6 Michael Evans, Forward from the Past: The Development of Australian Army Doctrine, 1972-present, Land 
Warfare Studies Centre (LWSC), Study Paper No. 301, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Land Warfare Studies 
Centre, Sep 1999), 91 pp.  
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subject is important, because Army has a poor success record in force restructures;7 studying 
previous major change attempts can inform Army’s current and future change initiatives. The 
sub-thesis asks the following questions: (1) Did A21/RTA fail? (2) What are the legacies of 
A21/RTA? (3) What lessons can be extracted from the A21/RTA experience for 
contemporary force restructuring initiatives? 
 
This Chapter critically reviews the literature pertaining to A21/RTA, to guide the conduct of 
the sub-thesis’ research. It identifies: the literature gaps the sub-thesis will fill; a theoretical 
framework to evaluate A21/RTA as a change management case study; specific themes the 
sub-thesis will address; an appropriate gap-filling methodology; and the sub-thesis’ unique 
contributions and relevance. The Chapter is presented in several parts. Part 1 briefly describes 
A21/RTA and identifies literature gaps. Part 2 derives the theoretical framework through 
review of organisational theory, covering structure, culture, change management, change 
leadership and provider capture. Part 3 begins applying this theoretical framework, by 
examining Army’s culture and force structuring principles and history, describing the internal 
organisational context in which A21/RTA was attempted. Part 4 considers the external 
political, strategic and resourcing context in which A21/RTA occurred. Parts 3 and 4 
collectively derive the sub-thesis’ themes. Part 5 considers the sub-thesis’ methodological 
issues. 
 
This Chapter finds the biggest literature gaps are around the internal A21 study conducted by 
Army in 1995-96; and the RTA trials from 1997. The sub-thesis seeks to fill these gaps by 
expert elicitation through interview; and through access to previously unpublished materials. 
 
Part 1: Description of A21/RTA 
 
Open-source literature on A21/RTA is sparse. A21 was first outlined by Jane’s Defence 
Weekly in August 1996.8 A21 was rebadged and announced by Defence Minister Ian 
McLachlan in October 1996 as RTA, described as a ‘shift from the traditional divisional 
                                                 
7 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, From Phantom to Force: Towards a More 
Efficient and Effective Army, Inquiry into the Suitability of the Australian Army for Peacetime, Peacekeeping 
and War, Report No. 95, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Sep 
2000), para 9.33, p. 192. 
8 ‘Units will operate as combined arms teams with a high level of self-sufficiency and integrated infantry, 
artillery, armour, aviation, engineering and signals elements’. Jane’s Defence Weekly, ‘Designing an Army for 
the Next Century’, IHS Global, 07 Aug 1996, p. 1. 
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structure towards flatter and more responsive Task Forces [to] create units which will be 
flexible, capable of a range of independent operations…’ He described the traditional 
divisional structure as ‘suitable for the concentrated battlefields of World War Two’ but 
unsuited to ‘widespread concurrent operations’.9 The Task Forces (TFs) proposed to embed 
infantry, armour, artillery and engineers at unit level,10 and to dismantle corps structures.11  
 
There are only two pieces of official literature on A21/RTA. Published in October 1996, An 
Australian Army for the 21st Century12 reported outcomes of Army’s internal A21 study. This 
booklet presents A21’s Order of Battle and composition of the seven TFs, describing the 
Detect-Protect-Respond concept of dispersed operations against a low-level threat. The 
booklet highlights new equipment acquisitions to improve mobility including helicopters and 
light armoured vehicles, and emphasises high-technology surveillance and communications. 
 
In February 1997, the Government published Restructuring the Australian Army. This 
describes Army’s ‘serious deficiencies’, pitching RTA as Army’s response to ‘better meet 
Government’s strategic posture’.13 RTA’s stated aim is to improve Army’s ‘capability, 
effectiveness and readiness’ through consolidating units, eliminating hollowness and 
redistributing equipment and personnel, with a prominent Reserve role. The book assigns 
notional operational areas in Northern Australia for four TFs, the remainder supporting 
offshore and other contingencies.14 The need for future additional capital equipment 
investment is identified: though the book signals this will be informed by trials. 
 
Given the scale of A21/RTA’s proposals, the absence of further official literature seems 
remarkable. The outcomes of the trials were not officially published: the A21/RTA structures 
were not implemented. What happened? The above survey suggests two discrete time 
windows for investigation – the internal A21 study during 1995-1996; and the RTA trials 
                                                 
9 Ian McLachlan, Ministerial Statement: Defence Policy, Restructuring the Australian Army, (Canberra, ACT, 
Australia: Parliament 38 of the Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives Hansard, 15 Oct 1996). 
10 Department of Defence, Restructuring the Australian Army: A Force Structure for the Army of the Future, 
(Canberra, ACT, Australia: Commonwealth of Australia, DPUBS: 24432/96, DPVC, Feb 1997), p. 54. 
11 Department of Defence, Restructuring the Australian Army, p. 96; in a December 1996 speech to the Royal 
United Services Institute, Defence Minister Ian McLachlan mentioned ‘dismantling the corps and divisional 
structures’ as a critical aspect of the Army restructuring plan. Ian McLachlan, ‘Australia’s Post-Cold War 
Defence Planning’, The RUSI Journal, 142(1): 9-13, Feb 1997, p. 11. 
12 Australian Army, An Australian Army for the 21st Century, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Commonwealth of 
Australia, Oct 1996), 24 pp. 
13 Department of Defence, Restructuring the Australian Army, p. iv. 
14 Department of Defence, Restructuring the Australian Army, p. 68. 
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during 1997-1998. Methods for filling these literature gaps are explored in Part 5. However, 
for the sub-thesis to examine A21/RTA as a change management case study, it requires a 
sound theoretical framework: Part 2 builds this. 
 
Part 2: Organisational Theory 
 
This Part reviews organisational theory to identify a theoretical framework for evaluating 
A21/RTA as a change management case study. Considered here are organisational structure, 
culture, change management, change leadership and the provider capture concept. One of this 
sub-thesis’ unique contributions to the literature is application of generic civilian 
organisational theory to a major military force structure reform. 
 
Structure 
Organisational structures are broadly classified as ‘mechanistic’ and ‘organic’. Mechanistic 
organisations are typically hierarchical, characterised by high specialisation, rigid 
departmentalisation, clear chain of command, narrow spans of control, centralisation and high 
formalisation.15 Mechanistic structures emerged during the industrial revolution, and were 
designed for ease of administration and economies of scale.16 Conversely, the more recent, 
organic structures are characterised by cross-functional teams, free flows of information, 
wide spans of control and decentralisation.17 Through reduced management layers, most 
literature assumes flatter organic structures are theoretically more manoeuvrable;18 though 
Child posits an alternative theoretical view that a range of structures can be agile, contingent 
on other conditions.19 Stace and Dunphy present one of the few empirical comparative 
studies, concluding that ‘prudent mechanistic’ organisations can be highly successful.20 Part 
3 applies these structural concepts to Army, classifying Army’s divisional structure as 
mechanistic and A21’s TF structure as organic. 
                                                 
15 Stephen Robbins, Bruce Millett, Ron Cacioppe and Terry Waters-Marsh, Organisational Behaviour: Leading 
and Managing in Australia and New Zealand, 3rd Edition, (Frenchs Forest, NSW, Australia: Pearson Education, 
2001), p. 605-606. 
16 Peter Block, Stewardship: Choosing Service Over Self-Interest, (San Francisco, CA, USA: Berrett-Koehler 
Publishers, 1996), p. 101. 
17 Robbins et al., Organisational Behaviour, p. 605. 
18 E.g. John P. Kotter, Leading Change, (Boston, Massachusetts, USA: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 
p. 169. 
19 J. Child, ‘Organizational structure, environment and performance: the role of strategic choice’, Sociology, 
6(1): 1-22, 1972. 
20 Doug Stace and Dexter Dunphy, Beyond the Boundaries: Leading and Re-creating the Successful Enterprise, 
2nd Edition, (Roseville, NSW, Australia: McGraw-Hill, 2001), p. 99. 
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These structural types become significant when the motivations for movement from a 
mechanistic to an organic structure are analysed. A21/RTA’s wider context was the parallel 
corporate restructuring occurring across Australian business during the 1990s. Faced with 
globalisation, increased competitiveness, technological penetration and economic recession, 
organisations downsized and implemented organic structures as a response to uncertainty.21 
Motivations for this included cost savings, achieving improved collaboration, faster decision-
making, increased flexibility, getting closer to clients, and empowering employees.22 Here it 
is asserted that A21’s organic structure reflected 1990s corporate leading practice, and was 
possibly influenced by this zeitgeist. This prompts an hypothesis: that military force 
structures may be motivated by similar theories of change, militarily-translated.23 Part 3 
considers this in a previous Army force restructure attempt; the sub-thesis will examine this 
hypothesis in detail for A21/RTA through analysing its drivers.  
 
Culture 
Organisational culture is defined as ‘a system of shared meaning held by members that 
distinguishes the organisation from other organisations’.24 Organisational culture has become 
increasingly studied because it influences organisational performance,25 and is a critical 
factor in change management (next section). This represents a considerable innovation on 
organisational theory’s early Classical school, which treated organisations and structures as 
rational. The later (and now dominant) Human Relations (HR) school moderates this with 
recognition of the human and political nature of organisations,26 to improve organisational 
theory’s explanatory power for real organisational dynamics. Fusing these perspectives 
suggests structure and culture are mutually supporting.27 Further, it may be hypothesised that 
where culture is not supportive, chances of successful structural change are reduced. The sub-
thesis will apply this hypothesis to A21/RTA, considering how culture impacted A21/RTA’s 
implementation, specifically as a source of resistance from Army’s senior leadership. 
 
                                                 
21 Robbins et al., Organisational Behaviour, p. 611. See also Bernard Burnes, Managing Change: A Strategic 
Approach to Organisational Dynamics, (Harlow, Essex, UK: Pearson Education, 2000), p.102. 
22 Robbins et al., Organisational Behaviour, p. 349, 595. 
23 Annex 2-A. 
24 Robbins et al., Organisational Behaviour, p. 555. 
25 T. Deal and A. Kennedy, ‘Culture: a new look through old lenses’, Journal of Applied Behavioural Science, 
19(4): 497-507, 1982. 
26 Burnes, Managing Change, p. 186. 
27 Y. Allaire and M.E. Firsirotu, ‘Theories of organizational culture’, Organization Studies, 5(3): 193-226, 1984. 
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The literature furnishes valuable interpretative tools for application to Army’s culture in Part 
3. Strong cultures are positively associated with ‘severe initiations’28, an organisation’s age 
and size.29 Larger organisations tend to have a dominant culture and several sub-cultures,30 
often based on specialisation. These subcultures can develop separate goals and interests,31 
which are then defended.32 In summary: understanding an organisation’s culture is essential 
to successful change management.33  
 
Change Management 
This Chapter seeks to identify an evaluation framework for A21/RTA as a change 
management case study. A priori, this has two components: firstly to identify elements 
associated with successful organisational change; and secondly to identify elements which 
impair this outcome. Empirical evidence is required of elements of success and impairment in 
practice. Critically analysing the change management literature identifies a surfeit of 
individual case studies of organisational success and failure, some being non-academic and 
marketed as organisational self-help manuals. Systematic assemblies of cross-sectional 
studies of numbers of organisational examples, to academically analyse change management 
commonalities, are less frequent. Reputable examples include Kanter et al.’s ‘Ten 
Commandments’34 and Kotter’s Eight-Stage Change Process.35 Robbins et al. present a 
succinct summary of seven elements of successful change management, incorporating 
common elements from most cross-sectional studies.36 With expansion from a range of 
sources, these are:  
 
1. Pressure for Change: the driver must be compelling. 
2. Clear, shared vision: the vision must be credible.37 
3. Actionable first steps:  
                                                 
28 Broadly, an ‘initiation’ in this context is the manner of selecting and inducting new individuals into an 
organisation. 
29 Robbins et al., Organisational Behaviour, p. 296, 580. 
30 G. Salaman, Work Organisations, (London, UK: Longman, 1979). 
31 Burnes, Managing Change, p. 51. 
32 A.M. Pettigrew, ‘Context and action in the transformation of the firm’, Journal of Management Sciences, 
24(6): 649-670, 1987, p. 659. 
33 R. Kaplan and D. Norton, ‘Putting the Balanced Scorecard to Work’, Harvard Business Review, Sep/Oct 
1993, p. 134-147. 
34 R.M. Kanter, B.A. Stein, T.D. Jick, The Challenge of Organizational Change, (New York, USA: Free Press, 
1992), p. 382-383.   
35 Kotter, Leading Change. 
36 after Robbins et al., Organisational Behaviour, p. 716. 
37 P. Dobson, ‘Changing Culture’, Employment Gazette, Dec 1988, p. 647-650. 
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• the importance of achieving early successes.38  
• ‘results, not plans, provide solutions’.39 
4. Enablers for change: time, skills, resources, training must be provided. 
5. Model the way:  
• internally: senior leadership must have buy-in.40 
• externally: political sponsorship must be secured.41 
6. Reinforce and solidify change: provide required supporting efforts. 
7. Evaluate and improve:  
• use appropriate metrics: evaluate them fairly and transparently.  
• change is also a process of learning.42 
 
These elements provide the framework for evaluating A21/RTA in this sub-thesis.  
 
Next is consideration of elements impairing change. The literature underscores the difficulty 
of major change for large organisations,43 with success rare.44 Common sources of 
organisational resistance to change include:45 
 
1. Threat to established resource allocations; 
                                                 
38 Kotter, Leading Change, p. 11. 
39 Kari Tuominen, Managing Change: Practical Strategies for Competitive Advantage, (Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 
USA: American Society for Quality (ASQ), 2000), p. xiv. 
40 Dobson, ‘Changing Culture’. 
41 Kanter et al., The Challenge of Organizational Change, p. 382-383.  
42 P. Dawson, Organizational Change: A Processual Approach, (London, UK: Paul Chapman Publishing, 
1994);  
C. Mabey and B. Mayon-White, Managing Change, 2nd Edition, (London, UK: The Open University/Paul 
Chapman Publishing, 1993); D.C. Wilson, A Strategy of Change, (London, UK: Routledge, 1992). 
43 ‘…change is a political-social process and not an analytical-rational one…changing organisations is a 
complex process fraught with more opportunities for failure than success’. Burnes, Managing Change, p. 300, 
505. 
44 D. Brindle, ‘Benefits payments in chaos: computer collapse wipes out records’, The Guardian, 10 Sep 1998; 
B. Burnes and B. Weekes, AMT: A Strategy for Success? (London, UK: NEDO, 1989); Bywater PLC,   
Executive Briefings: The Executive Role in Sponsoring Change – Making it Happen, (Reading, UK: Bywater 
PLC, 1997); T.G. Cummings and C.G. Worley, Organization Development and Change, 6th Edition, 
(Cincinnati, OH, USA: South-Western College Publishing, 1997); C. Howarth, ‘Report of the Joint Design of 
Technology, Organisation and People Growth Conference, Venice 12-14 Oct’, Information Services News and 
Abstracts, 95 Nov/Dec (London, UK: Work Research Unit, 1988); Kanter et al., The Challenge of 
Organizational Change; J.E. Kelly, ‘Economic and Structural analysis of Job Design’, in J.E. Kelly and C.W. 
Clegg (eds), Autonomy and Control at the Workplace, (London, UK: Croom Helm, 1982); J.E. Kelly, Scientific 
Management, Job Redesign and Work Performance, (London, UK: Academic Press, 1982); Kotter, Leading 
Change; Stace and Dunphy, Beyond the Boundaries;  F. Strickland, The Dynamics of Change: Insights into 
Organisational Transition from the Natural World, (London, UK: Routledge, 1998); Tuominen, Managing 
Change, p. xxv. 
45 Robbins et al., Organisational Behaviour, p. 707. 
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2. Threat to established power relationships;46 
3. Threat to expertise; 
4. Group inertia (group norms that apply peer pressure to achieve conformity); 
5. Structural inertia (all of an organisation’s built-in mechanisms to produce stability 
under BAU,47 e.g. structures and processes48); and 
6. Insufficient enablers (e.g. where structure is changed without commensurate 
technology). 
 
Analysing the above suggests that support for change at an individual/group level heavily 
depends on alignment with individual/group interests,49 and that successful change initiatives 
must anticipate and address these.50 Compared with the Classical school, the HR school 
emphasises form over the substance of change, underscoring process:51 i.e. how a change 
initiative is done. The literature notes a frequent, mistaken corporate focus on technical, not 
cultural, process aspects of change.52 Given the HR school’s dominance, the current literature 
places less emphasis on the change outcome: will the new structure work in practice? 
Critically analysing this literature suggests a more complete change management theory is 
needed: simply, the outcome of successful change management must be both technically 
feasible, and provide cultural adjustment opportunities. This theory will be applied to 
A21/RTA in the sub-thesis. 
 
Another HR school deficiency is its limited guidance for challenging change management 
scenarios where the change required/sought is manifestly not in members’, or the existing 
dominant cultures’, interests. A21/RTA’s magnitude clearly classifies it in the ‘challenging’ 
change category. The HR school recommends highlighting how the change will benefit 
                                                 
46 Burnes, Managing Change, p. 187. 
47 BAU = Business As Usual. 
48 Katzenbach and Smith describe transformational change as ‘intentionally derailing and finding replacements 
for…activities’. J.R. Katzenbach and D.K. Smith, The Wisdom of Teams, (Maidenhead, Berkshire, UK: 
McGraw-Hill, 1998), p. 197. 
49 L.J. Mullins, Management and Organisational Behaviour, 3rd Edition, (London, UK: Pitman, 1993). See also 
Peter J. Makin, Cary L. Cooper and Charles J. Cox, Organizations and the Psychological Contract: Managing 
People at Work, (Westport, Connecticut, USA: Quorum Books, 1996), p. 305. 
50 Dobson notes that cultural change may require workforce reorganisation so that employees and managers with 
the desired attributes occupy positions of influence. Dobson, ‘Changing Culture’. See also H. Schwartz and S. 
Davis, ‘Matching corporate culture and business strategy’, Organizational Dynamics, 10: 30-48, 1981. 
51 E.g. D.W. Waddell, A. Creed, T.G. Cummings and C.G. Worley, Organisational Change: Development and 
Transformation, 5th Edition, (South Melbourne, VIC, Australia: Cengage Learning Australia, 2014), p. 409-411. 
52 H. Kingsley, ‘A New Paradigm for CEOs’, HR Monthly, Jul 1999, p. 28-29. See also Kotter, Leading Change, 
p. 15. 
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members and their own interests:53 but this is unrealistic if those interests are unaligned. This 
dilemma is illustrated forte by the ‘psychological contract’,54 defined by Schein as an 
‘unwritten set of expectations operating at all times between every member of an organisation 
and the various managers and others in that organisation’.55 Arguably, Army’s unique culture 
gives rise to a particularly strong psychological contract between soldiers and the Service: in 
exchange for preparedness to risk one’s life in combat, the soldier expects Army to ‘look 
after them’ in various respects. This renders change acceptance difficult if members perceive 
Army acting against their interests. To resolve this deficiency in guidance, change leadership 
literature is examined next. 
 
Change Leadership 
Aristotle’s Art of Rhetoric56 offers leaders a tool for challenging change scenarios. Aristotle 
posited three techniques for effective thought leadership: logos (an appeal to logic and 
rational evidence); ethos (an appeal to authority and expertise); and pathos (an appeal to 
emotions). Incorporating a deduction from the previous section, the balance of effective 
techniques is likely to depend on the target organisation’s culture; e.g. a rational/mechanistic 
culture may be more receptive to a logic-based case for change. These insights provide the 
sub-thesis’ framework for interpreting Army and Government’s response to A21/RTA. 
 
Magnitude is an important dimension of challenging change scenarios. The literature grades 
magnitude from incremental to transformational,57 the latter ‘involving reframing of 
assumptions about the organisation and the world in which it operates’.58 Incremental change 
is interpreted as best-serving status quo interests;59 transformational change is more 
challenging, but necessary for some organisations.60 The sub-thesis will demonstrate that 
A21/RTA was a transformational change attempt. 
 
                                                 
53 Richard Cooke, ‘Deflating resistance to change: or a quick guide to understanding resistance and moving 
forwards’, Human Resource Management International Digest, 17(3): 3-4, 2009. 
54 E.H. Schein, Organizational Psychology, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA: Prentice-Hall, 1980).  
55 Makin et al., Organizations and the Psychological Contract, p. 4. 
56 George Kennedy, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse / Aristotle, 2nd Edition, (New York, USA: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
57 Dexter Dunphy and Doug Stace, Under New Management: Australian Organizations in Transition, 
(Roseville, NSW, Australia: McGraw-Hill, 1991), p. 67. 
58 Robbins et al., Organisational Behaviour, p. 700. 
59 Block, Stewardship, p. 45. 
60 Kanter et al., The Challenge of Organizational Change. See also Stace and Dunphy, Beyond the Boundaries, 
p. 187. 
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A powerful insight on leading challenging, transformational change is offered by Dunphy and 
Stace.61 They introduce a second dimension for leadership style, grading from highly 
consultative to directive/coercive. Contingent on the urgency and magnitude of change, they 
conclude that directive/coercive leadership may be required when ‘major organisational 
restructuring is needed and may run counter to…entrenched interests…there may be few 
rewards to offer for change’.62 Transformational leadership, designed to inspire re-alignment 
of members’ interests with the leader’s vision,63 can transcend the transactional approach of 
incentivising change. Dunphy and Stace note that truly transformational leaders are rare,64 
and Block65 and Bondy66 moderate the importance of the leader in transforming 
organisations. Nonetheless, Stace and Dunphy highlight that effective change leaders operate 
by a theory of change.67 Explicit or implicit, this theory guides their actions and results in 
consistency: a form of Aristotelian logos that may hold stakeholder appeal. The sub-thesis 
uses these constructs to evaluate A21/RTA.  
 
Assembling this literature thus presents a paradox: while the need to address culture in major 
organisational change is emphasised, in reality, there may be limited scope to win cultural 
support when key stakeholder vested interests cannot be accommodated. Here, 
directive/coercive change leadership may be appropriate to drive change. This summary 
provides the theoretical framework for the sub-thesis’ analysis of Army’s leadership during 
A21/RTA, especially the senior leadership team. 
 
Provider Capture 
The previous sections considered change management as a process of influencing internal 
stakeholders (i.e. organisational member/followers). Part 4 demonstrates a feature of 
A21/RTA was the criticality of external stakeholders (e.g. Government as principal policy-
maker). Hence the sub-thesis considers Army’s relationship with Government during this 
period. To frame this, the final key concept of organisational theory reviewed here is the 
                                                 
61 Dunphy and Stace, Under New Management. 
62 Dunphy and Stace, Under New Management, p. 81, 89. 
63 J.M. Burns, Leadership, (New York, USA: Harper and Row, 1978). 
64 Dunphy and Stace, Under New Management, p. 172, 174. 
65 Block, Stewardship, p. 15. 
66 H. Bondy, ‘Personality Type and Military Culture in the Anglo-West’, Australian Defence Force Journal, 
169: 4-14, 2005. 
67 Stace and Dunphy, Beyond the Boundaries, p. 125. 
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principal/agent problem of ‘Provider Capture’. The principal/agent problem68 defines a 
principal, who commissions specialist work, and an agent, an expert who performs the work. 
The principal lacks both expertise to judge the agent’s work, and the ability to closely 
supervise. Due to superior expertise (‘information asymmetry’), the agent can exploit the 
principal, through overcharging, and may lack incentive to be efficient. The principal/agent 
problem is especially salient where few agents are qualified to perform a task.  
 
The modern manifestation of the principal/agent problem is public agency provider 
capture.69 Nobel prize-winning economist George Stigler identified capture as a problem70 
whereby an agent (e.g. government department/regulator) becomes captured by (its own or 
other stakeholders’) interests, and strays from serving the needs of the principal 
(government).71 For example, Army (as an agent) has a vested self-interest in promoting 
combat capability whether Government wants this or not. When Army provides advice, 
Government may be sceptical: is Army serving its self-interest (more combat capability) or 
the nation’s? This is the provider capture dilemma; and prima facie, the Army/Government 
relationship seems a good candidate. Government, being inexpert in warfighting, may have 
difficulty judging the efficacy of service received from Army (the exclusive contractor for 
ground-based combat), especially in peacetime. A forte ‘test case’ for provider capture is to 
examine Army’s response when its interests diverge from those of Government: e.g. in 
constrained strategic and resourcing circumstances. These are reviewed in Part 4.  
 
Analysing the provider capture literature shows this problem in the banking,72 education73 
and medical74 sectors. This sub-thesis innovatively proposes provider capture as the 
                                                 
68 Michael C. Jensen, and William H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4): 305-360, Oct 1976; Sanford J. Grossman and 
Oliver D. Hart, ‘An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem, Econometrica, 51(1): 7-46, Jan 1983. 
69 L. Angus, ‘The Sociology of School Effectiveness: Review Essay’, British Journal of Sociology of Education, 
14(3): 333-345, 1993. 
70 G.J. Stigler, ‘The theory of economic regulation’, Bell Journal of Economic Management Science, 2: 3-21, 
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Limit It, (New York, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
73 R.J.S. MacPherson, ‘Challenging “provider capture” with radical changes to educational administration in 
New Zealand’, in Y. Martin and R.J.S. MacPherson (eds), Restructuring administration policy in public 
 22 
interpretative framework for Army’s relationship with Government during the A21/RTA 
period. Provider capture may help interpret the principal/agent relationship in two respects, 
potentially amplified by culture. First, it explains why an agent/(organisation) may resist 
change initiated by its principal: a negative change response. Second, the provider capture 
literature advocates external accountability as a preventative measure.75 This sub-thesis will 
consider the Defence contestability environment during A21/RTA as external accountability 
Army sought to satisfy: a positive change response. 
 
Collectively, this review of organisational theory has identified a theoretical framework for 
evaluating A21/RTA. Having reviewed structure and culture components in theory in this 
Part, Part 3 reviews these in practice for the Australian Army. 
 
Part 3: Army Culture and Force Structure 
 
Army Culture 
Analysis of Army culture literature indicates no single, universally recognised description. 
Descriptions range from strategic level76 attempts to describe a uniquely Australian ‘Way of 
War’, to the ‘I’m an Australian Soldier’ initiative listing nine attributes, the first underscoring 
professional mastery: ‘every soldier an expert in close combat’.77 Literature on Army culture 
published during A21/RTA is sparse. Wolfe foresaw in 1996 that A21 required major Army 
cultural change.78  Phelps defined six Army culture attributes: 79 
 
1. Combat Masculine Warrior 
2. Subordination to the Civil Authority 
                                                                                                                                                        
schooling: Canadian and international perspectives, (Calgary, Canada: Detselig, 1993). See also J. Codd, 
‘Teachers as ‘managed professionals’ in the global education industry: the New Zealand experience’, 
Educational Review, 57(2): 193-206, 2005. 
74 G. Bevan, ‘Impact of devolution of health care in the UK: provider challenge in England and provider capture 
in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland?’, Journal of Health Services Research and Policy, 15(2): 67-68, Apr 
2010. 
75 M. Thrupp, ‘Exploring the Politics of Blame: School inspection and its contestation in New Zealand and 
England’, Comparative Education, 34(2): 197, 1998. See also Carpenter and Moss, Preventing Regulatory 
Capture. 
76 Department of Defence, The Australian Approach to Warfare, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2002). 
77 D. Ashley, ‘Army’s Spirit’, Australian Army Journal, X(3): 203-210, 2013, p. 210. 
78 K. Wolfe, ‘Army 21 - A New Culture for the Australian Army’, Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, XXII(5/6): 8-
10, May/Jun 1996. 
79 M.L. Phelps, ‘The Australian Army's Culture: From Institutional Warrior to Pragmatic Professional’, 
Australian Defence Force Journal, 123: 37-46, Mar/Apr 1997. 
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3. Vocational Institution 
4. Expeditionary Force 
5. Mateship 
6. Individual Competency and Initiative 
 
He further argued that Army was in 1997 transitioning from a ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ 
cultural paradigm, anticipating an A21-triggered shift from an Expeditionary to a Sovereignty 
Defence culture. More recently, Winter viewed traditionalism as the pre-eminent Army 
cultural attribute. He saw traditionalism as a response to uncertainty, and an impediment to 
transformational change; yet conducive to adaptation as incremental change.80 Winter judged 
Army’s traditionalism as a useful guard against ‘ill-conceived radical change’.81 Evans 
emphasised the cultural dominance of Army’s expeditionary outlook, grounded in Army’s 
history and doctrine.82 Hughes listed four cultural attributes,83 including insularity and anti-
intellectualism – the latter stressing a preference for simple, direct, strong logic, but without 
deep thought.84 Hughes casts these as adaptive and necessary to Army’s unique combat role. 
 
This survey’s common elements are an emphasis on individual professional mastery, 
conservatism and an expeditionary outlook. Evaluating Army’s culture using Part 2’s 
organisational theory suggests that Army’s size, age and severe initiation (e.g. recruit course) 
would generate a strong culture with both dominant and sub-cultures representing different 
interest groups within Army. Collectively, a strong culture represents a formidable obstacle 
for change management, and this sub-thesis will consider cultural resistance to A21/RTA. 
 
Force Structure 
This section contextualises A21/RTA within the succession of force structuring principles the 
Australian Army used from World War Two (WWII). Considered as risk management, force 
structuring principles include mobilisation planning, threat-based, and the portfolio 
approach.85 The Australian Army’s structure was dominated by these principles in succession 
                                                 
80 S. Winter, ‘‘Fixed, Determined, Inviolable’: Military Organisational Culture and Adaptation’, Australian 
Army Journal, VI(3): 53-68, 2009. 
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84 R. Hughes, ‘On the Culture of the Australian Army’, Australian Army Journal, X(3): 226-243, 2013. 
85 Stephan Frühling, ‘Defence Planning as Risk Management’, Chapter 2 in S. Frühling, Defence Planning and 
Uncertainty, (Routledge, 2014), p. 18-43 and Stephan Frühling, ‘Enduring Tensions in Defence Planning’, 
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after WWII. Inherited from WWII’s mass mobilisation,86 the post-Vietnam Australian Army 
had a divisional structure87 based on the mobilisation planning principle. A division is 
hierarchical, comprising a headquarters and several brigades with nested battalions (units): a 
mechanistic structure in organisational theory terms. Specialisation is represented by a 
shadow structure of separate corps (e.g. armoured corps). Designed to be fully-manned 
through mobilisation in war, as peacetime resourcing constraints tightened from the mid-70s 
Army responded by retaining the basic divisional architecture, but allowed units to ‘hollow 
out’ with unfilled positions.88 An alternative downscaling response is to consolidate the 
number of units; however Army’s informal reasoning was to retain a ‘Core Force’,89 as a 
mobilisation base. Connery documents the enshrining of the divisional structure in Army 
doctrine90 and the growing disconnect between Army’s divisional structure and the Defence-
of-Australia strategic guidance91 (see Part 4).  
 
There was one major force structural experiment in the Australian Army between WWII and 
A21/RTA: the 1960s pentropic division. An example of threat-based force structuring, the 
pentropic experiment is a valuable case study, reviewed here to identify possible parallels 
with A21/RTA. The pentropic concept aimed to improve dispersal (hence survivability) of 
troops against a specific threat: the Cold War nuclear battlefield. The proposed pentropic 
division comprised five battlegroups, with pentropic battalions and supporting arms. Each 
pentropic battalion comprised five infantry companies: a significantly larger span-of-
command relative to the traditional divisional structure. Other drivers for this reform 
included: firstly, improved efficiency (reducing administrative layers and improved ratios of 
combat to support personnel); secondly, greater tactical agility through shortened command 
chains; thirdly, improved interoperability with the US (which had earlier adopted a 
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‘pentomic’ model in response to the nuclear threat); and finally to attract modernisation 
funding for Army.92  
 
Yet by 1964, the pentropic experiment had been abandoned, for several reasons. First, the 
span-of-command proved unwieldy in practice,93 especially given the era’s technology did 
not match the structure’s communication requirements (insufficient enablers). Pentropic’s 
widely dispersed operations were environmentally unsuitable for manoeuvre in close and 
jungle country, where the Australian Army was operating.94 The pentropic structure 
selectively increased mobility but invested lightly in armour (contrary to the pentomic 
model);95 combined with limited artillery range,96 this increased force vulnerability. Finally, 
Blaxland documents cultural resistance from the Service.97 From an organisational theory 
perspective, the pentropic experiment was motivated by the postulated benefits of an organic 
structure as a ‘theory of change’ against a specific threat; i.e. a flatter, more dispersed, 
responsive and efficient organisation. A 2000 parliamentary inquiry noted the institutional, 
operational (technical feasibility) and cultural reasons for pentropic’s limited success, but 
concluded inadequate resourcing (enablers) was the primary reason.98 These findings provide 
valuable insights for this sub-thesis’ analysis of A21/RTA: did similar circumstances apply? 
 
The reasons for the US abandonment of its pentomic experiment are also relevant for 
A21/RTA. Blaxland proposes three reasons.99 First, the pentomic model itself was 
incomplete: the capabilities achieved in practice could not meet theoretical ideals (technical 
feasibility). Second, pentomic’s threat-based force structuring principle was overly restrictive 
–optimised for ‘the war’ (i.e. nuclear) rather than ‘a war’- and hence failed the critical 
flexibility test. Finally, the pentomic structure’s envisaged battlefield role became 
disconnected from evolving national strategic policies. Subsequently, Vietnam demonstrated 
these required sub-nuclear threshold military response options for which pentomic was less 
suited. 
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In high strategic uncertainty a ‘balanced force’ response hedges risk, an example of the 
portfolio force structuring principle.100 A balanced force avoids overspecialisation (associated 
with mechanistic, divisional structures) and also corresponds to an organic structure, 
stressing flat, agile, multi-role compositions. This force structuring principle has gained 
prominence in Army’s latest restructure initiative, PLAN BEERSHEBA.101 Therefore, both 
threat-based and portfolio force structuring principles have been associated with organic 
structures, suggesting a design tension between specialisation and agility, within resourcing 
and technological constraints. Between pentropic and BEERSHEBA there was A21/RTA, 
prompting a sub-thesis question: how did A21/RTA address this design tension? Part 4 shows 
how strategic and resourcing guidance led to A21/RTA’s commencement with a threat-based 
force structuring principle. 
 
Part 4: Strategic and Resourcing Guidance influencing A21/RTA 
 
Force structuring occurs in the context of politics and strategic guidance.102 The 1994-2000 
A21/RTA period straddles a generational political transition, and concomitant shifts in 
strategic guidance. Following thirteen years of Labor Government, John Howard’s Coalition, 
elected in March 1996, governed for over eleven years. Here, the major features of strategic 
and resourcing guidance that influenced A21/RTA over this transition are outlined. 
 
A21/RTA occurred at the zenith, and then eclipse, of ‘Defence-of-Australia’ (DoA) as the 
nation’s strategic doctrine. For most of Australia’s history, military strategy has been 
characterised by Forward Defence;103 all of Army’s major campaigns have been fought 
overseas, shaping its expeditionary culture.104 However, Australia’s withdrawal from 
Vietnam ushered in the DoA military strategy which dominated until 1999’s East Timor 
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deployment, and the emergence of a modern maritime strategy.105 Literature reviews of DoA 
are voluminous:106 this work’s purpose is not to critique DoA’s efficacy, but rather to place 
A21/RTA within context.  
 
DoA evolved in the post-Vietnam environment of profound war weariness,107 and the US 
Guam Doctrine, triggering Australia’s movement towards a more self-reliant defence 
policy.108 Politicians sought a strategic narrative which reflected Government’s desire to 
avoid expeditionary entanglements and reap the so-called peace dividend. By 1976, a basic 
bipartisan DoA strategic narrative had formed, based on continental defence, an expandable 
‘Core Force’ and a focus on ‘credible low-level contingencies in Australia’s North’.109 
 
However, 1976’s pre-declaratory era (1976-1986) Defence White Paper (DWP) did not 
successfully translate DoA strategic guidance into force structure outcomes. Connery 
documents this period’s strategic guidance as ambiguous and unendorsed.110 Titheridge notes 
‘a lack of coordination and a degree of randomness in the overall process’111 of developing 
force structures, and Coghlan describes that after DWP76, ‘civilian and military planners 
could not reach agreement on an overall set of force structure priorities’.112 As a result, Army 
retained its divisional force structure (despite successive budget cuts which progressively 
hollowed out the force),113 and barely adjusted its operating concepts, doctrine or disposition 
to the DoA strategic guidance. The Departmental force structure stalemate triggered 
Ministerial intervention: Kim Beazley engaged Paul Dibb to ‘forge a consensus’.114 Dibb’s 
terms-of-reference were ‘to undertake a review of the content, priorities and rationale of 
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43, Apr 2001; Evans, Forward from the Past. 
107 Blaxland, The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard, p. 4-5. 
108 Stephan Frühling, ‘Australian Defence Policy and the Concept of Self-Reliance’, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, 68(5): 531-547, 2014. See also Paul Dibb, ‘The Self-Reliant Defence of Australia: The 
history of an idea’, in Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher (eds), History as Policy: Framing the debate on the 
future of Australia’s defence policy, (Australian National University (ANU) E-Press, 2007), p. 11-26. 
109 Frühling, ‘Australian Strategic Guidance Since the Second World War’, p. 31-32. 
110 Connery, Which Division?, p. 9. 
111 A.W. Titheridge, ‘The Force Structure Process’, Australian Defence Force Journal, 82: 22-29, 1990, p. 27. 
112 David Coghlan, ‘Australian Defence Policy in the Post-Cold War World’, Australian Army Journal, 2002: 
93-110, 2002, p. 95. 
113 Palazzo, The Australian Army, p. 364. 
114 Coghlan, ‘Australian Defence Policy’, p. 95. 
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defence forward planning in…light of…strategic and financial planning guidance endorsed 
by…Government’.115 
 
Later labelled as a geographic determinist,116 Dibb used a threat-based force structuring 
principle. Assessing the then relatively benign regional strategic environment, Dibb reasoned 
that a military strategy constrained to continental defence was most appropriate. In a pivotal 
leap of logic, Dibb further coined the notion of the Sea-Air gap, positing that provided naval 
and air assets could interdict hostile forces there, Army’s role could be reduced to handling 
remnants reaching northern Australia.117  
 
Critically analysing the Dibb Review identifies two major outcomes relevant to A21/RTA: 
firstly, a relegation of Army to ‘low-level contingencies’ on Australian territory; and 
secondly a well-justified strategic argument for the other two services to dominate capability 
development budgets.118 Published the following year, DWP87,119 the first declaratory white 
paper, explicitly cemented DoA120 as the principal force structure determinant; though did 
not direct an Army force restructure. 
 
Nonetheless, Dibb’s prescription of DoA threatened Army’s interests (combat capability); 
organisational theory suggests resistance could be expected. An expeditionary culture 
fundamentally clashes with confinement to continental Australia.121 However a survey of 
articles published up to 1999 in the Australian Defence Force Journal (ADFJ) reveals very 
little discussion from Army on strategy.122 DWP87 attracted two articles in the ADFJ,123 one 
critical of low-level contingencies and dubious of its budget-saving motivations.124  
                                                 
115 Paul Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities: Report to the Minister for Defence, (Canberra, ACT, 
Australia: Australian Government Publishing Service, R85/1177 Cat. No. 8604776, 1986), p. xv. 
116 Dupont, ‘Transformation or stagnation?’. 
117 Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, p. 2, 5. 
118 Grey, The Australian Army, p. 253. See also International Defense Review, ‘Australia Battles to Keep Pace’, 
IHS Global, 01 Jan 1997, p. 1. 
119 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Commonwealth of Australia, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, R86/951 Cat. No. 8623599, 1987), 113 pp. 
120 Peter Jennings, ‘The Politics of Defence White Papers’, Security Challenges, 9(2): 1-14, 2013. 
121 Phelps, ‘The Australian Army’s Culture’, p. 41-42. 
122 A 1983 article by Major C.R. Prickett criticised continental defence, advocated expeditionary forward 
defence, and called for an increased focus on a balanced force rather than a balanced budget. (C.R. Prickett, 
‘Australian Defence and Force Structure’, Australian Defence Force Journal, 39: 48-50, 1983). At the tactical 
level, Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) A.J. Molan expressed concern for Army’s skills, training and 
resources if reduced to guarding naval and air bases (A.J. Molan, ‘Prospect for Infantry’, Australian Defence 
Force Journal, 63: 19-33, 1987); and Major W.A. Jucha highlighted the disconnect between the ostensive low-
level threat and the lack of training emphasis on that threat.  (W.A. Jucha, ‘Preparing to Defeat the Low-Level 
Threat’, Australian Defence Force Journal, 60: 50-53, 1986). 
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Coinciding with the DoA era, the Australian Army Journal was discontinued in 1976 (re-
launching in 1999), removing one potential Army mouthpiece to engage in the strategic 
debate and represent its interests. While journal activity is not an accurate indication of 
Army’s senior leadership views or influence, Connery notes that Army’s leadership in the 
1970s appeared unable to influence the strategic debate.125 A recent study of Army leadership 
during Dibb’s Review found that while Army justified preservation of its basic structure and 
capabilities under Dibb’s ‘escalated low-level conflict’,126 Army’s leadership was ultimately 
unsuccessful in retaining a prominent role for Army within the nation’s military strategy in 
the Dibb Review and subsequent DWP87.127 
 
To this strategic guidance was added strong financial guidance. The Wrigley Review 
(1990)128 commenced outsourcing many non-combat functions and a broader Commercial 
Support Program.129 In 1991 Government commissioned a Force Structure Review (FSR91), 
which recommended a fifteen percent decrease130 in full-time Army personnel from over 
30,000 in 1992 to 25,810 over eight years,131 with a nine percent budget decrease.132 FSR91 
barely addresses military strategy, reinforcing DoA and low-level contingencies.133 Army’s 
response focused on resource constraints and downsizing, and did not propose a major force 
restructure, retaining the divisional structure:134 an incremental change management 
approach. The 1994 DWP was tabled during recovery from economic recession.135 In 
                                                                                                                                                        
123 D.G. Schott, ‘Australian Defence Policy 1976-1987’, Australian Defence Force Journal, 67: 12-18, 1987. 
124 R. Crawshaw, ‘Low-Level Conflict’, Australian Defence Force Journal, 69: 6-9, 1988, p. 9. 
125 Connery, Which Division?, p. 32. 
126 Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, p. 53. 
127 David Connery, ‘The strategic leader: orders only get you so far’, Chapter 2 in D.K. Connery (ed), The 
Battles Before: Case Studies of Australian Army Leadership 1972-2010, (Sydney, NSW, Australia: Big Sky, 
2016). 
128 A.K. Wrigley, The Defence Force and the Community: A partnership in Australia's Defence, (Report 
Commissioned by the Minister for Defence, 1990). See also A.K. Wrigley, ‘The Defence Force and the 
Community’, Australian Defence Force Journal, 84: 10-18, 1990. 
129 Mark Thomson, The Cost of Defence 2014–15: Defence Industry, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2014, 
p. 144. 
130 Australian Army, Army into the 21st Century, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Commonwealth of Australia, 
1992), p. 21. 
131 FSR91 also announced the Ready Reserve (RRes) scheme, a higher-readiness form of service over the 
General Reserve (GRes). In decreasing order of readiness, there were thus three forms of service: Australian 
Regular Army (ARA) (i.e. full-time); RRes and GRes (part-time). In practice, introduction of the RRes scheme 
involved the conversion of two battalions in the 6th Brigade to RRes battalions. This reduced the Australian 
Army’s ARA battalions from six to four. Brigadier (retd) Tim McKenna, correspondence 20 Jun 2016.  
132 Australian Army, Army into the 21st Century, p. 26. 
133 Department of Defence, Force Structure Review, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Commonwealth of Australia, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, DPUBS 35/91, 1991), 48 pp. 
134 Australian Army, Army into the 21st Century, p. 17. 
135 David Gruen, The Australian Economy in the 1990s, Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, Oct 2000, 6 pp. 
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addition to reiterating DoA as the principal force structure determinant, it announced yet 
another force review,136 which became A21.  
 
This section documents a trajectory of increasingly constrained and prescriptive strategic 
guidance, and tightened resourcing, directed towards Army, culminating in A21. In March 
1996, the Coalition won Government, and in 1997 released new strategic guidance, 
Australia’s Strategy Policy,137 described by commentators as signalling the end of the DoA 
era through more active foreign and defence policies and a maritime strategy.138 However, 
the Coalition also announced the Defence Efficiency Review139 with an undeclared $1 billion 
savings objective.140 Therefore: A21/RTA occurred concurrently with the largest Defence 
cost-saving initiative yet. 
  
Few academic works critiqued A21/RTA at the time. O’Connor took issue with: DoA’s 
strategic premise; force-structuring against a single, low-level contingency; RTA’s dispersed 
operational concept, framed as breaching a Principle of War;141 and Army’s budget 
constraints. In 1998, Evans added reduced interoperability with allies to these criticisms.142 
Shine highlighted the Coalition Government’s new strategic guidance, suggesting RTA’s 
narrow DoA focus sowed ‘seeds of future crisis’.143 In September 1999 the Army deployed to 
East Timor, using the original divisional/brigade structure. Following A21/RTA, Army had 
                                                 
136 ‘A review of the land force, to be completed by late 1995, will establish what further adjustment to its 
structure is necessary. This review will address a range of issues including the number and readiness of infantry 
units, the benefits of additional ground reconnaissance units, the balance between Regular and Reserve elements 
of the force and the resource implications of any options for further change’. Department of Defence, Defending 
Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Commonwealth of Australia, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, DPUBS 12065/94 1994), para 5.50, p. 49. 
137 Department of Defence, Australia’s Strategic Policy 1997, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1997), 66 pp. 
138 Frühling, ‘Australian Strategic Guidance Since the Second World War’, p. 38. 
139 McLachlan, Restructuring the Australian Army; Malcolm McIntosh, Andrew Michelmore, Richard Brabin-
Smith, John Stone, Ian Burgess and Robert Walls, Future Directions for the Management of Australia’s 
Defence: Report of the Defence Efficiency Review, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Commonwealth of Australia, 
Department of Defence, 1997), 58 pp. 
140 The official DER announcement did not specify a savings objective; however the Defence Reform Program 
(DRP) arising from the DER targeted $1 billion in savings. See also Thomson, The Cost of Defence, p. 145. 
141 Michael O’Connor, ‘The Emperor’s New Clothes: Restructuring the Australian Army’, Defender, XIV(3): 
24-27, 1997. 
142 Michael Evans, ‘The Role of the Australian Army in a Maritime Concept of Strategy’, Journal of the Royal 
United Services Institute of Australia, 19: 67-72, 1998. 
143 C.J. Shine, ‘Restructuring the Australian Army: The Seeds of Future Crisis?’, Australian Defence Force 
Journal, 131: 5-18, 1998. See also Hugh White, ‘The Strategic Review: What’s New?’, Journal of the Royal 
United Services Institute of Australia, 19: 55-66, 1998. 
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structurally returned to status quo ante. Subsequently, various general historical literature 
briefly outline A21/RTA retrospectively,144 though without detailed analysis. 
 
This Literature Review hints at, but does not confirm, A21/RTA’s fate. It circumstantially 
suggests strategic guidance shifts, resourcing constraints and cultural resistance as 
contributors to A21/RTA’s abandonment. The sub-thesis requires more context on these 
themes to describe and evaluate A21/RTA. This suggests appropriate methodologies, which 
are addressed next. 
 
Part 5: Methodology 
 
Two key methods are proposed for the sub-thesis: expert elicitation through interview; and 
access to a range of primary sources including: 
 
• minutes from the Chief of the General Staff’s Advisory Committee,145 declassified 
where required for this work; 
• parliamentary hansard; 
• submissions and transcripts from the parliamentary inquiry ‘Suitability of the 
Australian Army for peacetime, peacekeeping and war’; 
• National Press Club addresses given by senior Army leadership; 
• previously unpublished internal reports (namely the A21 Study and RTA Trials Final 
Report); and 
• scientific reports published by the then Defence Science and Technology Organisation 
(DSTO). 
 
These methods are required due to the literature paucity; the nature of A21/RTA as an 
internal initiative; and the requirement for critical context, most likely to be elicited through 
conversation with senior Army and other leaders of this period. Annex 2-B lists the 
interviews conducted. 
 
                                                 
144 J.M. Malik, Australia’s Security in the 21st Century, (St Leonards, NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1999), p. 
58, 178-179; Palazzo, The Australian Army, p. 363-364; Grey, The Australian Army, p. 253; Blaxland, The 
Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard, p. 124-126. 
145 Renamed in early 1997 to Chief of Army Senior Advisory Group. 
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Research conducted by interview has several limitations.146 First is basic recollection – 
particularly after twenty years. Second, associated with elite interviews, is the problem of 
legacy defence – the contention that senior leaders defend their reputations,147 favourably 
casting their actions. The sub-thesis will counter these by interviewing a large number of 
people (30+), deliberately seeking diverse perspectives from Army, public service, academia 
and politics.  
 
Contribution and Relevance 
This sub-thesis’ contribution to the literature is timely in three respects. First, twenty years 
have elapsed since A21/RTA, enabling a comprehensive retrospective appraisal benefiting 
from hindsight and knowledge of subsequent events. Second, Defence’s 2015 First 
Principles Review recommended a new contestability approach,148  designed to overcome the 
problem of (real and perceived) provider capture, by ensuring alignment of strategy, force 
structure and resourcing.149 Contestability requires logos arguments, based on evidence, and 
is impartial to more subjective claims based on culture. This Chapter has identified the 
themes of strategy, resourcing and culture as central to A21/RTA. This new contestability 
model is currently in the design phase of implementation,150 underscoring the acute 
contemporary relevance of A21/RTA’s lessons as a large, radical and recent initiative, 
sharing similar themes. Finally, many senior leaders involved in A21/RTA are still living: a 
valuable opportunity to collect primary evidence as eyewitness accounts.  
 
Conclusion 
This Chapter considered the literature pertaining to A21/RTA, highlighting a significant gap 
in Australia’s military history. It aimed to inform the sub-thesis research by identifying: 
specific literature gaps which the sub-thesis aims to fill; the theoretical framework to evaluate 
                                                 
146 Charles L. Briggs, Learning How to Ask: A sociolinguistic appraisal of the role of the interview in social 
science research, (Cambridge University Press, 1986), 155 pp. See also K. Roulston, K. deMarrais and J.B. 
Lewis, ‘Learning to Interview in the Social Sciences’, Qualitative Inquiry, 9(4): 643-668, 2003. 
147 Hugh Heclo and Aaron Wildavsky, The Private Government of Public Money: Community and  
Policy inside British Politics, (London, UK: MacMillan Press, 1974), p. xxii, 14-17. 
148 Recommendation 1.10: ‘a strong and credible internal contestability function be built and led by the Deputy 
Secretary Policy and Intelligence with responsibility for strategic contestability, scope, technical and cost 
contestability’. D. Peever, R. Hill, P. Leahy, J. McDowell and L. Tanner, First Principles Review: Creating One 
Defence, (Report Commissioned by the Minister for Defence, 2015), p. 9.  
149 ‘Defence…requires a mechanism for providing internal contestability, at arm’s-length from owners and 
sponsors, up to the point of decision. This will ensure strategy, plans and resource allocations are tightly aligned 
and appropriately prioritised’. Peever et al., First Principles Review, p. 26. 
150 Marc Ablong, First Assistant Secretary, Defence White Paper, Department of Defence, pers comm, 21 Dec 
2015. 
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A21/RTA; specific themes the sub-thesis will consider; an appropriate methodology; and its 
unique literature contributions. 
 
Two specific literature gaps were identified: the internal A21 study (1995-96) and the RTA 
trials (1997-98). The Chapter then assembled a theoretical framework, including success 
criteria, for the sub-thesis to evaluate A21/RTA as a transformational change case study. Also 
reviewed were factors potentially impairing change initiatives, both internal and external. 
Critical analysis of literature deficiencies led to a new, outcome-focused change management 
theory: successful internal change must be both technically feasible, and provide cultural 
adjustment opportunities. Externally, provider capture is innovatively proposed to interpret 
Army/Government relations during A21/RTA. The themes of strategy, resourcing and culture 
were identified as central to A21/RTA.  
 
A gap-filling methodology involving expert elicitation through interview, and access to 
primary, unpublished sources was proposed. This methodology is appropriate, feasible, and 
able to address the sub-thesis’ questions. The sub-thesis’ unique contributions include the 
first detailed description and evaluation of A21/RTA as a change management case study; 
and application of civilian organisational theory to a military context. These contributions are 
relevant to contemporary Defence change initiatives, including the new contestability model. 
Chapter 3 begins applying the methodology, and considers A21/RTA’s drivers.
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Annex 2-A: Posited Benefits of Organic Structures - Mapping Civilian Concepts to 
Military Equivalents 
 
Serial Civilian organisational theory1 Military translation 
1. Reduced layers of management Increased span of command 
2. Improved collaboration Improved teamwork;
2  
improved combined arms/joint effects 
3. Faster decision-making Achieving decision superiority 
4. Getting closer to clients Improved combat effectiveness against an adversary; improved interoperability with allies 
5. Empowering employees Innovation: increased soldier initiative
3 and 
ingenuity 
6. Cost savings Economy of Effort (Principle of War) 
7. Flexibility Flexibility (Principle of War) 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 After Robbins et al., Organisational Behaviour, p. 349, 595. 
2 ‘Teamwork’ is one of four Army Values: Courage, Initiative, Respect, Teamwork. 
3 ‘Initiative’ is one of four Army Values: Courage, Initiative, Respect, Teamwork. 
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Annex 2-B: A21/RTA Interviews 
All interviews were conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Renée Kidson 
 
Serial: Date: Interviewee: Connection with A21/RTA: Place of Interview: 
1 3-Feb-15 Professor Michael Evans 
Former Senior Research Fellow, Land Warfare Studies Centre, during RTA 
Currently Professor and General Sir Francis Hassett Chair of Military Studies, Deakin 
University 
Mecca Bah restaurant, Canberra 
2 9-Mar-15 Professor Alan Dupont Professor of International Security, University of NSW 
Nonresident Fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy 
Café in Surrey Hills, Sydney 
3 9-Mar-15 Major General Andrew Bottrell CSC and Bar, DSM Former subunit commander, Logistics, during RTA 
Currently Commander, Joint Agency Task Force (JATF) OP SOVEREIGN BORDERS 
Headquarters, 17th Brigade, Randwick, Sydney 
4 22-Mar-15 Lieutenant General (retd) Peter Leahy AC 
Former Director, Army Research and Analysis (DARA) during A21 
Former Chief of Army (2002-2008) 
Currently Professor and Director, National Security Institute, University of Canberra 
General Leahy's private residence, Canberra 
5 13-Aug-15 Lieutenant General (retd) Francis ('Frank') Hickling AO CSC Former Chief of Army (24 Jun 1998 - 15 Jul 2000) General Hickling's private residence, Brisbane 
6 13-Aug-15 Colonel Iain Cruickshank 
Principal Staff Officer, Plans, Deployable Joint Forces Headquarters during RTA 
Currently Deputy Commander, 7th Brigade and Manager, Adaptive Warfare Branch, 
Headquarters 1st Division 
Headquarters, 1st Division, Enoggera Barracks, Brisbane 
7 16-Nov-15 Lieutenant Colonel Neil James 
Former Director, Land Warfare Studies Centre, during RTA 
Currently Executive Director of the Australia Defence Association, and Army Reserve 
Officer 
Royal Military College, Duntroon, Officer's Mess 
8 17-Nov-15 Admiral (retd) Chris Barrie AC 
Former Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) (04 Jul 1998-03 Jul 2002) 
Currently Adjunct Professor, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, Australian National 
University College of Asia and the Pacific 
Professor Barrie's office, Australian National University 
9 18-Nov-15 Major General (retd) Peter Dunn AO 
Former Director General, Force Development - Land, during A21 
Subsequently Joint Head of Secretariat, Defence Efficiency Review (DER) 
Currently Principal Consultant, Noetic Group 
Noetic Corporate Office, Deakin, Canberra 
10 18-Nov-15 Professor Hugh White AO 
Former Deputy Secretary, Strategy, Department of Defence (1995-2000)  
Contributing author to Defence White Paper 1994 
Later Founding Director, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) 
Currently Professor of Strategic Studies, School of International, Political and Strategic 
Studies, Australian National University College of Asia and the Pacific 
Professor White's office, Australian National University 
11 23-Nov-15 Lieutenant General (retd) John Sanderson AC 
Former Chief of the General Staff/Chief of Army (08 Jul 1995-23 Jun 1998) during 
A21/RTA 
Later 29th Governor of Western Australia (2000-2005) 
General Sanderson's private residence, Canberra 
12 25-Nov-15 Mark Thomson 
Former Analyst, Force Development and Analysis (FDA), Department of Defence, during 
A21 
Currently Senior Analyst, Defence Economics, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Barton, 
Canberra 
13 26-Nov-15 Brigadier (retd) James ('Jim' or 'JJ') Wallace AM Former Commander, 1st Brigade (1997-1998) during RTA trials 
Currently Deputy Chairman, Australian Christian Lobby 
Australian Christian Lobby Headquarters, Deakin, 
Canberra 
14 30-Nov-15 Brigadier (retd) David Welch 
Former Commanding Officer, 1st Combat Service Support Battalion (CSSB) during RTA 
trials 
Subsequently Director General, Land Close Combat Systems; Director General, Integrated 
Capability Development; and General Manager, Rapid Prototyping Development and 
Evaluation (RPDE) Program 
Currently General Manager (ACT), Communications, Design and Management (CDM) 
Royal Military College, Duntroon, Officer's Mess 
15 2-Dec-15 Major General (retd) Dave Chalmers AO CSC 
Former Project Officer, A21 Working Group 
Currently First Assistant Secretary, Client and Commemorations Division,  
Department of Veteran's Affairs 
Department of Veterans Affairs, Woden, Canberra 
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Serial: Date: Interviewee: Connection with A21/RTA: Place of Interview: 
16 2-Dec-15 Lieutenant Colonel Brice Pacey 
Former staff member, Directorate of Army Research and Analysis (DARA) during A21 
Currently serving Army Reserve officer (Strategy Stream, First Principles Review, 
Contestability Design, Department of Defence); and Principal of Lucidian Consulting 
Royal Military College, Duntroon, Officer's Mess 
17 3-Dec-15 Major General (retd) Peter Abigail AO 
Former Deputy Chief of Army (DCA) (Jul 1998-Jun 2000) 
Subsequently Land Commander Australia (2000-2002) 
Later Executive Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) (2005-2012) 
Royal Military College, Duntroon, Officer's Mess 
18 6-Dec-15 Major General (retd) Andrew ('Jim') Molan AO DSC Former Commander, 1st Brigade (1994-1996); and Commander, 1st Division  General Molan's private residence, regional NSW 
19 7-Dec-15 Ian McLachlan AO Former Minister for Defence (Mar 1996-Oct 1998) Mr McLachlan's Corporate Office, Adelaide 
20 17-Dec-15 Major General (retd) Mark Kelly AO DSC 
Former Commander, 3rd Brigade (2000-2002); Commander, 1st Division (2004-2005);  
Land Commander Australia (2005-2008); and Commander JTF633 (2009-2010) 
Currently Commissioner, Repatriation Commission, Department of Veterans Affairs 
Department of Veterans Affairs, Woden, Canberra 
21 17-Dec-15 David Goyne 
Former Army officer, rank of Major, during RTA 
Currently Deputy Director Strategic Analysis, Directorate of Military Strategy and Future 
Warfighting, Military Strategy Branch, Strategic Policy Division, Department of Defence  
Royal Military College, Duntroon, Officer's Mess 
22 18-Dec-15 Peter Jennings PSM Former Chief of Staff to Defence Minister Ian McLachlan 
Currently Executive Director, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Barton, 
Canberra 
23 19-Dec-15 Lieutenant Colonel Dean Bowley 
Former Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) Head of RTA Trials and 
RTA Lead Analyst (1996-1998) 
Currently Program Manager and Head of Office (South Australia), Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, and Army Reserve Officer 
Skype from Adelaide 
24 20-Dec-15 Brigadier (retd) Justin Kelly AM Former Director General, Future Land Warfare, Australian Defence Force Skype from regional Victoria 
25 21-Dec-15 Dr Michael Brennan Former Research Scientist, Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) Skype from regional NSW 
26 20-Jan-16 Associate Professor Stephan Frühling Currently Deputy Director of Military Studies Program, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, Australian National University College of Asia and the Pacific 
Professor Frühling's office, Australian National 
University 
27 4-Feb-16 Lieutenant General (retd) John Grey AC Former Chief of the General Staff (01 May 1992-07 Jul 1995) 
Recently Chancellor of James Cook University 
Telephone from Queensland 
28 18-Feb-16 Dr Richard Brabin-Smith AO 
Former Assistant Secretary, Department of Defence, during Defence White Paper 1994 
Later First Assistant Secretary, International Policy; First Assistant Secretary, Strategy Policy 
and Coordination; First Assistant Secretary, Force Development and Analysis (Department of 
Defence); Deputy Secretary, International Policy; and  
Chief Defence Scientist, Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO). 
Currently Visiting Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Coral Bell School of Asia 
Pacific Affairs, Australian National University College of Asia and the Pacific 
Dr Brabin-Smith's office, Australian National University 
29 19-Feb-16 Major General (retd) John Hartley AO Former Deputy Chief of Army (DCA) (Jul 1995-Jun 1998) 
Currently Chief Executive, Future Directions International 
Telephone from Perth 
30 1-Mar-16 Major General Fergus ('Gus') McLachlan AM Former sub-unit commander, 1st Armoured Regiment during RTA trials Currently Head, Modernisation and Strategic Planning-Army General McLachlan's Office, Russell, Canberra 
31 1-Apr-16 Richard ('Ric') Smith AO PSM 
Former Deputy Secretary Strategic Policy, Department of Defence, coordinating author of 
Defence White Paper 1994 
Later Australian Ambassador to China (1996-2000); Australian Ambassador to Indonesia 
(2001-2002); and Secretary of Defence (2002-2006). 
Cream Café, Canberra 
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Chapter 3: Drivers 
 
An Australian Army raised only for service in Australia would, in all probability, be raised 
for no service at all.1 
 
Chapter 2 highlighted the first element of successful change management as ‘compelling 
drivers’. Therefore, this Chapter examines A21’s key drivers, mounting four arguments. First, 
Army was initially relatively unresponsive to Dibb’s 1986 Review, making only incremental 
changes amidst a culture of DoA resistance. This unresponsiveness prompted a Government-
directed force structure review in 1994’s Defence White Paper (DWP94): this review became 
A21.  
 
Second, by 1994 a policy ambiguity was emerging: while DWP94’s declared strategic 
guidance emphasised DoA, there was increasing recognition of the need for some Army 
expeditionary options. A21’s paradoxical strategic driver from Government involved 
reconciling this policy ambiguity through a force structure which improved overt DoA 
alignment while providing some expeditionary capabilities. 
 
Third, there was a budget driver, from the other two services which, under acute resourcing 
constraints, placed mounting pressure on Army to justify its structure (and hence budget). 
Together, these strategic and budget drivers catalysed A21, compelling a transformational 
change from Army. Finally, Army’s DoA resistance is interpreted as provider capture, which 
also rendered A21’s transformational opportunity a cultural challenge. These arguments are 
presented in the following four sections. 
 
Initially, Army was relatively unresponsive to Dibb 
From a senior Defence civilian perspective, Richard Brabin-Smith2 viewed Dibb’s sharp 
focus on DoA as a: 
 
                                                 
1 R.G. Menzies, Current Notes in International Affairs, 21(9): 658-669, Sep 1950. 
2 Dr Brabin-Smith occupied a number of influential senior Defence civilian roles during the 1990s, including 
Former Assistant Secretary, Department of Defence, during the 1994 Defence White Paper; later; First Assistant 
Secretary, International Policy; First Assistant Secretary, Strategy Policy and Coordination; First Assistant 
Secretary, Force Development and Analysis; Deputy Secretary, International Policy (all Department of Defence) 
and Chief Defence Scientist, Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO).  
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quick over-steering of the ship, to get it…quickly…onto the course represented by the 
strategic principles…because we were dealing with a quite recalcitrant set of armed 
forces.3 
 
Chapter 2 highlighted Dibb’s 1986 Review as a fundamental challenge to Army’s culture and 
structure. Brabin-Smith acknowledges that of the three services, “the biggest intellectual and 
cultural challenge [of Dibb’s Review] was for Army”,4 due to its expeditionary and 
conventional focus. Dibb’s casting of DoA challenged much of the purpose for which the 
Australian Regular Army had been raised and previously used (expeditionary operations). 
Dibb also questioned the requirement for armour in Army’s structure.5  
 
How did Army respond to Dibb’s recommendations on its force structure? Response options 
included: (1) accept and make substantial changes; (2) make incremental changes only; and 
(3) challenge the strategic guidance. Evaluation suggests that until A21, Army chose Option 
2, which is this Chapter’s first argument: Army was initially relatively unresponsive to 
Dibb’s Review, implementing only incremental changes amidst prevailing internal cultural 
resistance. The Options analysis follows.  
 
On Option 1, Chief of the General Staff (CGS), Lieutenant General John Grey’s response to 
the 1991 Force Structure Review (FSR91) did not include substantial structural adjustments. 
He retained the divisional structure despite FSR91’s significant budget and personnel cuts to 
Army.6 As the 1987 Defence White Paper (DWP87) following Dibb’s Review did not direct 
a major Army restructure,7 Army did not initiate one. 
 
On Option 2, Army implemented three incremental changes in response to Dibb’s Review. 
First, Army began re-posturing to northern Australia under the ‘Army Presence in the North’ 
                                                 
3 Richard Brabin-Smith, interview 18 Feb 2016. 
4 Richard Brabin-Smith, interview 18 Feb 2016. 
5 Paul Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities: Report to the Minister for Defence, (Canberra, ACT, 
Australia: Australian Government Publishing Service, R85/1177 Cat. No. 8604776, 1986), p. 11. 
6 Australian Army, Army into the 21st Century, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Commonwealth of Australia, 1992), 
p. v, 8, 17. 
7 ‘This force structure requires no major changes from the current Army organisation.’ Department of Defence, 
The Defence of Australia, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Government 
Publishing Service, R86/951 Cat. No. 8623599, 1987), para 4.84, p. 53. 
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initiative.8 This established Regional Force Surveillance Units, Northern Command, and unit 
relocation to Darwin. Second, Army focused the ‘Kangaroo’ exercise series on Northern 
Australia;9 and third, some modest doctrinal publications were produced on low-level 
contingencies.10  
 
These changes were incremental because they masked limited operational-tactical level 
adjustment to DoA in practice. First, several interviewees described the Kangaroo exercises 
as deploying whole battalions after small ‘enemy’ numbers. Major General Jim Molan 
asserted that Army essentially payed lip service to DoA, using Kangaroo to practice 
conventional operations.11 Second, this view is supported by Major W.A. Jucha’s Australian 
Defence Force Journal (ADFJ) article, describing limited practical adjustment to northern 
Australian low-level contingencies. He noted ‘but one operational mode [conventional 
warfare to medium and high levels]…applied to all situations’.12 Third, while the threat 
scenario seemed ridiculous to military participants,13 the disproportionate conventional 
response deployed to it seemed ridiculous to civilian observers.14  
 
On Option 3, the evidence does not suggest Army effectively challenged DoA’s strategic 
guidance. Chapter 2 noted the dearth of Army discussion of strategy during 1986-1999 in 
ADFJ. Army’s culture was unconditioned to strategic debate participation, posited here as a 
leading explanation for Army’s failure to challenge DoA. Chapter 2 highlighted Army’s anti-
intellectualism; and Leahy asserted that Army then was “intellectually not up to it – 
intellectualism was not valued as a warrior-type attribute”.15 Numerous interviewees 
(military and civilian) concurred with this view. Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) General 
John Baker, during a 1996 National Press Club address, described how history had culturally 
conditioned Army towards tactical excellence as an input to an ally’s force; this and the post-
                                                 
8 John Blaxland, The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard, (Port Melbourne, VIC, Australia: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), p. 59. 
9 Blaxland, The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard, p. 31-34. 
10 E.g. Australian Army, Training Information Bulletin (TIB) 68: Low-Level Conflict, 1988. See also Michael 
Evans, Forward from the Past: The Development of Australian Army Doctrine, 1972-present, Land Warfare 
Studies Centre (LWSC), Study Paper No. 301, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Land Warfare Studies Centre, Sep 
1999), p. 30. 
11 Jim Molan, interview 06 Dec 2015. 
12 W.A. Jucha, ‘Preparing to Defeat the Low-Level Threat’, Australian Defence Force Journal, 60: 50-53, 1986, 
p. 51. 
13 Jim Molan, interview 06 Dec 2015. 
14 Hugh White, interview 18 Nov 2015. 
15 Peter Leahy, interview 22 Mar 2015. 
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Guam doctrine era of ‘self-reliant DoA’ caught Army bereft of strategic skills.16 Paraphrasing 
a quote attributed to Lieutenant Colonel Neil James: Army was a ‘strategy-taker, not a 
strategy-maker’.17  
 
Internal Cultural Resistance 
Perhaps because it lacked the external articulation skills to influence the strategic debate, 
Army’s relative unresponsiveness to Dibb’s Review and DoA was internally expressed as 
prevailing cultural resistance. This is summarised by Major General Peter Abigail (former 
Deputy Chief of Army): 
 
DoA was crazy. It was never going to occur. Who were you talking about? And you 
reckon they’re going to come where? And what then? That was deeply in the Army 
psyche…we’re not going to sign on to this, because we know in our bones that’s not 
what we’ll be doing. We’ll be going somewhere else…and we need a structure that 
allows you to do that.18 
 
Abigail’s quote pinpoints the reason for Army’s DoA resistance. Army did not agree with 
DoA as strategic guidance. Just as it retained its divisional structure immediately post-Dibb, 
Army also retained its expeditionary/conventional warfighting culture, grounded in its history 
and doctrine. Overwhelmingly, Army officers interviewed for this study articulated a strong, 
simple, fundamental disagreement with DoA. This strategic guidance polarised the Army-
Government relationship.  
 
While consistent with Army’s culture, DoA resistance had consequences. Brabin-Smith’s 
‘recalcitrant’ quote suggests a Defence civilian perception of Army provider capture (i.e. an 
agent unresponsive to its principal). The 1994 Defence White Paper (DWP94) provides 
stronger evidence that Army’s so-far incremental response to Dibb was perceived by its 
principal as inadequate. 
 
 
                                                 
16 Chief of the Defence Force, General John Baker, National Press Club Address, 27 Nov 1996, (DVD audio-
visual recording). 
17 Peter Leahy, ‘Middle East: Our troops, and the nation, need a strategy’, The Australian, 15 Aug 2015. The 
original context was ‘Australia’ (cf. Army) and in a coalition (i.e. multi-national military) sense. Neil James is 
currently Executive Director of the Australia Defence Association. 
18 Peter Abigail, interview 03 Dec 2015. 
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DWP94 forced the structural issue 
DWP94 forced the structural issue. Under severe budget constraints during recovery from 
economic recession,19 DWP94 re-iterated DoA as the primary force structure determinant;20 
and directed an Army force structure review:  
 
to be completed by late 1995 [to] establish what further adjustment to its structure is 
necessary. This review will address…number and readiness of infantry 
units…benefits of additional ground reconnaissance units…balance between Regular 
and Reserve elements of the force and…resource implications.21 
 
This review became A21. 
 
Emerging Policy Ambiguity 
This chapter’s second argument is that by 1994, policy ambiguity was emerging: while 
DWP94’s declared strategic guidance emphasised DoA, there was increasing recognition by 
senior defence civilians of the need for some Army expeditionary options. The evidence for 
this follows.  
 
First, DWP94 boldly assumes that a DoA force structure would also provide Government 
with ‘sufficient range of options to meet’22 other contingencies. DWP94 carefully stated that 
other operations (e.g. expeditionary peace operations) ‘need not, and will not, influence the 
force development process other than at the margins’.23 This was a convenient policy device: 
Government was signalling that Army should force structure for DoA: but ‘be prepared to’ 
provide some expeditionary capability. While this approach dates from at least DWP87, this 
guidance became forte ambiguous for Army by DWP94, because the expeditionary ‘margin’ 
was undefined; yet Government expectations appeared increasingly stretched. Regional 
deployments (e.g. Bougainville and Irian Jaya)24 and the near miss of Morris Dance25 
                                                 
19 David Gruen, The Australian Economy in the 1990s, Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, Oct 2000, 6 pp. 
20 Department of Defence, Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: 
Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Government Publishing Service, DPUBS 12065/94 1994), para 4.48, p. 
33. 
21 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, para 5.50, p. 49. 
22 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, para 3.11, p. 15. 
23 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, para 10.11, p. 106. 
24 Blaxland, The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard, p. 135. 
25 Blaxland, The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard, p. 64-68. 
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underscored the strategic ‘tyranny of dissonance’26 where Government practice deviated from 
its DoA theory. 
 
Second, senior Defence civilians acknowledge that DoA thinking climaxed in Government 
with Dibb’s Review and DWP87; then shifted somewhat in the expeditionary direction very 
soon after, as Government considered responses to civil/political unrest in Fiji and Vanuatu. 
However, the three senior defence civilians interviewed differ in the degree to which they 
viewed this strategic guidance as ambiguous. Hugh White labelled the emerging ambiguity as 
a “policy disconnect”.27 Brabin-Smith was more circumspect, indicating “yes it is 
true…having a good set of options up the Government’s sleeve for deploying the armed 
forces outside Australia…was [by 1994] becoming more important”28 though he qualifies 
this as “at the margins” and not intended as a force structural determinant – as stated in 
DWP94. Ric Smith29 concurred with this view, describing a “graduation” in the strategic 
guidance from 1986/87’s strong-form DoA (very limited expeditionary intent) to weaker-
form DoA (some expeditionary intent) by 1994. Neither Brabin-Smith nor Smith viewed 
DWP94’s guidance as ambiguous; though it must be noted that public servants are culturally 
conditioned to manoeuvre comfortably within policy ambiguity.30 Blaxland contends the 
‘tyranny of dissonance’ ‘was not so sharply felt by Defence policy-makers’.31 Whether 
ambiguity was Government’s intent in 1994, all three sources agree some expeditionary 
capability was. 
 
Third, there was more than public service cultural conditioning contributing to the policy 
ambiguity. White describes two very practical reasons why DoA was difficult to revise – 
even once Government wanted to. First, following DWP87’s perfected DoA narrative, DoA 
had a life of its own. Politicians of both persuasions recognised the Australian public 
                                                 
26 Michael Evans, The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia’s Strategic Culture and Way of War 1901-2005, Land 
Warfare Studies Centre (LWSC), Study Paper No. 306, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Land Warfare Studies 
Centre), Feb 2005. 
27 Hugh White, interview 18 Nov 2015. Professor White was a contributing author to DWP94. 
28 Richard Brabin-Smith, interview 18 Feb 2016. 
29 Dr Ric Smith was then Deputy Secretary, Strategic Policy (Department of Defence) and coordinating author 
of DWP94. 
30 E.g. The Australian Public Service (APS) Integrated Leadership System (ILS) contains five capabilities used 
as assessment criteria in APS recruitment processes. The ‘Shapes Strategic Thinking’ capability includes 
‘Works effectively in situations of ambiguity and with issues that cannot be immediately resolved’. Australian 
Public Service Commission, Integrated Leadership System (ILS), Individual Profile, Senior Executive Service 
(SES) Band 1, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Australian Public Service Commission (APSC), 2004), p. 62. 
31 Blaxland, The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard, p. 70. 
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identified with DoA.32 Second, Tange-era perspectives amongst Defence civilians meant their 
strategic planners favoured DoA because it “imposed a discipline”;33 Abigail, from a military 
perspective, contends DoA “was about keeping a lid on Army”.34 This is evidence of 
Government perceiving its agent, Army, as captive to its own expeditionary interests, despite 
relatively benign geo-strategic circumstances and investment prioritisation towards other 
capabilities within Defence’s constrained budget. 
 
Government’s reluctance to change the declaratory DoA narrative contributed to the policy 
ambiguity. Though recognising the increasing need for expeditionary capability, force 
structuring outside the margins could not be declared due to inconsistency with DoA; further, 
it was important to curb Army’s expeditionary ambitions in force structuring. DWP94’s force 
structuring guidance was a convenient policy device that reinforced DoA orthodoxy, veiling 
expeditionary possibilities. 
 
This ambiguous guidance sat uncomfortably beside Army’s cultural predilection for simple, 
clear and direct logic.35 DWP94’s policy device transferred significant ambiguity to Army to 
resolve in A21. It posed challenging and practical questions for Army: how big was the 
‘margin’? How much expeditionary capability was likely to be enough? Was it possible to 
force structure for DoA with a little bit of expeditionary capability, beyond Army’s existing 
provision for that, the 3rd Brigade’s Ready Deployment Group?36  
 
This policy ambiguity was a strategic driver for A21’s development. DWP94’s force 
structure review required a DoA force structure and some expeditionary capability. The 
implicit guidance was: 
 
stop thinking…in terms of building a force for deployment;…[or] of preserving 
something [from] the Forward Defence era;… [or] like something that was 
                                                 
32 Hugh White (interview 18 Nov 2015), Mark Thomson (interview 25 Nov 2015) and Ian McLachlan 
(interview 07 Dec 2015) concurred on this point. In McLachlan’s words, such was the “Vietnam conscience” in 
the Australian community, that “to change the verbage [from DoA] you had to be careful”. 
33 “…and stopped the Army from asking for too much”. Hugh White, interview 18 Nov 2015. 
34 Peter Abigail, interview 03 Dec 2015. 
35 See Chapter 2. 
36 David Connery, Which Division? Risk Management and the Australian Army’s force structure after the 
Vietnam War, Australian Army History Unit Occasional Paper Series, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Defence 
Publishing Service, DPS JUN023-14, Jul 2014). See also David Connery, ‘The Strategic Director: ambiguity, 
the Army and the East Timor crisis of 1999’, Chapter 3 in D.K. Connery (ed), The Battles Before: Case Studies 
of Australian Army Leadership 1972-2010, (Sydney, NSW, Australia: Big Sky, 2016). 
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a…WWII…expansion base; start looking like something…designed for the job that the 
Government said it wanted [done].37 
 
DWP94’s force structure review ipso facto demonstrates a perception that the existing 
(divisional) structure did not satisfy these Government requirements. In A21, Government 
sought a structural response and transformational change. 
 
Budget Driver 
According to Hugh White “what drove…A21…was the desire to redesign an Army that: (a) 
we could afford; and (b) would more closely meet the task[s] the Government had given it”.38 
This section expands on A21’s budget driver, presenting this Chapter’s third argument: A21 
was also motivated by a resource claim on Army by the other two services. This could only 
be done by challenging Army’s substantial operating budget for salaries sustaining the (albeit 
emaciated) divisional structure. This is evidenced as follows. First, the review concept 
originated not from the (civilian) DWP94 drafting team, but from the Chiefs of Service 
Committee (COSC), under CDF Admiral Alan Beaumont, in July 1994:39 Australian Defence 
Headquarters (ADHQ) directed the review, which DWP94 subsequently included. The 
Defence capital budget split between Navy, Airforce and Army was then 45:45:10.40 Second, 
CGS Grey states the objective of Navy and Airforce within COSC then was to further 
increase their budget shares.41 This seems a credible legacy of DWP87’s air and naval 
investment emphasis.42 Third, Brigadier (later Major General) Peter Dunn (A21 Lead) recalls 
CDF Baker’s remarks during the former’s in-brief: 
 
Army has never faced a greater threat to its establishment than what it does 
now…they [i.e. RAN and RAAF] needed money, and Army is going to lose money 
unless we can justify a structure.43  
 
                                                 
37 Hugh White, interview 18 Nov 2015. 
38 Hugh White, interview 18 Nov 2015. 
39 John Hartley, ‘An Australian Army for the 21st Century’, in J.M. Malik (ed), The Future Battlefield, (Geelong, 
VIC, Australia: Deakin University Press, 1997), p. 210. COSC = Chiefs of Service Committee. COSC contained 
the CDF, Vice CDF, and the respective Chiefs of Service of the Navy, Army and Airforce. Admiral Alan 
Beaumont was CDF from 17 Apr 1993 - 06 Jul 1995. 
40 Brice Pacey, interview 02 Dec 2015. 
41 John Grey, interview 04 Feb 2016. 
42 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia, p. viii, 108. 
43 Peter Dunn, interview 18 Nov 2015. 
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Unfortunately, Baker cannot be interviewed;44 however he drafted A21’s Terms-of-
Reference, and it seems likely he viewed A21 as a defensive measure to justify Army’s 
operating budget. ADHQ’s change management message was clear: “don’t tell us you have a 
Division because you have a Division”.45 Not only was budget justification the second key 
A21 driver, the solution needed to appear significantly different from the divisional structure. 
A21 demanded a transformational, not an incremental, change. 
 
The Cultural Capture Dilemma 
While capture is difficult to ‘prove’ in intent, action and outcome,46 this Chapter’s final 
argument is that Army’s DoA resistance can be interpreted as a form of provider capture. 
Prima facie, this is based on three pieces of evidence. First, DoA clashed with Army’s 
expeditionary and conventional warfighting culture, grounded in its history and doctrine. 
Simply: DoA ran contrary to evidence from Army’s expeditionary history. Second, DoA 
threatened Army’s material self-interest (defined as the maintenance of Army’s existing 
capabilities, as a minimum). But most importantly: Army disagreed with the minimalist 
strategic role Government had assigned it.  
 
Carpenter and Moss differentiate strong-form47 from weak-form capture.48 Army’s DoA 
resistance was weak-form capture in two respects. First, until 1994, Government had not 
expressly directed Army to restructure (so Army’s failure/reluctance to was not overt 
defiance). Second, Army’s pre-A21 ‘Core Force’ structuring principle and divisional 
structure retention was not contrary to the national interest (hence not subverting 
Government’s ultimate intent).  
 
                                                 
44 John Baker passed away 09 Jul 2007. 
45 Peter Dunn, interview 18 Nov 2015. 
46 Daniel Carpenter, ‘Detecting and Measuring Capture’, in D. Carpenter and D.A. Moss (eds), Preventing 
Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It, (New York, USA: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), p. 63. 
47 ‘Strong capture violates the public interest to such an extent that the public would be better served by either 
(a) no regulation of the activity in question – because the benefits of regulation are outweighed by the costs of 
capture, or (b) comprehensive replacement of the policy and agency in question’. Daniel Carpenter and David 
A. Moss, ‘Introduction’, in D. Carpenter and D.A. Moss (eds), Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest 
Influence and How to Limit It, (New York, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 11. 
48 ‘Weak capture, by contrast, occurs when special interest influence compromises the capacity of regulation to 
enhance the public interest, but the public is still being served by regulation, relative to the baseline of no 
regulation. In other words, weak capture prevails when the net social benefits of regulation are diminished as a 
result of special interest influence, but remain positive overall’. Carpenter and Moss, ‘Introduction’, p. 11. 
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This and the last Chapter have underscored the contribution of Army’s culture to its DoA 
resistance. Further linkage with emerging theory from the provider capture field is possible. 
Kwak recently defined the concept of cultural capture, where an organisation becomes 
captured by ideologies framing its worldview, actions and decisions.49 Cultural capture offers 
immediate potential explanatory value on Army’s DoA resistance. For example, it can be 
argued that Army’s perception of national interest differed from its principal; and was 
probably defined over different time horizons.50 Abigail’s ‘DoA was crazy’ quote is the 
evidentiary leitmotif of the overwhelming Army officer rejection of DoA as serving the 
national interest, expressed in interviews for this sub-thesis. However, it follows that Army’s 
pre-A21 ‘Core Force’, divisional structuring principle – and budget bids based on it - tends to 
(subconsciously?) conflate self-interest (protection and enhancement of expeditionary and 
conventional capabilities) with Army’s perception of national interest (not DoA). This 
renders distinction between the two motivators (self- and national-interest) difficult – for the 
agent, principal or other stakeholders. This circularity is the cultural capture dilemma.51 
 
The first of three counter-arguments to cultural capture is that the period’s strategic guidance 
was vague and unendorsed.52 This is reasonable pre-1986; but not afterwards (prior to 
DWP94), given the clarity of Dibb’s recommendations. Second concerns the principal’s 
competence. Simply: Army resisted (post-1986) DoA because it was poor strategy. Without 
questioning the civil power’s authority, Army may nonetheless question the quality of 
strategic guidance. This counter-argument is expertise-based: ‘professional military 
judgement’ (Aristotelian ethos), noting Army’s culture is rationally-founded upon its history 
and doctrine. Army, as a guardian responsible for national security, claims genuine concern 
for how the national interest is best-served. This counter-argument’s two weaknesses are: (1) 
indistinguishability from Army’s material self-interest (introducing perception/possibility of 
cultural capture, absent independent corroborative evidence (i.e. an immediate ground-based 
threat)); and (2) Army’s absence in the era’s strategic debate (cultural capture being 
unconducive to logos arguments). Third, Army’s actions reflect conscious and unconscious 
                                                 
49 James Kwak, ‘Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis’, in D. Carpenter and D.A. Moss (eds), Preventing 
Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It, (New York, USA: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), p. 79. 
50 The respective force structuring principles of agent and principal symbolise this difference: Army’s pre-A21 
‘Core Force’ structuring principle is long-run; Government’s DoA threat-based force structuring principle is 
short-to-medium-run.  
51 Kwak, ‘Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis’, p. 78. 
52 E.g. later Chief of Army Lieutenant General Frank Hickling refers to this period as one of ‘strategic drift’. 
Frank Hickling, interview 13 Aug 2015. 
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risk management;53 hedging against Government tasks for which it is unprepared. Risk 
management is not inconsistent with cultural capture –an Army perception of national interest 
varying from its principal simply elevates risk management to cultural capture. 
 
The more parsimonious explanation - Army’s cultural capture - rendered A21 both an 
opportunity and challenge. A21 was Army’s opportunity to respond to its principal’s interests 
(expressed in DWP94’s policy ambiguity of declaratory DoA alongside some expeditionary 
capabilities) by designing a structure meeting the former overtly; and the latter implicitly. 
This structure could be win-win, if it also protected/enhanced capabilities Army valued. The 
challenge was for Army to overcome its cultural capture and DoA resistance.  
 
Conclusion 
This Chapter identified two key drivers for A21. The first was strategic, originating from 
Government; and revealed through two arguments. First, Army was initially relatively 
unresponsive to Dibb’s Review, making only incremental changes amidst a culture of DoA 
resistance. Army’s divisional structure remained largely intact, and Army’s DoA 
unresponsiveness prompted Government to direct an Army force structure review in DWP94: 
this become A21. Second, a policy ambiguity emerged around DWP94; Army’s force 
restructure was required to achieve overt conformance with DoA; yet provide some 
expeditionary options. 
 
The second driver was budgetary pressure principally from Navy and Airforce in COSC. This 
chapter argued the motivation was these services’ desire for increased allocation within 
Defence’s constrained budget. A21 was conceived as a mechanism for Army to justify a 
structure (and budget). Together, these strategic and budget drivers compelled 
transformational change. 
 
Finally, the Chapter argued Army’s DoA resistance can be interpreted as a form of provider 
capture. Prima facie, DoA threatened Army’s material interests; but Army’s DoA resistance 
stemmed from the fundamental clash between DoA and Army’s expeditionary and 
                                                 
53 Highlighted theoretically by Stephan Frühling, ‘Defence Planning as Risk Management’, Chapter 2 in S. 
Frühling, Defence Planning and Uncertainty, (Routledge, 2014), p. 18-43; and in practice by Connery, who 
contends Army’s leadership risk-managed during the 1970s, describing how Army sought to save the 
‘silverware’ (its infantry battalions). Connery, Which Division?, p. 17. 
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conventional warfighting culture. Army’s DoA resistance shows evidence of weak-form 
capture; Army did not overtly defy Government direction; and resistance was not aimed at 
subverting the principal’s ultimate intent (the national interest). However, Army’s view of the 
national interest was at variance with its principal; and happened to conflate with its self-
interest. This opens Army to the charge of cultural capture, an agent unable to differentiate 
these motivators and thus hampered in communications with its principal. 
 
Assembling these findings presents A21’s transformational change as both an opportunity 
and challenge. The strategic driver was Army’s opportunity to respond with capabilities 
wider than just DoA; the budget driver an opportunity to justify operating budget. But 
Army’s challenge was overcoming cultural capture to embrace A21, despite its DoA premise. 
Chapter 4 examines how Army handled A21’s change management opportunity and 
challenge.
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Chapter 4: A21 (1995-1996) 
 
In 1995, new Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant General John Sanderson did not tackle the 
DoA strategic orthodoxy directly, recognising instead A21 as an opportunity to boldly 
transform Army’s divisional force structure:1 and hence win more capability resources. This 
Chapter contends A21 was a capability game, mounting four arguments. First, Army’s 
primary A21 objective was winning capability resources. Second, A21’s force structure was 
designed to meet DoA and other contingencies. Third, A21 encountered significant internal 
resistance from Army’s senior leaders, mostly cultural. Finally, Sanderson persevered to 
build political sponsorship with the new Coalition Government, primarily to advance Army’s 
capability resourcing: but with qualified success. In change management terms, A21’s 
capability game undermined ‘a clear, shared, credible vision’ and ‘senior leadership buy-in’ 
internally; and achieved only qualified ‘political sponsorship’ externally. These arguments 
are developed in the following four sections.  
 
Sanderson’s Objective was Winning Capability Resources 
Sanderson’s primary A21 objective was winning more capability resources, evidenced as 
follows. First, Sanderson’s earlier role as Assistant Chief of the Defence Force – Force 
Development (ACDEV) reinforced for him Army’s imperative to win more capability 
resources..2 Second, Sanderson’s method used A21 to ‘say what we need, as opposed to what 
we have’3… ‘in terms that will stand up in the Centre…to any scrutiny’.4 Sanderson’s 
deputy, Major General John Hartley, summarised ‘two positive outcomes’ from A21 in the 
Chief of the General Staff’s Advisory Committee (CGSAC): ‘a very clear and definitive 
vision of where Army is going’ and ‘to redress the…Army…resourcing…decline’.5 
 
Third, Sanderson exploited Government’s policy ambiguity with the declared strategic 
guidance of DoA low-level contingencies alongside interest in wider capabilities.6 Believing 
                                                 
1 “He [Sanderson] wanted a ‘bold and innovative solution’, and it was”. Frank Hickling, interview 13 Aug 2015. 
2 John Sanderson, interview 23 Nov 2015. 
3 Australian Army History Unit (AAHU), Chief of the General Staff’s Advisory Committee (CGSAC) (1994-
1996) / Chief of Army’s Senior Advisory Group (CASAG) (1997-1998) Proceedings, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: 
Australian Army Headquarters, 1994-1998), Agenda Item 2: A21 Progress Report, dated 31 Aug 1995, para 35, 
p. 6. and para 24, p. 5. 
4 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Minute No. 9/95, ‘Deployment of the Land Force in Defence of Australia 
during Short Warning Conflict’, dated 27 Jul 1995, para 23, p. 4. 
5 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Agenda Item 2: A21 Progress Report – CCC Agendum Conclusions (Draft), 
dated 30 Nov 1995, para 5, p. 2. 
6 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Agenda Item 2: A21 Progress Report, dated 31 Aug 1995, para 28, p. 6 and 
AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, ‘A21 Progress and Issues for Consideration’, dated 08 Nov 1995, para 28, p. 7. 
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future conflict would inevitably feature Army; Sanderson liberally interpreted DoA to mean 
defending Australia “against whatever”.7 The policy ambiguity enabled Sanderson to believe 
he was fulfilling the strategic guidance. This was the sense in which A21 was a capability 
game. Sanderson’s approach, dating from his ACDEV role, separated the political setting of 
strategic guidance from the military process of developing capabilities.8 In A21, he 
recognised ‘much…flexibility…allowing a force to be constructed which sustains the central 
and enduring ethos of the organisation and maintains latent capabilities in other levels of 
conflict’.9 
 
Finally, Sanderson exploited a promising reform environment. Sanderson commenced 
relatively well-endowed with political capital10 from Defence civilians, who were confident 
A21 would generate “more useful capability more quickly”.11  Brigadier Peter Dunn was 
selected to lead A21 as the newly created Director General, Force Development – Land, with 
defence civilian contributions from Force Development and Analysis (FDA) Division within 
the Department of Defence.12 The team was respected by Defence civilians.13 Finally, Army 
initially greeted A21 with some keenness, following years of neglect.14 These were promising 
change management precursor conditions for A21. 
 
Moderating an exclusive focus on winning capability resources, however, other reformist 
objectives in A21 can be attributed to Sanderson. First, he was interested in DoA as a non-
trivial military problem,15 and new doctrinal concepts, especially ‘strategic manoeuvre’.16 
Second, Sanderson was aware of cultural barriers to reform, seeing senior Infantry generals’ 
                                                 
7 John Sanderson, interview 23 Nov 2015. This is also supported by evidence from the Defence Annual Report, 
1994-95, which lists four Objectives for the Combat Forces, none suggestive of low-level contingencies. 
Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report, 1994-95. (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Australian Government, 
1995), p. 85. 
8 John Sanderson, interview 23 Nov 2015. 
9 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Agenda Item 2: A21 Progress Report, dated 21 Sep 1995, para 18, p. 3. 
10 Nicholas Jans, The Chiefs: A Study of Strategic Leadership, (Australian Defence College, Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2013), p. 61. 
11 Hugh White, interview 18 Nov 2015. 
12 FDA Division was tasked with independently critiquing the force structure proposals presented by the 
Services to the Defence Committee process. Ralph Neumann was Assistant Secretary, Force Development, and 
a member of the A21 Working Group. 
13 Hugh White, interview 18 Nov 2016. 
14 Peter Leahy, interview 22 Mar 2015. 
15 John Sanderson, interview 23 Nov 2015. 
16 John Sanderson, ‘A Perspective on the Operational Art’, Keynote Address to the Senior Officer Study Period, 
Command and Staff College, Fort Queenscliff, 25 September 1995. See also AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, 
Agenda Item 2: A21 Progress Report, para 24, p. 5. 
 51 
simple insistence on more fully-manned battalions as unrealistic given budget constraints.17 
Third, he had previously in his career championed extraction of more capability from the 
Army Reserve.18 A21 can be interpreted as a pretext to pursue these reforms, some aligned 
with views outside Army.19 These reforms were also useful for demonstrating A21 was a 
convincing package, not just an ambit capability bid.20 
 
Dunn faced three challenges in A21. First, the methodology and resultant force structure 
needed to justify Army’s operating expenditure.21 Second, Dunn needed to fulfil the A21 
Terms-of-Reference, an amalgam of Army’s problematic issues including hollowness, 
readiness, Regular/Reserve balance and introducing new technology. Finally, Dunn and his 
project officer, Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Dave Chalmers had a tight CGSAC 
deadline of December 1995.22 
 
Dunn pursued a three-part methodology. First was a consultative approach based on focus 
groups – at Staff College, in each of the Brigades, amongst Reserve formations, and with the 
other two Services.23 Second was Assumption Based Planning (ABP), reflecting novel 
corporate ideas emanating from RAND Corporation.24 Dunn presented each focus group with 
A21’s scenario, its assumptions and constraints (strategic guidance, budget etc) and allowed 
groups to workshop their solution as a staff exercise. Third was ‘an exhaustive study’ to 
synthesize this material into the final A21 report, tabled in CGSAC in November 1995.25  
                                                 
17 John Sanderson, interview 23 Nov 2015. 
18 J.M. Sanderson and B.N. Nunn, Army Reserve Review Committee report on the force structure and tasks of 
the Army Reserve, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Australian Army Reserve, October 1986). 
19 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Annex A to Agenda Item 15: A21 Progress Report, dated 27 Oct 1995, 
‘Summary of Contemporary Debate on Reserves’. 
20 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Agenda Item 2: A21 Progress Report – CCC Agendum Conclusions (Draft), 
dated 30 Nov 1995, para 5, p. 2. 
21 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Agenda Item 2: A21 Update, dated 27 Jul 1995, para 8, p. 2; AAHU, CGSAC 
Proceedings, Agenda Item 2: A21 Progress Report, dated 31 Aug 1995, paras 14 and 17, p. 3-4; AAHU, 
CGSAC Proceedings, Agenda Item 2: A21 Progress Report – CCC Agendum Conclusions (Draft), dated 30 Nov 
1995, para 20, p. 4; and AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Agenda Item 2: A21 Progress Report, dated 31 Aug 
1995, para 38, p. 7. 
22 This deadline had been specified in DWP94. See also: AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Agenda Item 13: 
General Business, dated 09 Mar 1995, para 52, p. 11; and AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Minute from DCGS to 
CGSAC: ‘CGSAC Submission 8/95’, dated 26 Jun 1995. 
23 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Submission: Employment of the Land Force in the Defence of Australia during 
Short Warning Conflict, dated 07 Jul 1995, para 3, p. 2. 
24 James A. Dewar, Carl Builder, William M. Hix and Morlie H. Levin, Assumption-Based Planning: A Tool for 
Very Uncertain Times, (Santa Monica, CA, USA: RAND Corporation, 1993). 
25 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Agenda Item 1: A21 WG Progress and Activities, dated 08 Nov 1995, para 4. 
See also AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, dated 30 Nov 1995. 
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The A21 package included a force structure, operational and personnel concepts, and 
equipment consequences. Dunn proposed a transformational change to Army’s structure. Key 
recommendations were: 
• abolition of divisional structures, including headquarters26 and ‘examination...[of] the 
continuing utility of Corps’;27 
• creation of flexible task force (TF) structures with armour, artillery and engineers 
embedded at unit (battalion) level; 
• a substantial increase in Special Forces; and 
• major increases in helicopters and vehicles. 
 
Aligned with DoA strategic guidance, the seven TFs were notionally assigned areas across 
Northern Australia, with a Pilbara, Cape York, Kimberley, Darwin and Offshore TF.28 This 
force disposition was supported by a new operational concept: Detect-Protect-Respond.29 The 
A21 TFs were designed for dispersed, independent operations, low force-to-space ratios and 
“flexibility in contact”30 – concentrating and dispersing contingent upon the threat scenario. 
These concepts resonated with Sanderson’s interests in ‘strategic manoeuvre’. 
 
A21 required 2,500 more personnel than the existing force31 so an innovative personnel 
concept was required to fit the Terms-of-Reference budget envelope. A21 proposed 
substantially increasing Reserve involvement, through integrated units. Fortuitously, the 
Ready Reserve (RRes) scheme, spearheaded by the 6th Brigade in Brisbane, was generating 
quality Reserve capability fit for A21’s purpose.32 Sanderson recognised the RRes model for 
delivering higher capability levels more cheaply than the Australian Regular Army.33 
                                                 
26 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Agenda Item 15: A21 Progress Report, dated 27 Oct 1995, para 136, p. 19. 
27 Department of Defence, Restructuring the Australian Army: A Force Structure for the Army of the Future, 
(Canberra, ACT, Australia: Commonwealth of Australia, DPUBS: 24432/96, DPVC, Feb 1997), p. 96. 
28 The two remaining TFs were ‘Southern’. The Offshore TF Level 2 performance standards included: ‘respond 
offshore if required’ and ‘able to be sustained offshore’. AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Report to CGSAC, 27 
Oct – Item 15: A21 Progress Report, dated 18 Oct 1995, Annex B: ‘Land Force Component – Level Two’. 
29 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Submission 8/95: ‘Employment of the Land Force in the Defence of Australia 
during Short Warning Conflict’, dated 26 June 1995, para 25, Figure 1, p. 6. 
30 John Sanderson, interview, 23 Nov 2015. 
31 P.J. Dunn (Brigadier), R. Neumann, W. Traynor (Brigadier), W. Spears (Group Captain) and A. Bedford 
(Brigadier), Army in the 21st Century – Phase 3 – Options for the Future, A21 Army Structure Review. Report 
submitted to CGSAC, dated 30 Nov 1995, para 173 and 175, p. 52-53. 
32 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Agenda Item 6: Full Time / Part Time Balance, dated 08 Nov 1995, paras 115, 
119. See also Lieutenant General Coates and Dr Hugh Smith, Review of the Ready Reserve Scheme, (Canberra, 
ACT, Australia: Australian Army, 30 Jun 1995). 
33 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Report to CGSAC, 27 Oct: Item 15: A21 Progress Report, dated 18 Oct 1995, 
Annex C, ‘Employment of the Army Reserve – A Concept for the A21 Review’, ‘Reserves in the Total Force’, 
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Influenced by the US ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA),34 A21’s force structure 
proposed high-technology surveillance and communication assets and major investments in 
air and ground mobility assets (helicopters, Bushmasters and ASLAVs).35 As a force 
structure, operational and personnel package, A21 met its Terms-of-Reference; it was also a 
powerful capability development argument.36  
 
Designed for DoA and other Contingencies 
A21 was designed to fulfil DoA and wider contingencies. Four pieces of evidence support 
this. First, the A21 study included unofficial contestability work by the Directorate of Army 
Research and Analysis (DARA), under Colonel (later Chief of Army Lieutenant General) 
Peter Leahy. Tasked with ‘stress testing’ A21’s assumptions (an implicit ABP requirement), 
DARA analysed A21 at two levels. Prima facie, DARA tested the explicit A21 assumptions 
specified by the Terms-of-Reference and by the A21 Working Group (WG). At another level 
entirely, DARA tested the A21 structure against a range of ‘non-DoA’ scenarios. While not 
specifically commissioned, DARA deemed this required to test the WG-specified assumption 
that ‘forces developed for DoA provide a sufficient range of options to meet other tasks’.37 
The non-DoA scenarios were extremely sensitive: senior Defence civilians shut this work 
down once it became known.38 Importantly, however, its underlying thought processes 
valuably informed A21: “What we put forward publically was a koala bear…what we had in 
the background, in private, was a range of plausible contingencies”.39 
 
DARA’s Annex to the final A21 Report, tabled in CGSAC in November 1995, titled ‘Testing 
the Vulnerability of Assumptions for A21’, noted A21’s biggest challenge was the ‘policy 
deficit’ of ‘a lack of a national concept for the defence of Australia’. It noted DWP94’s 
strategic guidance specified that non-DoA tasks ‘are not considered force structure 
                                                                                                                                                        
para 7 and ‘Force Structure Considerations’, para 27(b). See also: Australian Army Headquarters, The Army 
Plan 1998, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Australian Army, 1998), para 13, p. 4; and A.K. Wrigley, The Defence 
Force and the Community: A partnership in Australia's Defence, (Report Commissioned by the Minister for 
Defence, 1990).  
34 J. Mohan Malik, (ed) The Future Battlefield, (Geelong, VIC, Australia: Deakin University Press, 1997), 288 
pp; Michael Brennan, interview 21 Dec 2015. 
35 Dunn et al., Army in the 21st Century , para 150, Table 4, p. 47. Note that ‘Bushmaster’ was an evolution of 
the previously labelled ‘Bushranger’ vehicle program. ASLAV = Australian (AS) Light Armoured Vehicle. 
36 Dunn et al., Army in the 21st Century, para 9, p. 3.  
37 Directorate of Army Research and Analysis (DARA), Testing the Vulnerability of Assumptions of A21, 
Unpublished Annex J to A21 Final Report, tabled at CGSAC, 30 Nov 1995, p. 28 (copy in possession of 
author). The full list of Assumptions is sensitive and is not reproduced in this sub-thesis. 
38 Undisclosed source, team member working within DARA at this time, interview Dec 2015. 
39 Undisclosed source, team member working within DARA at this time, interview Dec 2015. 
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determinants, except at the margins’. The Annex highlights the A21 team’s skilful use of 
DWP94’s terms ‘Adaptability and Versatility’ to develop the A21 structure. These terms had 
been interpreted liberally enough for DARA to provide CGSAC independent assurance that 
A21 had ‘the adaptability and versatility to be employable in the wide variety of future 
security roles that may be required by government’. In addition to challenging the Terms-of-
Reference budget envelope, the Annex’s criticism of the ‘scarcely credible contingencies’ of 
extant DoA strategic guidance was too controversial to risk further circulation.40 The Annex 
is notably absent in the official CGSAC files, and was alternatively sourced for this study.  
 
The second set of evidence is from the CGSAC Proceedings. These show clearly intent to 
retain and build wider capabilities.41 A21 proposed expansion of Special Forces (SF) 
capability.42 As SF capability can be legitimately trained for and tasked with non-DoA 
activities, and as these activities are highly classified, this discreetly built non-DoA capability 
while explicitly focusing the conventional forces on declaratory DoA.43  
 
The third piece of evidence relates to A21’s treatment of the arms corps.44 Rather than 
reducing Army’s conventional warfighting capabilities, A21 massaged these to fit DoA. This 
is evidenced as follows. First, contrasting with the Dibb Review’s recommendation against 
armour, A21 “gave us permission to buy two tank regiments”.45 Sanderson describes 
“working hard” to retain tanks, evidence he interpreted the DoA strategic guidance liberally, 
preparing Army for more than low-level contingencies. Second, Sanderson, a former 
commander of the 1st Brigade, espoused the warfighting tenets of ‘firepower, mobility and 
                                                 
40 DARA, Testing the Vulnerability of Assumptions of A21, p. 25, 11, 27, 26 and 15. See also AAHU, CGSAC 
Proceedings, ‘Aspects of a Maritime Focus in the Defence of Australia and its Interests’, DARA draft paper as 
at 17 Nov 1996, para 16. 
41 E.g. AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Minute: ‘CGSAC Submission 8/95 – Employment of the Land Force in 
the Defence of Australia during Short Warning Conflict’ (revised), dated 18 Jul 1995, Annex, paras 6 and 14;  
AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Agenda Item 2: A21 Progress Report, dated 31 Aug 1995, para 51, p. 9; and 
AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, ‘Army Submission to the A21 Working Group: Achieving Adaptability and 
Versatility within the Land Force Structure derived to support Short Warning Conflict’. Annex F to Agenda 
Item 15: A21 Progress Report, dated 27 Oct 1995, p. 10; para 15, p. 4 and para 23-24, p. 7. 
42 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Agenda Item 2: A21 Progress Report, dated 31 Aug 1995, para 13, p. 3; 
AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Agenda Item 15: A21 Progress Report, dated 27 Oct 1995, para 113, p. 17.  
43 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Agenda Item 2: A21 Progress Report, dated 31 Aug 1995, para 27, p. 5.  
44 Within the contemporary Army, the ‘arms corps’ include infantry, armour, artillery, engineers and aviation. 
These combat arms are differentiated from the ‘support’ corps, including logistic, health and other services. The 
arms corps context here refers specifically to armour, artillery and engineers, elements of which were embedded 
within the infantry-based TFs. 
45 John Sanderson, interview 23 Nov 2015. The Australian Army, then and since, has only one regiment of 
tanks. 
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protection’ throughout his career including as CGS.46 Finally, Major General Fergus 
McLachlan, then a junior (armoured corps) officer, offered the retrospective view that A21 
was “about hiding tanks in the structure”.47 This armour lens interprets A21’s unit-level 
embedding of combat arms as eliminating an obvious target for criticism by Defence civilians 
committed to DoA’s precepts. Disbanding arms corps regiments by dispersal across A21’s 
TFs preserved capability48 while removing the target: a political tactic. 
 
The culminating piece of evidence is A21’s force structure itself. Sanderson’s 1996 booklet 
for Army distribution includes a double-page array of A21’s seven TFs. This showed a 
massive military overmatch for DoA’s purported low-level contingencies: providing further 
evidence this force was designed for wider contingencies.49 This analysis further expands the 
Chapter’s first argument: A21 was a plan to build Army capability while apparently 
conforming with DoA: a capability game. Sanderson’s former Military Assistant, Lieutenant 
Colonel Kon Iliadis agreed: “A21 was a ruse”.50 The next section examines Army’s response 
to this transformational plan. 
 
Dissecting Resistance 
A21 challenged more than Army’s structure. This section argues that A21 encountered 
considerable internal resistance. Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework for interpreting 
this early resistance: mostly based on cultural grounds.  
 
First, Sanderson encountered strong internal resistance from his own leadership team.51 One 
CGSAC general resigned, allegedly in opposition to A21.52 Peter Dunn described the artillery 
                                                 
46 John Sanderson, interview 23 Nov 2015; Malik, The Future Battlefield, 288 pp.; Mark Kelly, interview 17 
Dec 2015. 
47 Fergus McLachlan, interview 01 March 2016. Major General McLachlan is currently Head, Modernisation 
and Strategic Planning – Army (HMSP-A). 
48 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Report to CGSAC 27 Oct, Item 15: A21 Progress Report, dated 18 Oct 1995, 
para 19, p. 4. 
49 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Report to CGSAC, 27 Oct, Item 15: A21 Progress Report, dated 18 Oct 1995, 
Annex F, ‘Achieving Adaptability and Versatility within the Land Force Structure derived to support Short 
Warning Conflict’, ‘Force Structuring Implications’, para 33, p. 9. 
50 Lieutenant Colonel Kon Iliadis, pers comm, 27 Feb 2016. 
51 John Sanderson, interview 23 Nov 2015. See also: AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Agenda Item 2: A21 
Update, dated 27 Jul 1995, para 14, p. 3; AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Agenda Item 15: A21 Progress Report, 
dated 27 Oct 1995, para 131, p. 19; and AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Summary, dated 07 Jul 1995, para 24(b), 
p. 5. 
52 Name withheld and known to author. Peter Dunn, interview 18 Nov 2015. 
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Head of Corps as “apoplectic” around A21’s implications for Artillery Corps.53 Major 
General (retd) Peter Abigail, Deputy Chief of Army from 1998, remarked that immediately 
following Sanderson’s retirement, he “couldn’t find a single General in Army” who 
supported A21.54 
 
Chalmers identified two sources of A21 resistance from Army’s generals.55 First, because 
they rejected DoA as strategic guidance, they opposed A21’s overt conformance with it. This 
suggests Army’s expeditionary culture rendered its generals unable to differentiate an 
unpopular strategy from A21’s capability merits; or unable to accept this ‘capability game’ as 
a trade-off.56 One consequence was that Sanderson couldn’t explicitly communicate to the 
wider Army that A21 was a capability game, or explain his liberal DoA interpretation 
underlying A21’s muscular force structure.57 
 
But Chalmers also cited Army’s cultural conservatism, noted in Chapter 2.58 A21 challenged 
the vested interests of at least three dominant tribes in Army culture. The first tribe is the 
Australian Regular Army (ARA). A21 sought an increased role for the Reserve; threatening 
the ARA’s interests.59 The RRes scheme was resisted by the ARA60 and the General Reserve, 
whose rival interests it also threatened.61 The Coalition was elected with a platform of 
scrapping the RRes,62 evidence of effective lobbying.  
 
The second dominant tribe was the arms corps. From their perspective, DoA had downplayed 
their role: now A21 proposed to remove their structural identity, threatening established 
                                                 
53 Peter Dunn, interview 18 Nov 2015. These changes inter alia included artillery regiments and independent 
batteries under centralised command of the 2nd Division passed to brigade headquarters: 2nd Division 
Headquarter artillery was directed to close in July 1998. Australian Army Headquarters, CGS Directive 7/96, 
‘Restructure of the Army: Initiating Directive’, dated 31 Oct 1996, p. A-3. 
54 Peter Abigail, interview 03 Dec 2015. Sanderson retired in June 1998. 
55 Dave Chalmers, interview 02 Dec 2015.  
56 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Minute No. 9/95, ‘Deployment of the Land Force for Defence of Australia’, 
dated 27 Jul 1995, para 27, p. 4. See also AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Submission: ‘Employment of the Land 
Force in the Defence of Australia during Short Warning Conflict’, dated 27 Jul 1995, para 3, p. 2. Peter Dunn 
retrospectively describes A21 as “a bridge too far”. Peter Dunn, interview 18 Nov 2015. 
57 “The hardest part was making people understand”. John Sanderson, interview 23 Nov 2015. 
58 Dave Chalmers, interview 02 Dec 2015. 
59 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Report to CGSAC, 27 Oct, Item 15: A21 Progress Report, dated 18 Oct 1995, 
Annex C, ‘Employment of the Army Reserve – A Concept for the A21 Review’, ‘Reserves in the Total Force’, 
para 10. 
60 Peter Dunn, interview 18 Nov 2015. 
61 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Agenda Item 6: Full Time / Part Time Balance, dated 08 Nov 1995, para 116, 
p. 18-19. See also AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Submission No. 8/94, p. 6 and Minute No. 6/94, dated 26 Aug 
1994, p. 3; and CGS Submission 1159/94, dated 26 Oct 94. 
62 Ian McLachlan, interview 07 Dec 2015. 
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power relationships despite a net capability gain to these corps.63 A third dominant tribe is 
the conventional forces (cf. SF). A21’s proposed increase in SF for expeditionary taskings 
antagonized the conventional tribe.64 
 
Further, A21’s unconventional drafting process undermined its credibility when back-briefed 
to the Service.65 Given Dunn’s focus-group methodology, A21’s force structure is a ‘bottom -
up’ solution – a best-fit assembly of contributions from diverse sources and influences. This 
design process posed an important, real capability question: would the A21 outcome work in 
the field, in practice? For example, while the tactical political convenience of embedding has 
been highlighted, this did not guarantee its practical effectiveness. While Sanderson praised 
Dunn for being “quick”,66 several interviewees claimed the process was rushed and the 
outcome artificial. Mark Thomson, then an FDA analyst, stated A21 had “quite an intricate 
threat picture…it was so precise it had to be contrived”.67 Lieutenant Colonel Brice Pacey 
(DARA) contended that A21’s focus was capability development, with less attention to 
tactics and organisations.68 This builds on arguments developed in this and the last Chapter. 
If the technical feasibility of A21’s force structure was secondary to the primary objective of 
securing and increasing Army capability, it is consequentially plausible that technical 
feasibility issues would arise during implementation. Chapter 2 posited that successful 
change management requires both technical feasibility and cultural sensitivity: this section 
has examined the latter; the following Chapter examines both. 
 
In change management terms, A21’s challenge to Army culture had not created a ‘clear, 
shared, credible vision’; nor did it achieve ‘senior leadership buy-in’. While Sanderson 
ultimately carried A21 through CGSAC, the Concepts and Capability Committee69 and the 
Chiefs of Service Committee,70 A21 hit a political approval hurdle71 with the 1996 election of 
Howard’s Coalition Government. 
                                                 
63 John Sanderson, interview 23 Nov 2015. 
64 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Agenda Item 2: A21 Progress Report, dated 31 Aug 1995, para 27, p. 5. Note 
that CGSAC did not include a permanent SF member.  
65 Neil James, interview 16 Nov 2015. 
66 John Sanderson, interview 23 Nov 2015. 
67 Mark Thomson, interview 25 Nov 2015. 
68 Brice Pacey, interview 02 Dec 2015. 
69 This Committee included senior defence civilians, and considered the A21 Final Report on 14 December 
1995. AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Annex to Agenda Item 15: A21 Progress Report, Minute: ‘Implementation 
of the A21 Report’, dated 27 Oct 1995, para 6(b), p. 3.   
70 This Committee met on 28 February 1996. AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Annex to Agenda Item 15: A21 
Progress Report, Minute: ‘Implementation of the A21 Report’, dated 27 Oct 1995, para 6(b), p. 3.  
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Political Sponsorship? 
Sanderson faced an important decision point with the new Government. Well-aware of 
internal resistance within Army, would he persevere with an unpopular transformational 
change if the strategic guidance shifted from DoA?72 Perseverance required winning political 
sponsorship from the new administration; and consideration of Government’s policy 
ownership of A21came late.73 This section argues that Sanderson persevered for several 
reasons. First, given his liberal interpretation of DoA strategic guidance, changing it became 
less relevant – A21 was designed for a range of contingencies. Second, by early 1996, 
Sanderson was invested in A21 as his legacy, creating a new manoeuvrist Army for the 
modern age. Third: he was confident, perhaps naively so,74 of persuading the new minister of 
A21’s merits. Finally, Army’s capability resourcing was his priority.75 Sanderson retained his 
utter conviction that A21 was in Army’s best interests. 
 
A surprise selection as Defence Minister,76 Ian McLachlan was enthusiastic about A21’s TFs; 
these seemed sensible to him as offering mobile, useful forces.77 But McLachlan had three 
reasons for caution. First, he wanted to understand A21; clear communication and select 
details were not initially forthcoming from Sanderson.78 Second, A21 was developed with 
limited ministerial involvement under Labor.79 Third, endorsement would be premature 
before the Coalition developed its foreign and defence policies. By 1st July 1996, 
McLachlan’s public statements reflected a settled line of cautious appetite beyond DoA;80 
ready to reframe A21 as a supporting effort for his new defence policy, McLachlan endorsed 
                                                                                                                                                        
71 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Annex to Agenda Item 15: A21 Progress Report, Minute: ‘Implementation of 
the A21 Report’, dated 27 Oct 1995, para 2.  
72 There were pre-election signals that the Coalition’s defence policy would extend beyond DoA. Peter Jennings, 
‘The Politics and Practicalities of Designing Australia’s Force Structure’, Chapter 9 in Desmond Ball and 
Sheryn Lee (eds), Geography, Power, Strategy and Defence Policy: Essays in Honour of Paul Dibb, (Canberra, 
ACT, Australia: ANU Press, http://press.anu.edu.au?p=346293, 2016), p. 124-125. 
73 Peter Jennings, interview 18 Dec 2015 and correspondence 23 Jun 2016. Notably, the A21 Implementation 
Plan did not include consideration of either an election date; or the possibility of a change of government. 
AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Annex to Agenda Item 15: A21 Progress Report, Minute: ‘Implementation of the 
A21 Report’, dated 27 Oct 1995, para 6(b), p. 3. 
74 Peter Jennings, interview 18 Dec 2015. 
75 John Sanderson, interview 23 Nov 2015. 
76 John Howard, Lazarus Rising – A Personal and Political Autobiography, (HarperCollins Publishers Australia, 
2010), p. 237. See also Ian McLachlan, interview 07 Dec 2015. 
77 Ian McLachlan, interview 07 Dec 2015 and Peter Abigail, interview 03 Dec 2015. 
78 For example, McLachlan wanted to understand the geographic distribution of A21’s TFs, and requested a 
map. It took almost two weeks for this map to be produced for the Minister. Ian McLachlan, interview 07 Dec 
2015; pers comm 24 Jun 2016. 
79 Peter Jennings, correspondence 23 Jun 2016. 
80 Ian McLachlan, ‘A Statement on Liberal Defence Policy, 1st July 1996’, Journal of the Royal United Services 
Institute of Australia, 17: 1-3, Nov 1996. 
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it in October subject to four modifications.81 The initiative was to be rebadged as 
‘Restructuring the Army’ (RTA). References to the RRes scheme were to be removed. The 
report’s treatment of non-DoA tasks was to be expanded. Finally, McLachlan’s 15th October 
1996 Ministerial Statement flagged capital investment in Army: though conveniently deferred 
until 2000, and informed by a trials program:82 this became RTA.  
 
The trials idea represented both clever politics (the trials demonstrated a proactive 
Government, and were ‘needed’ to inform subsequent investment) and a sensible risk hedge. 
Testing A21 prior to full implementation had been suggested in Army as early as May 
1996;83 further, Peter Jennings, the Minister’s Chief-of-Staff, was aware of disquietude in 
Army’s senior ranks over A21;84 this disunity informed Government’s calculus of RTA’s 
success likelihood.  
 
While Sanderson had achieved qualified political sponsorship, his interactions with the 
Minister were strained,85 contributing to the latter’s conviction that Defence needed major 
reform to improve responsiveness.86 This crystallised in the Defence Efficiency Review 
(DER), announced in the same Ministerial Statement as RTA.87 Chapter 5 examines how this 
concurrent resourcing constraint affected RTA’s implementation. 
 
Does A21/RTA constitute evidence of provider capture? The evidence strongly suggests 
Sanderson was: firstly, acting in Army’s self-interest, given the ambitious capability 
acquisitions A21 proposed; and secondly, liberally interpreting DoA given A21’s muscular 
force structure. Provider capture requires these actions be at variance to the principal’s 
interests. The Defence civilian reaction to DARA’s ‘non-DoA’ scenarios shows discomfort 
with Army’s stretch of policy ambiguity. However, clear provider capture diagnosis is 
hampered by that very policy ambiguity: declared DoA alongside interest in expeditionary 
                                                 
81 Peter Dunn, interview 18 Nov 2015. 
82 Ian McLachlan, Ministerial Statement: Defence Policy, Restructuring the Australian Army, (Canberra, ACT: 
Parliament 38 of the Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives Hansard, 15 October 1996). 
83 Frank Hickling, ‘Organising Land Forces for the Future’, Chapter 13 in Malik, The Future Battlefield, p. 219-
228. 
84 Peter Jennings, interview 18 Dec 2015. 
85 Ian McLachlan, interview 07 Dec 2015; Peter Jennings, interview 18 Dec 2015. 
86 Peter Jennings, interview 18 Dec 2015. Jans and Schmidtchen describe the DER as ‘dictatorial or forced 
transformation’, triggered by ADHQ’s ‘lack of responsiveness’. Nicholas Jans and David Schmidtchen, ‘Culture 
and Organisational Behaviour at Australian Defence Headquarters’, Australian Defence Force Journal, 158: 23-
28, Jan/Feb 2003, p. 23, 25. 
87 McLachlan, Restructuring the Australian Army. 
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capability (Chapter 3). The greater the strategic ambiguity, the less fair a charge of provider 
capture becomes.  
 
Did the principal detect provider capture? Certainly the Minister’s Office detected 
Sanderson’s professional ambition, the wider Defence inefficiency issue,88 and the overriding 
imperative of federal budget restraint89 - probably the primary motivation for directing trials 
and hence delaying investment. Also, the Minister’s Office lacked detailed expertise to judge 
A21,90 and had pressing portfolio issues elsewhere.91 Finally, the Coalition’s tentative policy 
movements beyond DoA increased ambiguity around the expeditionary margin: so 
Government’s interests were ‘catching up’ with Army’s ambition. While reducing provider 
capture severity, there remained still an imperfect alignment between the compelling strategic 
and budgetary drivers of Government; and Army’s ambitious capability objectives in A21: 
the latter exceeded the former. The strategic ambiguity allowed Army to mask its ambitions 
as a ‘capability game’. This imperfect alignment held change management consequences, as 
Sanderson could not transparently communicate A21’s ‘capability game’.92 This undermined 
building a clear, shared, credible A21 vision within Army; and political sponsorship with 
Government externally. 
 
Conclusion 
This Chapter contends that A21 was a capability game, and mounts four arguments. First, 
that Army’s primary objective for A21 was capability resources. Second, A21’s force 
structure was designed to meet DoA and other contingencies: its apparent DoA conformance 
masked a muscular force. Third, despite A21’s capability offerings, it encountered significant 
internal resistance from Army’s senior leadership, mostly based on culture. Finally, 
Sanderson persevered despite the change-of-Government, primarily to advance Army’s 
capability resourcing, burning significant political capital in doing so. But in change 
management terms he had not created ‘a clear, shared, credible vision’ or ‘senior leadership 
buy-in’ internally; and received only qualified ‘political sponsorship’ externally. Chapter 5 
                                                 
88 Peter Jennings, interview 18 Dec 2015. 
89 John Howard, Lazarus Rising. See also Ian McLachlan, interview 07 Dec 2015. 
90 Ian McLachlan, interview 07 Dec 2015; and Peter Jennings, interview 18 Dec 2015. 
91 Ian McLachlan, response to Questions on Notice – Defence Projects, (Canberra, ACT: Parliament 38 of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives Hansard, 25 Mar 1997). This featured JORN (Jindalee 
Over-the-Horizon RADAR Network) and the problematic Collins submarines. 
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considers the trials, which built an evidence base to justify significant investment in Army’s 
capability. 
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Chapter 5: RTA (1997-1998) 
 
The purpose of these Restructuring the Army trials is to inform…development…of an 
Army that is effective, affordable and sustainable. The [trials] objectives…cover six 
critical areas for future capability development…combat effectiveness, affordability, 
sustainability, doctrine, simulation and decision-making systems.1 
 
The trial had to be valid so an adverse result wasn’t rejected because the trial was 
flawed (or biased).2 
 
The scale of the RTA trials from 1997 was unprecedented.3 No one in the Service could 
recall a previous initiative committing an entire brigade (one-third of Army’s combat power) 
to several years of experimentation.4 This Chapter examines the change management 
elements of the RTA trials (1997-1998) from internal and external perspectives, revealing 
mixed success. The Chapter mounts two arguments. First, while the trials tested A21/RTA 
concepts, their real value lay in generating evidence supporting increased capability resources 
for Army: an important external objective.  
 
Second, A21/RTA was, however, less successful internally – in technical and cultural 
respects. Several A21 concepts failed for technical reasons in the trials; and disruptions 
elsewhere in Army hardened cultural resistance. The failure to achieve early successes in 
these respects (an important change management element) undermined confidence in the 
reform, ultimately expressed as externally-imposed leadership change. This outcome supports 
Chapter 2’s proposition that successful change management requires both technical feasibility 
and cultural sensitivity. These arguments are presented in the following two Sections. 
 
Trials: Generating Evidence for Capability Resources 
While the trials tested A21/RTA concepts, their real value lay in generating evidence 
supporting increased Army capability resources. Four pieces of evidence support this. First, 
while superficial RTA trials objectives included testing A21 concepts, the revealed deeper 
                                                 
1  Greg de Somer, The Capacity of the Australian Army to Conduct and Sustain Land Force Operations, Land 
Warfare Studies Centre (LWSC) Working Paper No. 106, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Land Warfare Studies 
Centre, October 1999), p. 53. This author’s underlined emphasis. 
2 Dean Bowley, interview 19 Dec 2015. 
3 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, ‘A21 Trials – Draft Trials Directive and Trials Management Structure’, dated 18 
Nov 1996, para 2, p. 1. 
4 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Chief of the General Staff Directive, ‘Restructure of the Army: A21 Trials 
Directive’, draft dated Nov 1996, para 26, p. 5. 
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objective, highlighted in the opening quote, was to inform capability development.5 Second, 
the trials’ team was composed to achieve ‘leadership buy-in’ that was open-minded on the 
A21/RTA concepts - and which understood the trials’ capability objective. Third, the 
involvement of the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) conferred 
credibility and a quantitative evidence base which re-affirmed capabilities desirable to Army 
(including a compelling case for tanks and artillery). This represented another change 
management element: ‘evaluation and improvement’.6 Finally, the 1998 trial outcomes 
contributed to improved capability resources for Army. These last three evidence pieces are 
presented in succession below. 
 
Trials Leadership Buy-In 
Sanderson’s selection of formation and commander to undertake the trials demonstrates 
intent to build leadership buy-in which was open-minded on the A21 concepts; but more 
importantly understood the capability objective of the trials. 
 
The December 1996 Chief of the General Staff (CGS) Directive for the RTA Trials7 
nominated 1st Brigade in Darwin as lead because ‘its mix of capabilities (tanks, ASLAVs,8 
long range artillery and mechanised infantry) was closest to that of the objective structure 
identified in A21’.9 The 1st Brigade was a good choice, due to firstly its conventional 
capabilities; and secondly its cultural reputation for experimentation: “an environment of 
innovation”.10 
 
For the new 1st Brigade Commander, Sanderson made an unusual selection in Brigadier J.J. 
Wallace, a career Special Forces officer. However, analysis reveals clear logic in this 
appointment, given RTA’s objectives. First, Wallace believed his surprise appointment to 
lead a (conventional) mechanised brigade was because “Sanderson thought I would have an 
                                                 
5 See also Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report, 1996-97, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Australian 
Government, 1997), p. 96 and 98. 
6 See Chapter 2. 
7 Australian Army Headquarters, Chief of the General Staff Directive 13/96, ‘A21 Task Force Trials’, dated 20 
Dec 96. 
8 ASLAV = Australian (AS) Light Armoured Vehicle. 
9  Directorate for Restructuring the Army (DTRIALS), Final Report into the Restructuring the Army Trials, 
(Canberra, ACT, Australia: Australian Army Headquarters, 2000), p. 5. 
10 Fergus McLachlan, interview 01 Mar 2016. See also: Jim Wallace, interview 18 Nov 2015; and David Welch, 
interview 30 Nov 2015.  
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open mind – I didn’t come with baggage, from a conventional point of view”.11 Second, 
Wallace’s selection reflected an obvious contrast with his predecessor: Brigadier (later Major 
General) Jim Molan had been a noted A21 critic.12 Third, Wallace’s selection aligned with 
Sanderson’s intent to give more prominence to SF in A21, noted in Chapter 4. Finally, 
Wallace had made some significant doctrinal contributions to the newly emergent manoeuvre 
theory,13 which resonated with Sanderson’s ‘strategic manoeuvre’ outlook.  
 
Wallace’s open-minded leadership buy-in on the A21/RTA concepts and understanding of 
the trials’ capability objective is demonstrated as follows. First, he did not feel pressured to 
‘prove’ A21/RTA (or not);14 confident he had a free hand, Wallace “was determined to give 
this a full go”.15 Second, Wallace was open-minded on the embedding concept16 for 
achieving a combined arms effect - one hypothesis tested in the trials. Intuitively, Army 
viewed unit-level embedding as contrary to the ‘Concentration of Force’ Principle of War, 
i.e. that scarce arms corps resources, such as armour and artillery, were best employed in 
mass, and commanded at a divisional level.17 As a manoeuvrist, Wallace regarded this view 
as parochial,18 conversely seeing potentially higher tempo (as TF units were already task-
organised for battlefield response).19 Finally, and most importantly, he perceived A21/RTA 
“was designed to protect the Army because it justified the retention (and in some cases 
expansion) of all these capabilities…there was a defensible logic in the structure”.20 While 
Wallace’s leadership represented supportive internal buy-in for the trials’ objectives, this was 
complemented by external scientific credibility provided by DSTO. 
 
  
                                                 
11 Jim Wallace, interview 26 Nov 2015. 
12 Jim Molan, interview 06 Dec 2015. See also Michael Evans, Forward from the Past: The Development of 
Australian Army Doctrine, 1972-present, Land Warfare Studies Centre (LWSC), Study Paper No. 301, 
(Canberra, ACT, Australia: Land Warfare Studies Centre, September 1999, 91 pp.). 
13 Wallace authored some manoeuvre theory doctrine during an instructional posting in the UK. Jim Wallace, 
interview 26 Nov 2015. 
14 Jim Wallace, interview 26 Nov 2015. 
15 Jim Wallace, interview 26 Nov 2015. 
16 Australian Army, An Australian Army for the 21st Century, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Commonwealth of 
Australia, Oct 1996), p. 23. 
17 Annex 5-A. 
18 Jim Wallace, interview 26 Nov 2015.  
19 P.J. Dunn (Brigadier), R. Neumann, W. Traynor (Brigadier), W. Spears (Group Captain) and A. Bedford, 
Army in the 21st Century – Phase 3 – Options for the Future, A21 Army Structure Review. Report submitted to 
the Chief of the General Staff’s Advisory Committee (CGSAC), dated 30 Nov 1995, para 57, p. 17-18. 
20 Jim Wallace, interview 26 Nov 2015.  
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Evaluation and Improvement 
The RTA trials were the first large-scale DSTO application of quantitative operational 
analysis to the Army.21 This shows an evidence-based approach – Aristotelian logos22 - 
towards winning increased Army capability resources. DSTO’s metrics would provide 
credibility, with both evidence and (real and perceived) independence.23 This credibility was 
crucial to addressing possible perceptions of provider capture, relative to Army conducting 
the trials internally only. The DSTO team24 was committed to objective, scientific testing: 
 
[Army] constructed the A21 idea as a null hypothesis…that if they tested it, and it 
broke, they would find out what would work…and we tested structures and concepts 
to destruction – to validate or invalidate the hypothesis.25 
 
DSTO’s operational analysis commenced from October 1997, and focused on combat 
effectiveness and technology effects.26 DSTO applied a new approach –labelled the 
‘battlelab’.27 This involved an iterative ‘model-test-model’28 process based on computer 
modelling, simulation wargaming and finally field phase testing with Wallace’s formation 
throughout 1998.  
 
DSTO generated categorical evidence in 1998 re-affirming capabilities desirable to Army, 
especially armour and artillery – even in low-level contingencies:  
 
                                                 
21 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report, 1997-98, Program 10: Science and Technology, (Canberra, 
ACT, Australia: Australian Government, 1998), p. 259-269. See also Joanne J. Fisher, Michael J. Brennan and 
Dean K. Bowley, A Study of Land Force Modernisation Studies in DSTO, 1996 to 2000 (U), Defence Science 
and Technology Organisation Report, DSTO-GD-0358, (Edinburgh, SA, Australia: Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2003), Executive Summary. Note that smaller-scale DSTO work with Army was initiated in 1994 for 
Project WUNDURRA. Dean Bowley, correspondence 11 Jun 2016. 
22 See Chapter 2. 
23  AAHU, Chief of Army’s Senior Advisory Group (CASAG) Proceedings, ‘RTA Update’, dated 07 May 1998, 
para 11, p. 2. 
24 This consisted of a large team from the newly created Land Operations Division (LOD) under Dr Roger 
Lough (Chief LOD), led by Head RTA Trials and Lead Analyst Dean Bowley. 
25 Michael Brennan, interview 21 Dec 2015. 
26 Australian Army Headquarters, Chief of Army Directive 12/97, ‘RTA Trials Master Plan’, dated 03 Oct 1997. 
See also: Australian Army Headquarters, Chief of the General Staff Directive 7/96, ‘Restructure of the Army: 
Initiating Directive’, dated 31 Oct 1996, para 33, p. 6; and Australian Army Headquarters, Chief of Army 
Directive 12/97, ‘RTA Trials Master Plan’, dated 03 Oct 1997. 
27 Fisher et al., A Study of Land Force Modernisation Studies in DSTO, Executive Summary. 
28 Australian Army Headquarters, Chief of Army Directive 10/98, ‘Restructuring of the Army Trials Master 
Plan’, dated 06 Jun 1998, para 6. 
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combined arms effects proved fundamental to success in low level conflict…in all 
cases, the presence of tanks and the employment of artillery in an infantry company 
attack reduced infantry casualties by a total of more than 70%, recommending 
retention of integral direct and indirect firepower (such as tanks and artillery) to 
allow local commanders to retain the initiative.29 
 
Translation into Capability Resources 
Wallace contended the trials’ biggest outcome was demonstrating the capabilities needed in 
Army.30 This evidence became even more important following release of revised strategic 
guidance, Australia’s Strategic Policy 1997 (ASP97). Despite signalling a Defence policy 
expansion beyond DoA,31 ASP97’s ‘maritime concept’ was essentially a naval strategy,32 
based on sea and air assets which left Army last on the priority funding list.33 Evidence from 
the trials was Army’s best hope for breaking this persistent budgetary phalanx.  
 
While commentators have questioned the relevance of A21/RTA concepts in ASP97’s 
wake,34 this analysis underscores the important capability context of the trials in 
understanding Army’s response to ASP97. Sanderson made two decisions following ASP97’s 
December 1997 release. First, he issued a revised Trials Directive and Army Plan. The 
Directive updated Phase 2 of the RTA trials from ‘High-Intensity Conflict’ to ‘Offshore 
Tasks’, in conformance with ASP97.35 The Army Plan of 1998 both acknowledges the 
                                                 
29 DTRIALS, Final Report into RTA Trials, p. 6, 7 and 8. 
30 Jim Wallace, interview 26 Nov 2015. 
31 Department of Defence, Australia’s Strategic Policy 1997, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1997), p. 32. See also Stephan Frühling, ‘Australian Strategic Guidance Since the Second World 
War’, in S. Frühling, A History of Australian Strategic Policy Since 1945, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Defence 
Publishing Service, 2009), p. 38. 
32 Michael Evans, The Role of the Australian Army in a Maritime Concept of Strategy, Land Warfare Studies 
Centre (LWSC), Working Paper No. 101, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 1998), p. 3, 
26. 
33 Ian McLachlan, Ministerial Statement: Australia’s Strategic Policy, (Canberra, ACT: Parliament 38 of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives Hansard), 02 Dec 1997. See also Joint Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, From Phantom to Force: Towards a More Efficient and 
Effective Army, Inquiry into the Suitability of the Australian Army for Peacetime, Peacekeeping and War, 
Report No. 95, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, September 
2000), p. 39, para 3.11. 
34 Hugh White, ‘The Strategic Review: What’s New?’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute of 
Australia, 19: 55-66, 1998, p. 59. See also: Michael Evans, Forward from the Past: The Development of 
Australian Army Doctrine, 1972-present, Land Warfare Studies Centre (LWSC), Study Paper No. 301, 
(Canberra, ACT, Australia: Land Warfare Studies Centre, September 1999), p. 53; and Albert Palazzo, The 
Australian Army: A History of the Organisation, 1901-2001, (South Melbourne, VIC, Australia: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), p. 366. 
35 Australian Army Headquarters, Chief of Army Directive 10/98, ‘Restructuring of the Army Trials Master 
Plan’, dated 06 Jun 1998. 
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revised strategic guidance and indicates that A21/RTA’s TF design possessed the inherent 
flexibility to meet that guidance36 - as argued in Chapter 4. Second, Sanderson decided to 
persevere with Phase 1, the first field phase of the trials, scheduled to commence in 1998.37 
This field phase, with DSTO’s involvement, was critical for generating evidence supporting 
increased Army capability resources.  
 
By late 1998, this approach paid dividends. Wallace was posted then as Director General, 
Land Development, determined to “put the capabilities into the procurement stream”.38 And 
there was some budget for this; by June 1998, Chief of the Defence Force (CDF), General 
John Baker was publically declaring Army’s share of Defence capital budget as 30 percent;39 
a big rise on the previous 10 percent. Minister McLachlan approved an order for 280 new 
ASLAVs; with Bushmasters in the pipeline.40 
 
…But Not Achieving Early Successes Internally 
The above section demonstrated how the real value of the trials was in generating evidence 
supporting increased Army capability resources. However, RTA failed to achieve early 
successes (another change management element) internally – in two other respects. Firstly, 
some A21 concepts tested in the trials failed for technical reasons; secondly, disruptions 
caused elsewhere in Army hardened cultural resistance to A21/RTA. Collectively, these 
undermined confidence in the reform, ultimately expressed as leadership change. 
 
Unsuccessful A21 Concepts 
The trials generated evidence not supporting three A21 concepts: embedding, logistics and 
technology. For Army, unit-level embedding was a controversial A21 concept,41 and Army 
extensively tested it during the trials.42 Embedding did not work, in practice: but for three 
quite subtle reasons, not for breaching ‘Concentration of Force’. First was “inefficiencies in 
                                                 
36 Australian Army Headquarters, The Army Plan 1998, Part One: The Army Vision and the Chief of Army’s 
Intent, para 10-11, p. 4.  
37 Annex 5-B. 
38 Dean Bowley (interview 19 Dec 2015) recalling a farewell conversation with Jim Wallace in late 1998. 
39 John Baker, National Press Club Address, 01 Jul 1998 (DVD audio-visual recording). 
40 Ian McLachlan, interview 07 Dec 2015.  
41 The embedding concept is critiqued in Annex 5-A. 
42 Embedding was not explicitly tested by DSTO in the RTA trials. DSTO emphasised its independence in the 
RTA trials, and notes that Army had responsibility for conclusions reached specifically on the embedding 
concept. Dean Bowley, correspondence 11 Jun 2016. 
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logistic support in barracks”.43 Wallace described that embedding armour across multiple 
infantry units required expanded reinforced hardstanding and upgraded roads within barracks. 
There were insufficient logistic elements to embed in the field and in barracks, and dispersed 
logisticians had difficulty achieving critical mass for professional development.44 Embedding 
engineer elements was found to be inefficient.45At Phase 1’s conclusion, Commanding 
Officer of 1st Combat Service Support Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier) David 
Welch recommended reversion to the original structure for both engineer and logistic 
subunits.46  
 
A21’s logistic concept involved removing some first and all second line support from the TF 
units; A2 and B echelon logistic support, especially workshops, was consolidated 
rearwards,47 leaving TF units with only A1 first line logistics. Analysis suggests this 
contradicts A21’s concept of widely dispersed, manoeuvrist operations and low force-to-
space ratios, which demanded more logistic support forward, not less. Wallace recalls that 
logistic limitations slowed down operational tempo, contrary to manoeuvrist tenets.48 Welch 
states that amongst the logistic corps, A21’s logistic concept was regarded as a design flaw.49 
 
The second embedding problem was revealed during the trials’ exercises. While designed to 
impart greater flexibility for the tactical commander, conversely Wallace noticed embedding 
“tended to create…a less flexible mindset”.50 This was because embedded TFs didn’t require 
the specific mental exercise of consciously task-organising a battalion group, from the 
centralised asset pool of the brigade, for each given tactical task. Junior officers lost mental 
agility as they manoeuvred ‘one size fits all’ units around the Northern Territory training 
areas. The third problem Wallace saw was too much ‘overforce’ in embedded units. 
                                                 
43 Jim Wallace, interview 26 Nov 2015. 
44 David Welch, interview 30 Nov 2015. 
45 David Welch, interview 30 Nov 2015. See also AAHU, CASAG Proceedings, Minute 6/98, ‘Army 
Maintenance Engineering in the 21st Century’, dated 07 May 1998, para 2, p. 1. 
46 David Welch, interview 30 Nov 2015. 
47 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, ‘GS DIV Update for CGSAC’, ‘Directorate of Vehicle Systems Projects – 
Army’, dated 18 Nov 1996, p. 3. 
48 Jim Wallace, interview 26 Nov 2015. 
49 David Welch, interview 30 Nov 2015. See also AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, ‘Combat Service Support Level 
Three Force Structure Requirements: Submission to the A21 Working Group’, dated 08 Nov 1995, para 78, p. 
14. 
50 Jim Wallace, interview 26 Nov 2015. 
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Manoeuvring infantry units bulked up with their embedded elements around the battlespace, 
regardless of the tactical task, was wasteful of resources.51  
 
The RTA Final Report concluded:  
 
embedding of combat arms was less successful…at unit level…While some synergy 
was offered, this was offset by the additional maintenance, training and technical 
control overheads created…Embedding offered no tactical advantage over 
conventional combined arms tactics. It militated against the development of a culture 
of excellence and tactical flexibility and it proved to be excessively complex to train, 
administer and command 52 
 
and that the ‘brigade is the optimal organisation to conduct Australian warfighting tasks’.53 
Combined arms effects can be conceptually understood as achievable along a spectrum of 
force size (Annex 5-A). While Army’s pre-A21 start-state was the divisional structure, and 
A21 proposed unit-level embedding, the RTA trials recommended an intermediate position 
along this spectrum as optimal for grouping combat arms: the brigade level. A21’s specific 
embedding model seemed too prescriptive. 
 
On logistics, the report noted ‘the Defence Reform Program [DRP]54…overtook 
many…recommendations affecting strategic logistics’. However: 
 
the logistic concepts were not entirely adaptable to the evolving operational concepts. 
In particular it was doubtful that…centralisation and rationalisation of logistics 
functions at formation level would support more than the very low level of demand in 
low level DAA operations.55 
 
                                                 
51 Jim Wallace, interview 26 Nov 2015; Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1997-1998, (Canberra, 
ACT, Australia: Australian Government, 1998), p. 201; DTRIALS, Final Report into RTA Trials, p. 5. 
Arguably, this disproportionate resourcing would be less wasteful at increased threat levels. 
52 DTRIALS, Final Report into RTA Trials, p. 9. 
53 DTRIALS, Final Report into RTA Trials, p. iv. 
54 The Defence Efficiency Review (DER) recommended a major savings program, subsequently implemented 
and titled the Defence Reform Program (DRP). 
55 DTRIALS, Final Report into RTA Trials, p. 10. DAA = Defeating Attacks Against Australia. 
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On technology, the Final Report found A21’s ‘fundamental assumption’ that ‘employment of 
technology would provide opportunities for significant offsets in personnel’56 was false, due 
to increased demands of higher tempo; and that extant surveillance technology could not 
achieve required detection levels.  
 
Cultural Resistance 
These three A21/RTA concepts (embedding, logistics and technology) failed to generate 
early successes for technical reasons. Elsewhere in Army, cultural resistance was hardening 
as A21/RTA structures were implemented.57 In South-East Queensland, the focus of 
motorised (Bushmaster) capability,58 8th/9th Royal Australian Regiment was disestablished,59 
disenchanting the culturally dominant Royal Australian Regiment,60 which also saw the 
conversion of the 4th Royal Australian Regiment to an SF unit in Sydney. The 6th and 7th 
Brigades were merged and re-birthed as an integrated unit with the remnant troops of the 
defunct Ready Reserve scheme.61 The General Reserve (GRes) resented the loss of a one-star 
appointment as the previously GRes 7th Brigade came under command of an Australian 
Regular Army (ARA) brigadier.62 This loss was compounded when 4th Brigade in Victoria, 
selected for the ‘Revitalisation of the Reserve’63 trial, also received an ARA one-star 
commander, in addition to more ARA cadre staff and an increased budget. While benefiting 
select ARA staff, the increased GRes budget was funded through DRP savings,64 which were 
by 1998 sharply felt across the ARA;65 a likely source of ARA resentment. The 
rationalisation of command appointments was a structural similarity between A21/RTA and 
                                                 
56 DTRIALS, Final Report into RTA Trials, p. 9. 
57 Australian Army Headquarters, Chief of the General Staff Directive 8/96, ‘Restructuring the Army: Personnel 
Transfer to the Combat Force’, dated 31 Oct 1996.  
58 Australian Army Headquarters, Chief of the General Staff Directive 7/96, ‘Restructure of the Army: Initiating 
Directive’, dated 31 Oct 1996, p. 2. 
59 Australian Army Headquarters, Chief of the General Staff Directive 7/96, ‘Restructure of the Army: Initiating 
Directive’, dated 31 Oct 1996, Annex 2, para 7(a), p. A-2. 
60 Mark Kelly, interview 17 Dec 2015.  
61 The RRes scheme was dismantled on 08 February 1997. Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report, 
1996-97, p. 105 
62 Mark Kelly, interview 17 Dec 2015. See also: AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Report to CGSAC, 27 Oct – 
Item 15: A21 Progress Report, dated 18 Oct 1995, Annex A1, PROJECT VIRGO, ‘Issues’; and Defence 
Reserves Association, Submission No. 25 to the JSCFADT Inquiry into the Suitability of the Australian Army, 
W.E. Glenny, ‘An Army for the 21st Century: Fact or Fiction’, in: Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade, Defence Sub-Committee, Submissions: Inquiry into the Suitability of the Australian Army 
for Peacetime, Peacekeeping and War, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Parliament 39 of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, July 1999), Volume 1, p. 215-294, p. 220.  
63 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report, 1996-97, p. 106. 
64 Ian McLachlan, Ministerial Statement: Defence Reform Program, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Parliament 38 
of the Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives Hansard, 30 Sep 1997). 
65 Jeffrey Grey, The Australian Army: A History, (South Melbourne, VIC, Australia: Oxford University Press, 
2001), p. 255. 
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the pentropic experiment.66 However, the vanishing arms corps unit command positions 
posed to dislocate mid-ranking officer career streams:67 and was doubtless another source of 
resentment.  
 
Morale was an issue in Army Headquarters as well, with several contributing factors. First, 
the DRP made dramatic personnel68 and budget reductions. The DRP directed $770 million-1 
billion in savings from Army.69 This was 34-44 percent of Army’s 1994-95 $2.27 billion 
budget.70 The Defence Annual Report 1997-98 reports a $1 billion-plus budget reduction for 
Army relative to 1994-95, highlighting a substantial personnel redundancy program.71 
 
Second, alongside this contractionary budget environment, various interviewees describe 
stifled intellectual debate within Army, e.g. an embargo on use of the ‘E’ word 
(‘Expeditionary’). Dave Chalmers reflected: “Is that healthy? They do that in North Korea”.72 
Neil James, tasked with establishing the Land Warfare Studies Centre as a think tank 
contemplating the far-future Army, recalls being under explicit Chief of Army (CA)73 
direction not to criticise A21.74 David Welch recounted the dilemma Army faced, trying to 
imbue transformational thinking in the RTA trials staff: “if there were people in key roles 
who straddled the before and after…they tended to be stuck in the past…Some people were 
selected”.75 Brigadier Justin Kelly goes even further on the selection concept: “at 
my…interview for promotion to Colonel, I was asked if I supported A21”.76 Peter Dunn 
recalled the mass resignation of GRes officers over 1996-97, partially triggered by 
unrealistically long ‘Common Induction Training’ - a personnel supporting effort for RTA.77 
                                                 
66 John Blaxland, Organising an Army: The Australian Experience 1957-1965, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1989). 
67 Dunn et al., Army in the 21st Century, para 58, p. 18.  
68 AAHU, CASAG Proceedings, ‘Defence Efficiency Review’, dated 10 Apr 1997, para 4.  
69 AAHU, CASAG Proceedings, ‘Defence Efficiency Review’, dated 10 Apr 1997, para 4(m) and 6, p. 2.  
70 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report, 1994-95, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Australian 
Government, 1995), p. 81; See also AAHU, CASAG Proceedings, Agenda Item 2: ‘Five Year Defence Program 
(FYDP)’, dated 12 Sep 1996, para 6, p. 2. 
71 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report, 1997-98, p. 208. 
72 Dave Chalmers, interview 02 Dec 2015. 
73 The title was converted from CGS to Chief of Army (CA) on 19 February 1997, as part of the DRP 
restructures of ADF headquarters. Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report, 1996-97, p. 95. 
74 Neil James, interview 16 Nov 2015. 
75 David Welch, interview 30 Nov 2015. 
76 Justin Kelly, interview 20 Dec 2015. 
77 Peter Dunn, interview 18 Nov 2015. See also: AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Agenda Item 6: Full Time / Part 
Time Balance, dated 08 Nov 1995, paras 109, 110 and 112; AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Agenda Item 2: A21 
Progress Report – CCC Agendum Conclusions (Draft), dated 30 Nov 1995, para 17, p. 3; and AAHU, CASAG 
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Neil James stated: “the motion of enforcing A21 was so brutal – you’re either with or against 
us, and if you’re against us, you can retire”;78 Deputy Chief of Army from July 1998, Major 
General Peter Abigail, agreed.79 The Opposition raised Army’s morale issues in parliament in 
September 1997 as a ‘Matter of Public Importance’.80 
 
Chapter 2 highlighted that directive/coercive leadership styles may be needed to implement 
transformational change not aligned with members’ interests. The flaw in applying this to 
A21/RTA is that there were so many disaffected members that the reform was left champion-
less following leadership change. 
 
Leadership Change  
Chapter 2 also posited that successful change management requires both technical feasibility 
and cultural sensitivity. By 1998, the lack of early trials successes (technical feasibility 
doubts), and Army morale issues (expressive of cultural insensitivity), undermined political 
confidence. Defence leadership underwent significant change, with appointment of a new 
Secretary, CDF and CA.81 Sanderson was a candidate for CDF. He didn’t get the job, retiring 
from the ADF in late June 1998. A21/RTA was a contributing factor. McLachlan was 
unhappy with RTA’s lengthy process. While aware of cultural resistance, ultimately he held 
the CA accountable: 
 
They were very disturbed about this business of bringing the various parts of Army 
together, they didn’t like it…so you had this resistance from Ye Olde…Sanderson – 
great soldier - he just didn’t get the job done fast enough, and I was very 
frustrated…here was Army, not able to bring together even itself into these strike [sic] 
forces… It took too long, it was too slow, and he couldn’t explain it in a way that we 
could all understand.82 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Proceedings, ‘Agenda Item 1: Business Arising – A21 Implementation / Army Restructuring Update’, dated 21 
Feb 1997, para 38(a), p. 5. 
78 Neil James, interview 16 Nov 2015. 
79 Peter Abigail, interview 03 Dec 2015. 
80 However the Blackhawk disaster (of 12 June 1996 at High Range Training Area near Townsville, which 
involved the deaths of fifteen SF and three 5th Aviation Regiment troops), the DER/DRP (e.g. Department of 
Defence, Defence Annual Report, 1996-97, p. 99) and A21/RTA were plausible contributors. Ian McLachlan, 
Matters of Public Importance - Australian Defence Force: Morale, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Parliament 38 of 
the Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives Hansard, 25 Sep 1997). 
81 Annex 1-B. 
82 Ian McLachlan, interview 07 Dec 2015. 
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This and the last Chapter have thus demonstrated the explanatory value of the change 
management elements as contributors to this outcome.  
 
Conclusion 
This Chapter considered the 1997-98 RTA trials from both internal and external perspectives, 
and mounted two arguments. First, while the trials tested A21/RTA concepts, their real value 
lay in generating evidence supporting increased Army capability resources. Sanderson 
composed a trials team that was open-minded on A21’s concepts; and which understood the 
trials’ capability objective. He chose the 1st Brigade, both for its conventional capabilities and 
culture of innovation. He unusually selected an SF brigadier, J.J. Wallace, to command 1st 
Brigade and undertake the trials, based on Wallace’s open-mindedness on A21 concepts and 
commitment to capability development. Critical involvement of DSTO generated valuable 
evidence from the trials supporting Army’s capability resourcing, which by late 1998 was 
delivering outcomes. 
 
Second, A21/RTA failed to achieve early successes (an important change management 
element) in technical and cultural respects. Three A21 concepts failed for technical reasons in 
the trials; embedding, logistics and technology as a personnel substitute. Disruptions 
elsewhere in Army hardened cultural resistance towards A21/RTA, including disestablished 
units, loss of arms corps and GRes command appointments, and a leadership approach within 
Army headquarters that disaffected members. Combined with DRP-related resourcing 
constraints, Army morale was becoming a public issue by late 1997. Collectively, these 
internal factors undermined political confidence, ultimately expressed as external leadership 
change. This outcome supports Chapter 2’s proposition that successful change management 
requires both technical feasibility and cultural sensitivity. 
 
In February 1999, as A21/RTA was maturing into a model of continuous improvement,83 
new Commander 1st Brigade, Brigadier (later CDF General) David Hurley prepared to 
commence Trials Phase 2 (Offshore), under an operational scenario of ‘a mid-to-high 
                                                 
83 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, ‘GS DIV Update for CGSAC’, ‘A21 Trials Evaluation Methodology’, dated 18 
Nov 1996, p. 2. See also: AAHU, CASAG Proceedings, ‘RTA Update’, dated 07 May 1998, paras 7 and 10, p. 
2; and John Hartley, ‘An Australian Army for the 21st Century’, in J. Mohan Malik, The Future Battlefield, 
(Geelong, VIC, Australia: Deakin University Press, 1997), p. 209-218. 
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intensity environment within a coalition force’.84 This proved realistic: a signal was received 
that month from new CA Lieutenant General Frank Hickling, ordering elements of 1st 
Brigade to a reduced notice of 28 days. Hickling judged the developing strategic situation 
with East Timor and Indonesia as serious. RTA trials were suspended as the brigade prepared 
for a peacekeeping mission.85
                                                 
84 Australian Army Headquarters, Chief of Army Directive 10/98, ‘Restructuring of the Army Trials Master 
Plan’, Indicative Phase 2 Tasks for RTA TF Trials, para 13, dated 06 Jun 1998. 
85 David Connery, ‘The Strategic Director: ambiguity, the Army and the East Timor crisis of 1999’, Chapter 3 in 
D.K. Connery (ed), The Battles Before: Case Studies of Australian Army Leadership 1972-2010, (Sydney, 
NSW, Australia: Big Sky, 2016). 
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Annex 5-A: Embedding 
 
The A21 Review proposes to introduce to the Australian Army Order of Battle unique 
organisations that deliver greater organic combined arms capabilities than previously 
existed at both formation and unit level.1 
 
The embedding concept was perhaps the most controversial idea proposed in A21. This 
Annex offers a deeper exploration of the embedding as an operational/tactical-level concept 
for achieving combined arms effects, an important force structuring principle.2 The Annex is 
presented in four sections. First, the traditional divisional structural approach for achieving 
combined arms effects is reviewed. Second, the more recent evolution of task-organisation as 
an approach for achieving combined arms effects is described; and the design tension this 
presents between the force structuring principles of specialisation versus achieving combined 
arms effects is analysed. Third, these two approaches are assembled to present combined 
arms effects as achievable along a spectrum of force size. This allows identification of A21’s 
specific unit-level embedding model as occurring at one point along this spectrum; and the 
conceptual advantages and disadvantages of this are considered. The final section considers 
the strategic-level drivers for embedding, and highlights the application of similar drivers to 
joint force design at a larger scale. 
 
Traditional Structural Approach for Achieving Combined Arms Effects 
Embedding is one mechanism for achieving combined arms effects.3 This is a fundamental 
land force structuring principle, used throughout military history. It is based on grouping 
together infantry, armour, artillery, engineers etc,4 reflecting the organising principle that the 
strengths of each arm cover the weaknesses of other arms in the configuration. For example, 
a combined arms effect is achieved when an operation is conducted with infantry and 
armoured vehicles, supported by artillery and engineers to defeat an opponent. 
 
                                                 
1 AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Chief of the General Staff Directive: ‘Restructure of the Army: A21 Trials 
Directive’, draft, dated Nov 1996, para 2, p. 1. 
2 The ideas in this annex were developed through discussion with Major General (retd) Mark Kelly (interview 
17 Dec 2015), Major General Fergus McLachlan (interview 01 Mar 2016) and Mark Thomson (interview 25 
Nov 2015). 
3 The A21 Final Report states the principle that: ‘Units should be structured with combined arms assets 
embedded, as modern warfare requires the close coordination and cooperation of all available assets’. P.J. Dunn 
(Brigadier), R. Neumann, W. Traynor (Brigadier), W. Spears (Group Captain) and A. Bedford, Army in the 21st 
Century – Phase 3 – Options for the Future, A21 Army Structure Review. Report submitted to the Chief of the 
General Staff’s Advisory Committee (CGSAC), dated 30 Nov 1995, para 71(d), p. 23. 
4 Modern means of achieving combined arms effects may include aviation and other joint (i.e. naval, air, 
aerospace and cyber) assets. 
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The open question is: at what stage of the force generation cycle should this grouping occur? 
The force generation cycle ranges from: (1) force preparation (i.e. the three functions 
involved in preparing a force for operations known as ‘Raise, Train, Sustain’); through to (2) 
the actual conduct of a combat operation; to (3) force regeneration upon returning to 
barracks. 
 
In the traditional divisional structure, the basic unit of the Australian Army is a battalion 
(sometimes referred to as a regiment). Most battalion-sized units designed for combat are 
infantry, and other battalion-sized units are based respectively on the remaining arms corps of 
armour, artillery and engineers. A corps in this sense refers to the branch of specialisation 
within the Army. The corps are grouped into categories of combat (tasked with undertaking 
the fighting), combat support (providing critical support to enable the fighting units including 
communications) and combat service support (including logistics, transport, medical and 
other support). The combat corps are referred to collectively as the ‘arms corps’. 
 
In World Wars One and Two, arms corps were traditionally grouped together, in terms of 
structure and command, at the divisional level. A division (indicative size of 10,000 
personnel) generally includes numerous infantry battalions and one or more regiments each 
of armour, artillery and engineers (plus combat service support). This represents a high ratio 
of infantry troops to the other arms corps. Intermediate in size between a battalion and 
division is the brigade – a formation traditionally comprised of several infantry battalions. 
Historically, battles have been fought by committing units of different sizes – battalion, 
brigade, division – based on the size of the military task. However, combined arms effects are 
achieved when assets are committed from the unit containing the range of arms corps. For 
example, if armour and artillery regiments are grouped at the divisional level, the division is 
the smallest organisation able to directly task its organic units (i.e. units normally found 
within its structure) to achieve combined arms effects.  
 
Rationales 
There are two basic rationales for holding the various arms corps at divisional level, based on 
the force generation cycle described above. The first rationale applies to combat operations: 
the ‘Concentration of Force’ Principle of War. This principle holds that arms corps are most 
effective in the battlespace when employed in mass. It therefore follows that because armour, 
artillery, engineers etc are more scarce than infantry, they need to be commanded at higher 
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levels within the structure, to achieve Concentration of Force.5 The second rationale relates to 
force preparation: the roles of armour, artillery, engineers etc are complex and specialised, 
and specific training is required to generate the requisite expertise. Following collective 
recruitment and common induction training, soldiers and officers complete specialist training 
in their designated corps before posting to a unit (battalion-equivalent) of their corps. 
Traditionally, battalion-sized units (or regiments) have been regarded as the smallest-sized 
organisation able to sustain specialised arms corps expertise. As noted in Chapter 2, 
‘professional mastery’ is amongst the leading cultural attributes of the Australian Army, and 
is highly valued; further, as a ‘mechanistic’ structure, battalion-sized units of specialised arms 
corps expertise are also relatively easy to administer.6 
 
Task-Organisation: Design Tension between Force Structuring Principles 
In more recent decades, models other than divisional structures for grouping arms corps in 
battle have been explored, such as grouping the arms corps at the brigade level: a lower ratio 
of infantry to the remaining arms corps. Most recently, these ‘rigid’ models of grouping for 
battle have been relaxed, with the concept of task-organisation. This means that in preparing 
for battle, a commander will compose a specific group, based on the specific tactical task. A 
battlegroup is a battalion-plus sized grouping based on elements of infantry, armour, artillery, 
engineers, etc, assigned from specialist units within a brigade or division, and in flexible 
proportions contingent on the scenario. The battlegroup comes together, fights its battle, then 
the elements return to their parent units, where the specialist skills are fostered and honed. 
 
Combined arms effects achieved through traditional divisional grouping, and by the more 
modern task-organisation approach, both involve the arms corps coming together at the point 
of battle: i.e., at one point of the force generation cycle described above. For most other 
purposes, including force preparation, the separate arms belong to their parent (battalion-
                                                 
5 The A21 Final Report states: ‘The current Army approach to the battlefield reflects an anticipated scarcity of 
some combat and combat support units, e.g. armour, fire support and aviation. Considered ‘scarce’ resources, 
these are currently controlled centrally and allocated as necessary to forces’, and further: ‘This approach is valid 
only if the assets can be regrouped in a timely fashion to support the highest priorities’. Dunn et al., Army in the 
21st Century, para 57, p. 17. 
6 The A21 team referred to these as ‘homogeneous structures’ and posited that these ‘are less capable of 
sustained, independent operations because they depend on combat and combat service support from other 
homogeneous structures. While they offer economies in specialist training and maintenance support, and are 
easily replicated, their ability to adapt horizontally is limited because they represent only one capability.’ 
AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Report to CGSAC, 27 Oct, Item 15: A21 Progress Report, dated 18 Oct 1995, 
Annex F, ‘Achieving Adaptability and Versatility within the Land Force Structure derived to support Short 
Warning Conflict’, ‘Force Structuring Implications’, para 16, p. 5. 
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sized) specialised unit, within a division or brigade. Therefore, Army’s predominant force 
structuring principle is around force generation for specialisation, rather than achieving 
combined arms effects. There is a design tension between these two force structuring 
principles. 
 
A downside consequence of force structuring primarily for specialisation is that teamwork - 
‘habits of cooperation’- between the arms is more difficult to develop. In battle, combined 
arms are most effective under conditions of high coordination. If soldiers of a given arms 
corps have less familiar working relations with other arms corps soldiers (e.g. because 
they’ve been task-organised just prior to a battle), combined arms may be less effective. 
 
The main solution to this dilemma is regular combined arms training exercises. Major 
General Mark Kelly, formerly Commander of 3rd Brigade, the Army’s high-readiness group, 
described the success of this training model for building close teamwork in battle despite 
force structuring the arms corps into separate units, grouped at brigade level.7 
 
In contrast, A21’s embedding concept involved permanently structuring elements of armour, 
artillery and engineers into infantry (battalion) units. Fully implemented, there would be no 
more battalion-sized units of armour, artillery and engineers. The A21 task force structuring 
principle thus favoured combined arms effects: 
 
 It is acknowledged that there are benefits gained through grouping capabilities into  
units in peacetime, and then allocating elements of these units to the task organised 
unit conducting operations. This approach ensures that technical and training 
standards specific to a capability are tightly controlled. However, permanently 
grouping capabilities into task organised units would ensure better understanding 
and…synergistic training in peacetime. Training as a combined arms team would be 
enhanced: the specific to capability training could be independently monitored. Task, 
rather than functional grouping not only presents operational advantages, but allows 
a saving of personnel through a reduced need for unit headquarters.8 
 
                                                 
7 Mark Kelly, interview 17 Dec 2015. 
8 Dunn et al., Army in the 21st Century, para 58, p. 18. 
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A21’s embedding concept was an ‘organic’ structure, and the above description mirrors the 
posited theoretical benefits of this structural type in civilian organisations: reduced layers of 
management, and a more agile, responsive team.9 Army described this as ‘horizontal 
adaptability’: ‘…a force structure that is flexible enough to acquire, adapt, integrate, employ 
and support new capabilities without recourse to fundamental change’.10 
 
Combined Arms Effects as a Spectrum 
The two approaches for achieving combined arms effects treated in the two preceding 
sections can now be assembled. Conceptually, combined arms effects can be achieved at 
various points along a size spectrum. While task-organisation allows flexibility in the 
selection of a position along that spectrum, A21 embedding provided one prescribed solution: 
combined arms effects were to be achieved at unit (battalion) level.  
 
There are two disadvantages with this approach. First, the scenario/threat can also be 
conceptualised as a spectrum (from low-level through to high intensity). If the threat is low-
level, A21 embedding at battalion-level may provide a sufficient combined arms effect. 
Because the mid-to-high level conflict Phase of the RTA trials was not undertaken, arguably 
the limitations to A21’s embedding model on the ‘Concentration of Force’ Principle of War 
were not tested. Logically, the higher the conflict intensity, the more important 
‘Concentration of Force’ becomes for defeating a massed enemy. Therefore, at higher threat 
levels, A21’s prescriptive solution may be limiting: permanent embedding at unit-level is not 
necessarily scalable to deal with larger missions against more capable enemies.  
 
The second disadvantage relates to the design tension between the force structuring 
principles. A21 embedding posed cultural, technical and administrative challenges for the 
embedded arms corps. Cultural challenges included loss of unit identity and history, and loss 
of unit command appointments in these arms corps. The technical challenge concerned how 
the requisite expertise and specialised skills of each arms corps could be developed and 
sustained without the critical mass of a battalion-sized unit. Thus A21’s structural change 
threatened the model for achieving specialisation and professional mastery. Finally, evidence 
                                                 
9 See Chapter 2 and Annex 2-A. 
10 ‘Additionally, such structures provide the potential for practising or conducting combined arms operations as 
a matter of course at each level of command without the overheads normally associated with such training.’ 
AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, Report to CGSAC, 27 Oct, Item 15: A21 Progress Report, dated 18 Oct 1995, 
Annex F, ‘Achieving Adaptability and Versatility within the land Force Structure derived to support Short 
Warning Conflict’, ‘Force Structuring Implications’, para 14, p. 4 and para 17, p. 5. 
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of the administrative challenges of A21’s embedding model, as argued in Chapter 5, 
ultimately formed the strongest case against A21 in the RTA trials. As A21’s embedding 
model required a decentralised distribution of armour, artillery and engineer elements across 
numbers of infantry units, the resultant proliferation of logistic support requirements for these 
specialised elements (which had previously been centralised), resulted in uneconomic 
administrative overheads. These costs could only be acceptable if the net tactical benefits of 
A21’s embedding outweighed them. ‘Economy of Effort’ and ‘Administration and Logistics’ 
were other Principles of War for which A21 (and indeed any other force structure) needed to 
offer an acceptable trade-off. 
 
The main posited advantage of A21 embedding was development of enhanced combined 
arms effects (albeit to a limited size) due to the arms corps elements working and training 
permanently in the same unit. This was supported by amalgamation in 1997-98 of separate 
arms corps training establishments into the Combined Arms Training and Development 
Centre (CATDC).11 Theoretically, unit-level embedding could generate higher tempo, as less 
time is needed to task-organise when a tactical situation arises. With this conceptual 
understanding of the operational/tactical-level advantages and disadvantages of A21’s 
embedding model, the final section of this Annex highlights the strategic-level drivers for 
embedding. The application of similar drivers to joint force design at a larger scale is a 
critical implication from this analysis. 
 
Drivers for Embedding 
This section argues there were two drivers for embedding in A21. The first driver related to 
military concept development of this era; the second was political and administrative reasons. 
 
Sanderson described one of his key intellectual influences during this period as Douglas 
MacGregor’s 1997 book Breaking the Phalanx.12 MacGregor, a decorated US Army 
lieutenant colonel and military scholar, presented the thesis that ‘organizational change in 
armies can produce revolutionary change in warfare’, and that ‘truly large payoffs require 
                                                 
11 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report, 1997-98, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Australian 
Government, 1998), p. 203. 
12 Douglas A. MacGregor, Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century,  
(Center for Strategic and International Studies, Westport, CT, USA: Praeger, 1997), 238 pp. John Sanderson, 
interview 23 Nov 2015. 
 81 
changes in strategy, doctrine and organisation’.13 Structurally, MacGregor advocated ‘Joint 
Task Forces [with] an Army component…composed of highly mobile, self-contained, 
independent “all-arms” combat forces-in-being’.14 MacGregor argued that ‘traditional service 
distinctions are meaningless’,15 and that the: 
  
greater warfighting potential…conferred [by]…new technologies finds its outlet 
within a fixed “all-arms” framework. Only the need to adjust the proportion of arms 
to different tactical situations seems to limit the degree to which the various arms are 
grouped together permanently.16 
 
A21’s provenance is readily traced to MacGregor’s influential US work and related 
developments in manoeuvre theory. A21’s embedding was thus consistent with international 
military concept development of the era. Applied to the Australian context, A21’s embedding 
was consistent with A21’s concept of widely dispersed, independent operations, low force-to-
space ratios (which rendered the task-organising time penalty costly), and a strictly low-level 
threat scenario.  
 
The second driver was the posited efficiency benefits of embedding, in terms of reducing 
layers of command and eliminating numbers of regimental headquarters. As an ‘organic’ 
structure, the benefits associated with this ‘Theory of Change’ were attractive to politicians 
and administrators, for non-military reasons. As argued in Chapter 4, embedding was also an 
effective means of ‘hiding tanks in the structure’ within a Defence-of-Australia politico-
strategic orthodoxy, which questioned the requirement for some arms corps. 
 
Scaled up, similar dual drivers (military concept development; and political and 
administrative reasons) can be recognised in the contemporary debate on joint force design, 
both in Australia and internationally. While embedding different arms corps aims to achieve 
combined arms effects within the Army, a joint force approach involves coordinating 
elements of the three services (Army, Navy and Airforce) to achieve joint effects at a higher 
level.  McKenna and McKay describe the drivers for this joint approach as: 
 
                                                 
13 MacGregor, Breaking the Phalanx, p. 5, 54. 
14 MacGregor, Breaking the Phalanx, p. 5. 
15 MacGregor, Breaking the Phalanx, p. 25. 
16 MacGregor, Breaking the Phalanx, p. 50. 
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…the move towards joint action requiring the integration and coordination of 
elements of the Professions of Arms that have until relatively recently been operating 
largely independently. The drivers for this move towards joint include the increasing 
need for greater efficiency; the desire for finer control over the application of lethal 
force; and the requirement for the military to be employed in an ever increasing 
range of missions.17 
 
This suggests that some of the lessons emerging from A21/RTA may be transferrable to 
higher-level debates on the appropriate degree of ‘jointness’. Consideration of strategic-level 
drivers for A21’s embedding highlights a specific lesson for future reform. In contrast to its 
drivers, A21’s embedding concept is an operational/tactical-level concept, not a strategic one. 
This sub-thesis argues A21 was a capability game, with the primary objective being strategic-
level capability resourcing for Army. Yet the controversy and strongly-held views that A21’s 
embedding – an operational/tactical-level concept – attracted from Army arguably distracted 
from the primary strategic-level objective; and detracted from A21’s success as a reform. The 
lesson here is around awareness of the potential for operational/tactical-level issues to 
‘hijack’ a strategic-level reform; and the need to align objectives across the tactical, 
operational and strategic levels. 
 
Conclusion 
This Annex presented a deeper exploration of the embedding concept, one of the most 
controversial A21 concepts tested in the RTA trials. The Annex positions embedding as an 
operational/tactical-level concept for achieving combined arms effects, a fundamental land 
force structuring principle. The first section reviewed the traditional divisional structural 
approach for achieving combined arms effects, and the two underpinning rationales: the 
‘Concentration of Force’ Principle of War; and the force preparation considerations of 
achieving professional mastery and ease of administration. The second section analysed the 
more recent evolution of task-organisation as a generic second approach for achieving 
combined arms effects. That analysis elicited the design tension between the two force 
structuring principles of specialisation versus achieving combined arms effects. The third 
section assembled the two approaches for achieving combined arms effects into a spectrum of 
                                                 
17 Tim McKenna and Tim McKay, Australia’s Joint Approach, Defence Science and Technology Group 
Research Report 0427, (Fisherman’s Bend, VIC, Australia: Joint and Operations Analysis Division, Defence 
Science and Technology Group, 2015), p. 64-65. 
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force size. Within that spectrum, A21’s specific unit-embedding model can be understood as 
achieving a combined arms effect at one point along that size spectrum. The advantages and 
disadvantages of that single point were then considered, which further highlighted design 
tensions between force structuring principles and the Principles of War. The closing section 
presented a strategic-level perspective on the drivers for embedding, underscoring the 
influence of both military concept development of the era; and political and administrative 
reasons. The posited efficiency benefits of A21’s embedding model as an ‘organic’ structure 
resonated with these drivers as a ‘Theory of Change’. Finally, the working of similar drivers 
in current debates on joint force design was highlighted; as was the implication that A21’s 
lessons may be relevant to these debates as well. One of those lessons is around the potential 
of operational/tactical-level concepts (e.g. embedding) to generate controversy for a strategic-
level reform; and the need for alignment of objectives across the tactical, operational and 
strategic levels.
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Annex 5-B: RTA Trial Phases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       Calendar Year:        1997         1998         1999 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Jim Wallace, interview 26 Nov 2015. 
2 Australian Army Headquarters, Chief of Army Directive 10/98, ‘Restructuring of the Army Trials Master Plan’, dated 06 Jun 1998. 
Phase 1 Field Trial: Low-
Level Contingencies (DSTO) 
 
Phase 2: Offshore Tasks 
(DSTO)  
Phase 1 Field Trial: Low-
Level Contingencies (DSTO) 
Phase 2: High-Intensity 
Conflict (DSTO) 
Preparation Phase: 
Doctrinal Development 
Sanderson’s June 1998 revised 
CA Directive 10/98 
RTA Trials Master Plan:2 
 
Wallace’s original 3-phase  
RTA Trials Plan:1 
Dec 1997: 
ASP97 
Feb 1999: 
RTA Trials suspended  
(East Timor preparations) 
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Chapter 6: Expeditionary Redux - Army’s Role in Maritime Strategy (1999-2000) 
 
As a transformational change attempt, A21/RTA was woven with inconsistencies. Chapter 3 
noted Army’s difficulties shaping Government strategy during the DoA era, and responding 
to Government policy ambiguity of declared DoA orthodoxy alongside interest in 
expeditionary capability. Chapter 4 argued that while A21 was a capability game, it contained 
serious change management deficiencies, including credibility issues associated with building 
muscular Army capability while ostensibly conforming with benign DoA. Chapter 5 
highlighted ASP97’s nudge of Australia’s foreign and defence policy beyond DoA, with a 
‘maritime concept’ of strategy based on sea and air assets: while placing Army last for 
funding priority.  
 
Chapter 6 explains how these several inconsistencies were resolved through A21/RTA’s 
outcomes. The Chapter’s two objectives are: firstly, to contrast the change management 
approach of new Chief of Army (CA), Lieutenant General Frank Hickling; and secondly, to 
identify A21/RTA’s contribution and legacies, as Army strove to define its place within 
maritime strategy. 
 
The Chapter presents three arguments. First, Hickling was successful in achieving overt 
alignment between strategy and Army’s likely (expeditionary) tasks in 1999. Reasons 
included: Hickling’s transparency and directness, which conferred credibility on his vision; 
his alignment with Army’s enduring culture, which ensured internal support; and evolving 
strategic circumstances (notably East Timor) which rendered his principal receptive to his 
vision. Second, Army mounted two shaping efforts in 2000 (through a parliamentary inquiry, 
and the Ministerial A21/RTA outbrief). Both successfully reinforced Army’s vision; and their 
target became inclusion of significant Army capability in the upcoming Defence White Paper 
2000 (DWP2000). Third, these shaping efforts were successful in winning additional 
capability resources for Army in DWP2000. 
 
A21/RTA’s fate was abandonment – the trials were ceased as Army structurally returned to 
status quo ante in preparation for deployment to East Timor.1 However, two immediate 
A21/RTA legacies contributed to Army’s successful outcomes. First, RTA trials results were 
                                                 
1 Experimentation work did proceed, however, within the Combined Arms Training and Development Centre 
(CATDC). 
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used to justify Army’s ‘clean break’ from DoA and return to conventional warfighting. 
Second, Army discovered the power of evidence-based operational analysis to persuade its 
principal, informing modernisation and capability development. 
 
The Chapter’s arguments are presented in each of the succeeding three sections. 
 
A Contrasting Change Management Approach 
Hickling saw three challenges upon his appointment: (1) defining a strategically relevant role 
for Army; (2) addressing morale issues; and (3) handling severe resourcing constraints.2  
Hickling and his deputy Peter Abigail scoped a deliberate, broad approach for meeting these 
challenges. They sought to “build a compelling case that was accepted and understood by 
others”,3 interpreted here as the first element of successful change management. In contrast to 
Sanderson, Hickling based this case on overt alignment of the strategic narrative with Army’s 
likely tasks - which he saw as expeditionary - and hence a capability resources rationale.4 
Hickling recognised A21/RTA could generate capabilities equally applicable to non-DoA and 
DoA tasks,5 but viewed A21/RTA as problematic on two counts. The big problem was DoA: 
A21’s “confining of Army to this continental role”, and the perceived strategic irrelevance of 
remote Australia which “nobody in his right mind would invade”.6 Hickling connected 
DoA’s confined strategic guidance to Army’s morale issues; Abigail concurred.7 A smaller 
problem was dismantling the corps structures – especially armour and artillery –Hickling 
cited legitimate concerns for how specialised technical mastery could otherwise be achieved. 
By his CA appointment Hickling had decided Army “was not going to pursue the RTA 
path”.8 Hickling used two tools, to a degree exceeding Sanderson, to address Army’s 
challenges – the first is retrospectively assigned here as ‘by design’; the second as 
opportunistic. 
 
                                                 
2 Frank Hickling, interview 13 Aug 2015. 
3 Peter Abigail, interview 03 Dec 2015. 
4 Peter Abigail, interview 03 Dec 2015. 
5 Frank Hickling, interview 13 Aug 2015. See also the Defence Annual Report 1998-99, which reports as 
‘Achieved As Forecast’ a Performance Outcome titled ‘Further enhancing Army capability through the trial and 
evaluation of concepts outlined in Restructuring the Army’, stating ‘The Army continues to move from a 
platform replacement focus to a concept-led approach to capability development’. Department of Defence, 
Defence Annual Report, 1998-99, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Australian Government, 1999), p. 204. 
6 Frank Hickling, interview 13 Aug 2015. 
7 “Defence-of-Australia was just wrong…it had an enormously debilitating effect”. Peter Abigail, interview 03 
Dec 2015. 
8 Frank Hickling, interview 13 Aug 2015. 
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First, Hickling marshalled critical intellectual support, evidenced as follows. Abigail recounts 
their deliberate approach: “We wanted to gain the intellectual high ground in defence…and 
[Hickling] was determined to be transparent”.9 Hickling commissioned the Land Warfare 
Studies Centre to prepare a paper defining Army’s role in ASP97’s maritime strategy.10 In 
September 1998, Michael Evans published The Role of the Australian Army in a Maritime 
Concept of Strategy.11 Evans highlighted RTA was ‘not optimising the Army’s capabilities, 
force structure and doctrine for tasks which a close reading of the strategic guidance 
contained in ASP97 might require’. The paper states ‘too much concentration 
on…continental task forces for single-scenario, low-level contingencies will be 
counterproductive’, exhorting Army planners to emphasise ‘land force power projection in 
regional littoral warfare’.12 Hickling then commissioned revised capstone doctrine – the 
Fundamentals of Land Warfare (LWD-1.0).13 This built on Evans’ work, defining the 
maritime concept as the ADF’s force structure determinant,14 stressing in the first paragraph 
that ‘land forces must…manoeuvre in a littoral environment to secure Australia’s maritime 
approaches as well as in defence of continental Australia’.15 Linking Aristotelian rhetoric 
from Chapter 2, these intellectual resources constituted powerful ethos arguments (that is, 
appeal to authority - doctrine). 
 
Second, Hickling opportunistically used evolving strategic exigencies, an Aristotelian logos 
argument – appealing to logic and evidence.  The Asian Financial Crisis heightened just after 
ASP97’s release, rendering its assumption of regional stability doubtful.16 Hickling’s 
February 1999 decision to place one squadron of the 1st Armoured Regiment on reduced 
notice17 reflected observations of the Australia-Indonesia relationship and escalating tensions 
over East Timor.18  
                                                 
9 Peter Abigail, interview 03 Dec 2015. 
10 See also AAHU, CGSAC Proceedings, ‘Aspects of a Maritime Focus in the Defence of Australia and its 
interests’, DARA draft paper as at 17 Nov 1996, para 16. 
11 Michael Evans, The Role of the Australian Army in a Maritime Concept of Strategy, Land Warfare Studies 
Centre (LWSC), Working Paper No. 101, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 1998), 49 
pp. The speed with which LWSC101 was produced suggests that much of the thinking had already been done 
during the A21/RTA era. 
12 Evans, The Role of the Australian Army in a Maritime Concept of Strategy, p. vii-viii. This author’s emphasis. 
13 Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare (LWD-1.0), Doctrine Wing, 
Combined Arms Training and Development Centre (CATDC), (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1998). LWD = Land Warfare Doctrine. 
14 LWD-1.0, p. 3-15. 
15 LWD-1.0, p. i. 
16 Peter Jennings, interview 18 Dec 2015. 
17 Hickling asserted that this was prior to a directive from Government: “I had unilaterally…and probably 
exceeded my authority”. Frank Hickling, interview 13 Aug 2015. The National Security Committee of Cabinet 
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The second element of successful change management is building a clear, shared, credible 
vision. Hickling engaged with Army and the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) to do this. 
Hickling’s October 1998 senior officer address announced ‘Army would embrace a maritime 
concept of strategy’.19 His March 1999 Staff College address closed with: 
 
Army has to operat[e] in a maritime setting, as well as…on the Australian 
continent…Consequently…I have committed myself to a maritime strategy…I have 
nailed Army’s colours to that mast.20 
 
Hickling recalls the enthusiastic reception, indicating his vision was shared by these 
officers.21 Hickling’s engagement with CDF Barrie to build a shared vision had several 
advantages. They were old friends; and held similar strategic views on Army’s expeditionary 
role22 and Defence’s dire budget. In charting Army’s new vision, Hickling was confident 
Barrie wouldn’t object.23  
 
Political Sponsorship? 
A third element of successful change management, political sponsorship, was more 
challenging. Under new Defence Minister, John Moore, Hickling opportunistically read the 
‘implications of…emerging military strategies, particularly the need for more options for 
working with joint task forces in the Asia-Pacific region…’24 However Abigail recounts that 
                                                                                                                                                        
(NSC) considered and approved increased readiness of air and naval assets, and a brigade group, at its February 
1999 meeting. David Connery, Crisis Policymaking: Australia and the East Timor Crisis of 1999, (Canberra, 
ACT, Australia: Australian National University Press, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra Papers 
on Strategy and Defence No. 77, 2010), p. 23-24. 
18 Frank Hickling, interview 13 Aug 2015. Both Barrie (interview 17 Nov 2015) and Abigail (interview 03 Dec 
2015) concurred that the ADF sensed the likelihood of military tensions in early 1999, ahead of formal 
Government direction. 
19 Michael Evans, Forward from the Past: The Development of Australian Army Doctrine, 1972-present, Land 
Warfare Studies Centre (LWSC), Study Paper No. 301, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Land Warfare Studies 
Centre, September 1999), p. 55. 
20 Cited in Evans, Forward from the Past, p. 56. 
21 Frank Hickling, interview 13 Aug 2015. 
22 Barrie was one of the few Navy officers to complete the Army staff college at Queenscliff, and this gave him 
“a very different view from most of [his] naval colleagues on the value of Army…ground operations is what 
most fighting is about…most of the tasks that troops do, you can’t solve any other way than having troops”. 
Chris Barrie, interview 17 Nov 2015. 
23 Nicholas Jans, The Chiefs: A Study of Strategic Leadership, (Australian Defence College, Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2013), p. 69. 
24 ‘…CA said the focus on readiness would emphasise off-shore response options and defence of Australia…’, 
AAHU, CASAG Proceedings, Minute 9/98, ‘Outcomes of the 23/15 Working Group’, dated 17 Jul 1998, para 1, 
p. 1. See also Frank Hickling, interview 13 Aug 2015. 
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civil-military relations had been “dreadful”;25 and Hickling had no faith in the Defence 
Committee process.26 In contrast to Sanderson, he decided to by-pass both, expending “all 
[his] political capital in one hit”,27 by a direct public appeal at the National Press Club (NPC) 
in April 1999.  
 
Hickling’s NPC address announced two strategically significant shifts for Army: firstly, the 
resumption of a conventional warfighting focus,28 and secondly that Army would ‘embrace a 
maritime concept of defence so that we remain relevant to the nation’s security needs and 
aligned with government’s direction of strategic policy’.29 He stated a maritime strategy 
‘demands…the army operate offshore… as well as onshore’, (under)stating that ‘this 
represents a significant change…since our withdrawal from Vietnam’.30  
 
In Australian civil-military relations, this ranks amongst the most audacious peacetime 
manoeuvres of a Service Chief.31 Was this dramatic change management tactic effective? 
This Section argues it was, for five reasons. First, the media reaction to the NPC address was 
relatively benign, without overt hostility.32 As a barometer of the public’s readiness to re-
accept an expeditionary army; a neutral reaction was not unhelpful to Army’s expeditionary 
thinking. Second, Army’s reaction was overwhelmingly positive.33 The understanding of 
Army’s culture built in Chapter 2 and previous chapters identifies the reason: Hickling’s 
vision resonated strongly with Army’s traditional expeditionary and conventional warfighting 
culture. Third, the Minister’s reaction confirmed Hickling’s sense that Government policy 
ambiguity and appetite was ripe for change, requiring only a catalyst.34 Fourth, public debate 
on Army’s role materialised within a fortnight: Minister Moore launched a parliamentary 
inquiry into the ‘suitability of the Australian Army for peacetime, peacekeeping and war…to 
                                                 
25 “…because we were argumentative, because we were ‘agin’ the Government, we wouldn’t sign on for DoA 
being the fundamental force structure determinant”. Peter Abigail, interview 03 Dec 2015. 
26 Frank Hickling, interview 13 Aug 2015. 
27 Frank Hickling, interview 13 Aug 2015. 
28 “There should be no doubt about this: our focus is and must remain the delivery of warfighting capabilities 
that are international best practice. To aim for anything less would be an insult to our people in uniform; and a 
betrayal of the nation.” Lieutenant General Francis Hickling, National Press Club Address, 14 April 1999, 
(transcript and DVD audio-visual recording).  
29 Hickling, National Press Club Address, 14 April 1999. 
30 Hickling, National Press Club Address, 14 April 1999. 
31 Jans, The Chiefs, p. 69. 
32 Frank Hickling, interview 13 Aug 2015; see also Hickling, National Press Club Address, 14 April 1999. 
33 “It was the first time a senior army officer had intellectually defended the role of the Army that anyone could 
remember”. Neil James, interview 16 Nov 2015. 
34 “The Minister wasn’t angry with what I said – he was angry that I didn’t seek his permission”. Frank 
Hickling, interview 13 Aug 2015. 
 90 
ensure it provides viable and credible land forces able to meet a range of contingencies’.35 
Finally, the tactic was successful largely because it happened to be prescient. Within five 
months, Australia’s largest single deployment since World War Two (East Timor) occurred. 
This “stopped everything in its tracks…[and] illustrated perfectly the requirement for an 
Army that could mount expeditions”.36 
 
This Section’s change management comparison with Sanderson’s A21/RTA approach 
highlights the following differences that contributed to Hickling’s successful overt alignment 
of strategy with Army’s likely (expeditionary) tasks. First, Hickling’s transparency and 
directness – though bypassing official processes – conferred credibility37 and consistency to 
his vision, as did his intellectual tools.38 Second, alignment with Army’s enduring culture 
ensured internal support. Finally, Hickling was aided by circumstance (evolving regional 
instability) rendering his principal (Government) receptive to his vision. 
 
A21/RTA Contribution and Legacies  
The RTA trials were abandoned in early 1999; in 1st Brigade and elsewhere, Army returned, 
structurally, to status quo ante. The initial force deployed to East Timor was based on the 
high-readiness 3rd Brigade,39 using its conventional structure, untouched by the trials. Abigail 
drafted the mobilisation directive, recalling “we couldn’t afford that risk [of deploying with 
A21/RTA structures]…there were still too many questions about some of the conceptual 
aspects…we went with what we knew”.40  
 
                                                 
35 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, From Phantom to Force: Towards a More 
Efficient and Effective Army, Inquiry into the Suitability of the Australian Army for Peacetime, Peacekeeping 
and War, Report No. 95, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
September 2000), p. iv. 
36 Frank Hickling, interview 13 Aug 2015. See also ‘…as East Timor demonstrates, we also need a highly 
capable land force—one which is ready to operate at short notice and is highly mobile.’ John Moore, Ministerial 
Statement: East Timor, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Parliament 39 of the Commonwealth of Australia, House of 
Representatives Hansard, 21 September 1999). 
37 James Kouzes and Barry Posner, Credibility: How Leaders Gain and Lose It, Why People Demand It, (San 
Francisco, CA, USA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1993), 332 pp. 
38 Hickling also used his NPC address as an opportunity to publically launch LWD-1.0 as an unclassified 
document: he held up the publication for his audience during his address. While not unprecedented, this is 
unusual for Army doctrine. Hickling, National Press Club address, 14 April 1999. 
39 David Connery, ‘The Strategic Director: ambiguity, the Army and the East Timor crisis of 1999’, Chapter 3 in 
D.K. Connery (ed), The Battles Before: Case Studies of Australian Army Leadership 1972-2010, (Sydney, 
NSW, Australia: Big Sky, 2016). 
40 Peter Abigail, interview 03 Dec 2015. 
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Tracing A21/RTA’s legacies requires analysis of succeeding events in 2000. Army had built 
significant momentum in 1999 in influencing the strategic narrative – a fourth element of 
successful change management, ‘achieving early successes’. But to win capability resources, 
this momentum needed to be reinforced to solidify change – another element of successful 
change management. This Section argues that Army mounted two shaping efforts; that both 
were successful in reinforcing Army’s vision; and that their target became inclusion of 
significant Army capability in the upcoming Defence White Paper 2000 (DWP2000).41 The 
first shaping effort was through the parliamentary inquiry; the second was the Ministerial 
A21/RTA outbrief. 
 
Parliamentary Inquiry 
Army and the CDF welcomed the 2000 parliamentary inquiry42 as providing ‘Army with a 
unique opportunity to raise awareness of the expanding…and integral role…land 
forces…have in support of Australia's military strategies’.43 Again Hickling marshalled 
intellectual resources. Lieutenant Colonel Greg de Somer was tasked with preparing ‘the 
conceptual and intellectual basis for the Army’s Submission’,44 publishing The Capacity of 
the Australian Army to Conduct and Sustain Land Force Operations in October 1999. This 
crystalised Army’s new strategic narrative, stating Army ‘must be prepared to conduct land 
force operations throughout the spectrum of conflict’ and must ‘develop and maintain a high 
level of warfighting capability’ in order to ‘offer Government as broad a range of Military 
Response Options as possible…’45 The paper skilfully highlighted ASP97’s assessment of 
increasing uncertainty in Australia’s strategic environment, and the consequent expansion in 
Army’s likely tasks. The paper argued its recommendations were required for Army to meet 
ASP97’s guidance, concluding that the principal force structure determinant should be the 
                                                 
41 “We had to get our narrative into that White Paper”. Peter Abigail, interview 03 Dec 2015. 
42 Lieutenant General Francis Hickling, in: Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 
Defence Sub-Committee: Inquiry into the Suitability of the Australian Army for Peacetime, Peacekeeping and 
War, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Parliament 39 of the Commonwealth of Australia, Transcript, Official Hansard 
Report, Friday 26 November 1999), p. FADT 74; Admiral Chris Barrie, in: Joint Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Defence Sub-Committee: Inquiry into the Suitability of the Australian 
Army for Peacetime, Peacekeeping and War, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Parliament 39 of the Commonwealth 
of Australia, Transcript, Official Hansard Report, Friday 26 November 1999), p. FADT 75. 
43 Greg de Somer, The Capacity of the Australian Army to Conduct and Sustain Land Force Operations, Land 
Warfare Studies Centre (LWSC) Working Paper No. 106, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Land Warfare Studies 
Centre, October 1999), p. vi. 
44 de Somer, The Capacity of the Australian Army, p. vii. 
45 de Somer, The Capacity of the Australian Army, p. vi. 
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highest-end warfighting capability to be fielded by the force.46 Finally, the paper mounted an 
enduring argument favouring force structure conservatism: 
 
…while changes in strategic circumstances can be very rapid and unforeseen, and 
adjustments to preparedness can be achieved reasonably quickly given adequate 
resources, fundamental changes to doctrine and force structure take many years.47 
 
Army’s inquiry submission included most of de Somer’s paper verbatim,48 and CDF Barrie’s 
submission reinforced Army’s key messages.49 This ‘united front’ demonstrated that 
Hickling had achieved an element of successful change management: wider leadership team 
buy-in. The Committee tabled its final report, From Phantom to Force, in September 2000 
having considered 74 submissions.  
 
The inquiry supported Army’s vision, evidenced as follows. First, the title suggests a scathing 
assessment of Army’s state then, calculated to shock readership into supporting remedial 
action. The Committee observed ‘a tension between ASP97’s declared tasks…for the Army 
and the Department’s own task list…[it] implies…Army is required to do more 
than…articulated within current strategy’.50 The Committee attributed this primarily to poor 
strategic guidance and insufficient resources from government, and was highly critical of ‘the 
recurrent peacetime desire to limit ground forces to territorial defence’ stating ‘peacetime, 
peacekeeping and war are not distinct and separable conditions. All armies must be able to 
operate within a conflict spectrum’.51  
 
Second, the Committee observed many similarities between A21/RTA and the pentropic 
experiment, finding while neither were ‘accepted for a range of institutional, operational, 
                                                 
46 LWSC106 also included a slogan used frequently thereafter to describe Army’s preferred force structuring 
principle: ‘structured for war – adapted for peace’. de Somer, The Capacity of the Australian Army, p. 56. 
47 de Somer, The Capacity of the Australian Army, p. 18. 
48 Australian Army, Submission No. 47 to the JSCFADT Inquiry into the Suitability of the Australian Army, in: 
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Defence Sub-Committee, Submissions: 
Inquiry into the Suitability of the Australian Army for Peacetime, Peacekeeping and War, (Canberra, ACT, 
Australia: Parliament 39 of the Commonwealth of Australia, July 1999), Volume 3, p. 753-795. 
49 Department of Defence, Submission No. 35 to the JSCFADT Inquiry into the Suitability of the Australian 
Army, in: Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Defence Sub-Committee, 
Submissions: Inquiry into the Suitability of the Australian Army for Peacetime, Peacekeeping and War, 
(Canberra, ACT, Australia: Parliament 39 of the Commonwealth of Australia, July 1999), Volume 3, p. 549-
558. 
50 JSCFADT, From Phantom to Force, para 3.47, p. 50. 
51 JSCFADT, From Phantom to Force, para 1.16, p. 5. 
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cultural and other reasons’,52 resourcing deficiency was the ‘single biggest reason for the 
limited change in Army’s force structure during periods of peace’.53 The Committee thus 
reached its own conclusion on another element of successful change management: ‘enablers 
for change’ (e.g. resources). 
 
Third, amongst the Committee’s twelve broad recommendations, the most important were: 
(a) clear, coherent strategic guidance; (b) a balanced force structure capable of being 
deployed and sustained in two simultaneous (one major, one minor) focal areas within 
Australia’s ‘Area of Critical Security Interest’; (c) a war-fighting focus up to mid-intensity 
conflict; and (d) an Army resourcing increase.54 These were powerful re-affirmations of 
Army’s preferred force structuring principles, including an expeditionary and conventional 
warfighting focus. The inquiry’s Final Report was tabled notably in time to influence 
DWP2000, then under development.55  
 
A21/RTA Outbrief 
In defining a strategically relevant role for Army, Hickling used A21/RTA to achieve a ‘clean 
break’ from DoA. In the second quarter of 2000, Hickling and Colonel Justin Kelly56 briefed 
Defence Minister Moore on the RTA Trials Final Report. This was an opportunity to 
reinforce Army’s departure from DoA, and return to conventional combined arms warfare. 
The briefing and report highlighted Army’s perceptions of A21/RTA’s key flaws as: a 
‘totally inadequate’ strategic premise; dependence ‘on technology Army didn’t have’; that 
embedding ‘proved…a more expensive way to achieve a lesser outcome’; and that ‘A21 
logistic concepts…were not robust enough to adapt to evolving operational circumstances’. 
However, Kelly reported that the trials reinforced the importance of conventional combined 
arms.57  
 
                                                 
52 JSCFADT, From Phantom to Force, para 2.49, p. 24. 
53 JSCFADT, From Phantom to Force, para 2.77, p. 32. 
54 Department of Defence, Government Response to Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade Report: ‘From Phantom to Force: Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army’ and Subsequent Report:  
‘A Model for a New Army – Community Comments on ‘From Phantom to Force’ Parliamentary Report into the 
Army, (Department of Defence: Commonwealth of Australia, May 2003), Recommendation 1, p. 1; 
Recommendation 2, p. 2-3;  Recommendation 6, p. 7; Recommendation 7, p. 8-9. 
55 The Government’s formal response was not forthcoming until 2003, and it agreed with these primary 
recommendations. Department of Defence, Government Response to ‘From Phantom to Force’. 
56 Later Brigadier and Director General, Future Land Warfare (DG-FLW). Dr Roger Lough, First Assistant 
Secretary, Science Policy (DSTO) also attended this briefing. 
57 Directorate for Restructuring the Army (DTRIALS), Presentation to Minister: RTA Trials Report, 
(Unpublished, Australian Army Headquarters, 2000), p. 4, 6, 8, 18, 6-7. 
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Thus A21/RTA’s first legacy was valuable evidence supporting return to a conventional 
warfighting focus. Hickling highlighted a second positive legacy as the new relationship with 
the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO), asserting ‘Army and DSTO are 
close to world best practice in the exploitation of scientific method in pursuit of force 
development’ and that ‘A21/RTA catalysed a process for the continuous modernisation of 
Army’. Hickling closed with reminding the Minister of the importance of the forthcoming 
DWP2000 to ‘shape Army modernisation for a long period to come’.58  
 
Resourcing Outcomes 
This Chapter’s final argument is that these shaping efforts were successful in winning 
additional capability resources for Army in DWP2000. The evidence follows. First, the 
Defence budget in early 1999 was weak. Annex 6-A examines some objective financial 
evidence, and shows: firstly, that over the A21/RTA period, the economy was strengthening; 
and secondly that Government allowed Defence to slip as a funding priority, in contrast to the 
economy’s relative strength.59 
 
Second, military leadership affirmed the parlous budget state. Hickling’s NPC address 
pitched an appeal for increased resourcing for Army.60 Reflecting on this, Hickling described 
how, upon becoming CA, his instructions from the CDF were to make personnel reductions 
of twenty percent, with commensurate reductions in other areas,61 legacy effects of the 
Defence Reform Program. Barrie confirms the dire budget situation.62 The 2000 
parliamentary inquiry also recommended increased Army resourcing. Annex 6-A presents 
factual budget evidence these opinions were more than self-interested provider capture. 
 
Third, while Defence’s claimed resource constraint was real, it reflected discretionary 
Government policy that shifted in Defence’s favour with East Timor. Prime Minister John 
Howard provided powerful evidence of growing political sponsorship: 
 
                                                 
58 DTRIALS, Presentation to Minister, p. 20-21, 20, 24. 
59 Unfortunately, the Australian Bureau of Statistics data do not include a breakdown within the Department of 
Defence to examine the distribution across the three services: so the relative proportion of this decline suffered 
by Army cannot be ascertained from these data. 
60 Hickling, NPC Address, 14 Apr 1999. 
61 Frank Hickling, interview 13 Aug 2015. 
62 “When I became CDF, we were trading insolvent – spending down our capital investment in the future to do 
current operations”. Chris Barrie, interview 17 Nov 2015. 
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East Timor had a profound impact on my thinking about Australia’s Defence 
preparedness…63 we would have to strengthen the Australian army, not at the 
expense of the navy or air force but as a commitment in its own right.64 
 
Finally, DWP2000 (released in December 2000), placed renewed emphasis on Army 
capability beyond DoA,65 with an unprecedented $5 billion Army allocation.66 Both the 
inquiry and DWP2000 were undoubtedly influenced by changing strategic circumstances 
(especially East Timor). However, Army’s concerted efforts to transcend DoA and harmonise 
strategic guidance with Army’s force structure and capability investment had contributed to 
substantial outcomes by late 2000. 
 
Conclusion 
The years 1999-2000 were the last dramatic period in A21/RTA’s history. This Chapter 
achieved two objectives. First, it presented a comparative analysis of Hickling’s change 
management approach, contrasting with Sanderson. Hickling sought to transcend DoA 
through overt alignment between the strategic narrative and Army’s likely tasks and 
capability needs. His methods included marshalling intellectual resources (new doctrine and 
think tank pieces), using escalating strategic tensions, and bypassing Defence Committee and 
Ministerial consultation processes with a direct public appeal for increased Army resources 
and an expeditionary/conventional warfighting focus. The Chapter firstly argued that in 
change management terms, Hickling was successful in building a compelling case for change 
and creating a clear, shared, credible vision. His success is attributable to: the transparency 
and directness of his approach (which conferred credibility, as did his intellectual tools); his 
alignment with Army’s enduring culture, which ensured internal support; and evolving 
strategic circumstances (i.e. East Timor) which rendered his principal, Government, more 
receptive to his vision for an Expeditionary Army.  
 
                                                 
63 ‘I realised that for a long time into the future, Australia would need to spend a lot of money on Defence. We 
had mounted a hugely successful operation, but launching and sustaining it had put an enormous strain on our 
military resources, particularly our ground forces and strategic lift assets’. John Howard, Lazarus Rising – A 
Personal and Political Autobiography, (HarperCollins Publishers Australia, 2010), p. 357. 
64 ‘This was realised with my Government’s subsequent investment in the hardening of the army program, and 
most significantly in 2006 with the decision to establish two new battalions…’, Howard, Lazarus Rising, p. 358. 
65 Department of Defence, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2000), p. 79. 
66 DWP2000, p. 97. 
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The Chapter’s second objective was to identify A21/RTA’s contribution and legacies within 
the above change management context. The RTA trials were abandoned in early 1999, and 
Army returned, structurally, to status quo ante. The Chapter’s second argument was that 
Army mounted two supporting efforts in 2000 aimed at winning Army capability resources in 
DWP2000. Both these supporting efforts, through the parliamentary inquiry, and the 
Ministerial A21/RTA outbrief, reinforced and solidified Army’s change to an expeditionary, 
conventional warfighting focus. The Chapter thirdly argued these efforts were successful: 
DWP2000 included a substantial boost in Army resourcing. 
 
A21/RTA was used to achieve a ‘clean break’ from DoA, with two immediate legacies. First, 
RTA trials evidence justified a return to an expeditionary, conventional warfighting focus. 
Second, Army discovered the power of evidence-based operational analysis to persuade its 
principal and guide Army’s future modernisation. 
 
Hickling’s unilateral re-alignment of the national strategic narrative for Army stretched the 
formal guidance in ASP97 to the limit; this tactic was successful largely because East Timor 
soon after demonstrated the necessity of explicit coherence between the strategic narrative 
and Army’s likely tasks. Together with Army’s shaping efforts to boost Army resourcing in 
DWP2000, these were significant achievements given Army’s ineffective strategic and 
resourcing influence during the DoA years. Here, Army demonstrated it was a ‘learning 
organisation’67- the ‘evaluate and improve’ element of successful change management - with 
significant learning arising from A21/RTA.
                                                 
67 D.W. Waddell, A. Creed, T.G. Cummings and C.G. Worley, Organisational Change: Development and 
Transformation, 5th Edition, (South Melbourne, VIC, Australia: Cengage Learning Australia, 2014), p. 200-217. 
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Annex 6-A: Defence Budget Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Annual GDP percentage change, 1961-2015. 
 
 
Figure 1 presents the annual GDP1 percentage change for Australia over the years 1961-
2015.2 During the 1990s period of A21/RTA interest, Figure 1 shows that the economy 
contracted in 1991 with negative growth (recession: circle 1); however by 1993 was 
recovering, with consistent growth around four percent for the four years 1993-1996 (circle 
2). This is a strong growth rate relative to contemporary standards: 2015’s growth rate was 
2.3 percent. However, lag effects in the wider economy following the 1991 recession (e.g. 
unemployment) took some time to recover.3 
 
 
                                                 
1 GDP = Gross Domestic Product. 
2 Australian Bureau of Statistics, 5204.0 - Australian System of National Accounts, Table 1: Key National 
Accounts Aggregates. www.abs.gov.au, accessed 16 January 2016. 
3 David Gruen, The Australian Economy in the 1990s, Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, Oct 2000, 6 pp. 
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Figure 2: Annual Defence expenditure as a percentage of total government outlay, 1987-
88 to 2013-14. 
 
 
Figure 2 shows annual Defence expenditure as a percentage of total government outlays from 
Financial Year (FY) 1987-88 through 2013-14.4 This shows a steady decline from FY 1987-
88 through to 1998-99, from 6.7 to 4.9 per cent of total government outlays. In fact, it is only 
in the FY 1999-2000, during which the East Timor deployment takes place, that this multi-
year decline is reversed with additional appropriations to support the deployment.  
  
                                                 
4 Australian Bureau of Statistics, 5512.0 - Government Finance Statistics, Australia, 1987-88 to 2013-14. 
www.abs.gov.au, accessed 16 January 2016. 
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Figure 3: Army personnel numbers, 1993-94 through 1998-99. 
 
 
Figure 3 presents Army personnel numbers from 1993-94 to 1998-99 as reported in the 
Defence Annual Reports from this period.5 Shown is the breakdown between Australian 
Regular Army (ARA – i.e. full-time members) and Reserve members. Figure 3 indicates that 
over this six-year period, total personnel declined by more than 23 percent, from over 50,000 
personnel in 1993-94 to less than 39,000 in 1998-99. Figure 3 also shows the ratio of ARA to 
Reserve personnel declining over this period, with 1:1 in 1993-94, and 0.9:1 in 1998-99, 
signalling a relative increase in the proportion of the Reserve members in the total force. This 
reflects the personnel downsizing measures (e.g. the redundancy program) directed towards 
the ARA during the Defence Reform Program (DRP).
                                                 
5 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Australian Government, series 
from 1994-95 through 1998-99). 
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Chapter 7: Towards Contemporary Contestability - How to Restructure Well 
 
 A21 was Army’s first journey in contestability.1 
 
The Introduction posed three questions: did A21/RTA fail? What are A21/RTA’s legacies? 
What are A21/RTA’s lessons for contemporary force structuring initiatives? This Chapter 
assembles the previous chapters’ arguments to address these questions. The first section 
evaluates A21/RTA against the critical change elements; deriving responses to each question, 
presented in the succeeding three sections. A final section presents future work priorities 
emerging.  
 
Evaluation against Change Management Elements 
Evaluating success or failure depends on definition of objectives. This section recaps then 
evaluates A21/RTA’s objectives against Chapter 2’s seven elements of successful change 
management.  
 
A21/RTA’s objectives varied by stakeholder and level. Key stakeholders for high-level 
objectives included, externally, Government and the Chiefs of Service Committee (COSC); 
and internally, Chief of the General Staff Sanderson. Chapter 3 presented the external 
objectives as A21/RTA’s compelling drivers for transformational change. Government’s 
strategic objective was an Army force structured for DoA while providing some 
expeditionary capabilities. COSC’s budget objective (responding to pressure from the other 
services, and reinforced in A21’s Terms-of-Reference) was for Army to justify a structure 
(and hence operating budget). Juxtaposed with these external objectives were Sanderson’s 
internal organisational objectives for A21. Chapter 4 identified these as firstly winning more 
capability resources for Army; and secondly other reforms to reshape Army, in capability and 
cultural terms, for modern warfare. Chapter 5 showed A21/RTA also involved lower-level 
objectives including testing concepts in the trials. Evaluating all these objectives against the 
critical elements of change management reveals answers to the sub-thesis’ questions on 
A21/RTA’s success/failure, lessons and legacies. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Michael Brennan, interview 21 Dec 2015. 
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1. Compelling Drivers 
 
Chapter 3 showed that A21/RTA’s drivers for transformational change were compelling. 
A21/RTA arose from years of relative Army unresponsiveness to DoA strategic guidance, 
resulting in an entrenched divisional structure externally perceived as no longer fit-for-
purpose. A21/RTA’s budget driver was also compelling, given the conflation of Australia’s 
recessionary economy and DoA’s emphasis on expensive sea and air assets, pressuring Army 
to justify its structure and budget. 
 
In the strict sense, A21’s design solution met these compelling drivers (as external 
objectives). The A21 Final Report presented a force structure, operational and personnel 
package that appeared to conform with DoA; and met its other prescriptive Terms-of-
Reference including budget envelope. COSC’s endorsement of A21’s Final Report indicates 
these objectives were met at least within the Defence Committee process. 
 
But Chapter 3 also highlighted the strategic ambiguity that A21 needed to satisfy: a force 
designed for DoA also had to contain expeditionary capabilities. Chapter 4 examined A21’s 
solution as a ‘capability game’: apparently conforming with DoA, but containing muscular 
capabilities at variance with DoA’s low-level threats. A21’s force structure rather 
overstepped Government’s original objectives and intent, notwithstanding strategic ambiguity 
around the expeditionary margin. This reflected Sanderson’s objective of winning increased 
capability resourcing for an Army suitable for wider contingencies. This driver/objective was 
also compelling, given the cumulative years of under-investment in the Army before A21. 
However, these external and internal objectives were not perfectly aligned; consequentially 
A21’s capability game could not be transparently communicated to the wider Army or 
Government. This fundamentally undermined two other elements of successful change 
management impacting these respective stakeholders: creating a clear, shared, credible vision 
internally; and political sponsorship externally. 
 
2. Clear, shared, credible vision 
 
While Sanderson’s A21 vision was clear, it was not shared or credible within Army. Chapter 
4 showed the early resistance encountered from Army’s senior leadership, based first on 
rejection of A21’s overt DoA premise, despite A21’s net capability gain and design for wider 
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contingencies. The fundamental clash of DoA with Army’s conservative expeditionary and 
conventional warfighting culture had underlain Army’s unresponsiveness to DoA for years 
before 1994. This same cultural clash undermined credibility of A21’s vision within Army, 
compounded by the lack of transparency noted above. While this suggests Army’s senior 
leadership was unable to differentiate an unpopular strategy (DoA) from A21’s net capability 
gain, there was a second reason for resistance. A21’s specific resource allocation posed to 
disrupt the interests of dominant cultural tribes within Army, favouring minority tribes 
including Special Forces and Reserves. Collectively, these factors meant that Army did not 
share Sanderson’s A21 vision. This early resistance was compounded when A21’s concepts 
failed to achieve early successes in the RTA trials. 
 
3. Achieving early successes 
 
Chapter 5 showed how RTA failed to achieve early successes in two respects. Several A21 
concepts failed for technical reasons; and disruptions elsewhere across Army hardened 
cultural resistance. The concept failures offer significant lessons, because despite being 
lower-level objectives (compared to the strategic, budgetary and capability objectives already 
discussed), the failure to achieve early successes through them drew disproportionate 
attention and undermined the whole A21/RTA initiative. The embedding concept is a case-in-
point. Analysis reveals the reason for failure as unnecessary over-prescription.   
 
Nothing in A21’s higher-level objectives or Terms-of-Reference directed embedding as a 
specific solution, yet A21/RTA’s colours became largely nailed to this mast. Army’s cultural 
pre-occupation with tactical-level professional mastery explains this failure. Chapter 4 noted 
A21’s design solution was presented as a single, deterministic outcome; partially attributable 
to the Assumption-Based-Planning methodology and deductive reasoning used by the A21 
team. As Chapter 5 demonstrated, unit-level embedding is but one means for achieving 
combined arms effects. By prescribing one specific model (unit-level embedding), A21/RTA 
‘set itself up’ for technical failure.2  
 
Instead of positing ‘unit-level embedding is optimal for achieving combined arms effects’, 
A21/RTA could have framed a more open hypothesis: ‘the optimal combined arms effect 
                                                 
2 DSTO noted that Army framed the embedding hypothesis. Dean Bowley, correspondence 11 Jun 2016. 
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may be achieved through grouping at levels below the division. The RTA trials will identify 
the optimum level for this grouping to occur’. This hypothesis leaves the answer open and 
more likely to generate successful experimental outcomes. In fact, the RTA trials suggested 
the brigade was the optimal grouping level, other things being equal. Relative to Army’s 
divisional start-state, this was a very significant, successful outcome for the transformational 
change initiative; yet repudiation of unit-level embedding cast the whole trials program as 
technically infeasible. This was compounded by the failure of A21’s logistics concept, which, 
as Chapter 5 argued, was another design (rather than execution) flaw, exacerbated by 
inadequate resourcing.  
 
4. Enablers for change: time, skills, resources, training must be provided 
 
The conflation of A21/RTA as a transformational change initiative with the Defence Reform 
Program (DRP) negatively influenced A21/RTA in several resourcing respects. First, A21’s 
logistics concept was heavily influenced by the DRP’s commercialisation/out-sourcing drive, 
which was at variance with A21’s manoeuvrist operational concept. Second, DRP’s deep 
budget cuts across Army contributed significantly to cultural resistance, as DRP savings were 
used to fund A21/RTA restructures outside the 1st Brigade trials. 
 
The 2000 parliamentary inquiry found inadequate resourcing was the principal reason for 
limited success not only in A21/RTA, but in Army’s previous force structural experiments 
also.3  This suggests a perennial issue for future transformational change initiatives. Time 
was another noteworthy A21/RTA factor. Given the longevity of Army’s divisional structure 
and culture, achieving A21/RTA’s transformational change in only several years was 
ambitious.   
 
5. Senior leadership buy-in and political sponsorship 
 
Not only did A21/RTA generate resistance from Army’s senior leadership; political 
sponsorship from Ministers was ambivalent after the change-of-Government in 1996. 
Cultural reasons for the former have already been discussed; however Chapter 5 noted the 
                                                 
3 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, From Phantom to Force: Towards a More 
Efficient and Effective Army, Inquiry into the Suitability of the Australian Army for Peacetime, Peacekeeping 
and War, Report No. 95, (Canberra, ACT, Australia: The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
September 2000), para 2.77, p. 32. 
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contribution of a directive leadership approach and strained civil-military relationships, with 
two resultant effects. First, directive leadership disaffected members, hardening internal 
resistance and undermining confidence: ultimately expressed in the leadership change from 
Sanderson to Hickling. Second, Sanderson’s retirement left A21/RTA champion-less. 
 
However, a hastily-drawn lesson that directive leadership was inappropriate for A21/RTA is 
ill-advised. This sub-thesis has shown the formidable cultural challenge A21/RTA faced. 
Chapter 2 highlighted that some transformational change is so dramatic it is achieved only 
with organisational generational change, either quickly (dismissing nonconforming 
employees) or slowly (natural attrition of older views). Either way, the lesson is that if 
directive leadership is used, then there must be sufficient leadership longevity to complete the 
reform. 
 
Institutionally, Army is not well-positioned for senior leadership longevity.4 The short tenure 
of both senior Army and most political leaders works against the time required for successful 
transformational change. A21/RTA’s lesson is the importance of depth of senior leadership 
buy-in for major reforms, so there are inter-generational champions within an organisation 
who can ‘reinforce and solidify’ change. 
 
Achieving political sponsorship was challenging for both Sanderson and Hickling. While 
Sanderson successfully persevered with the Defence Committee process but received only 
qualified political sponsorship, Hickling bypassed this process to win grudging political 
sponsorship through a risky direct public appeal. Provider capture explains why political 
sponsorship was so challenging. A21/RTA suggests: deficiencies in the Defence Committee 
process; limited Government5 involvement in Army’s ‘internal’ reforms; and 
(consequentially) levels of principal/agent distrust - a classic provider capture effect. Chapter 
2 identified evidence-based contestability to mitigate provider capture. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
chart A21/RTA’s evolution of an evidence-based approach to winning capability resources; 
                                                 
4 Anthony Ween, Thitima Pitinanondha, Ivan Garanovich, Tim McKenna and Tim McKay, Guiding Principles 
for Force Posture Design, Defence Science and Technology Organisation Technical Note 1221, (Fairbairn, 
Canberra,  ACT, Australia: Joint and Operations Analysis Division, Defence Science and Technology Group, 
2013), p. 22. 
5 ‘Government’ is understood here at two levels: civilian agencies (Defence and other government agencies) and 
elected political representatives. 
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this enduring legacy became known as the ‘Golden Thread of Logic’6 within Army. 
Significantly, the latest Defence reform initiative, the First Principals Review,7 features a 
reinvigorated contestability function. This proposes independent assurance on strategy, scope, 
technical and cost aspects, offering a leading practice contestability model with increased 
Government involvement. This contemporary contestability shows growing sophistication in 
mechanisms to overcome provider capture and improve political sponsorship. To date, 
however, civil-military relations have not been understood or articulated in provider capture 
terms. Therefore, this sub-thesis’ framing represents an advance, and a potentially powerful 
interpretative and analytical lens. 
 
6. Reinforce and solidify change: provide required supporting efforts 
 
A21’s force structure included several supporting efforts, with operational, personnel and 
capability concepts documented in Chapter 4. However, Chapter 2 noted the importance of 
addressing cultural, not just technical, aspects of a change initiative. A21/RTA notably lacked 
cultural adjustment opportunities, which questions what types of cultural efforts could have 
improved A21/RTA’s success. A more consultative approach is one possibility; however, this 
sub-thesis’ analysis of Army’s culture raises doubts that more consultation would overcome 
Army’s cultural resistance to A21/RTA. No amount of consultation would persuade Army 
that DoA against low-level contingencies was a good idea. Chapter 5’s analysis showed that 
Army’s DoA resistance was a form of ‘cultural capture’, where an agent’s ideological 
worldview results in a perception of national interest at variance with its principal, and 
conveniently conflates with the agent’s interest. Army’s particular form of cultural capture 
may be impervious: a culture so pervasive, the only way to change it is through the 
externality of a substantially changed threat scenario (war).8 Less compelling external drivers 
(e.g. from peacetime Governments) will likely receive much scepticism and resistance if 
change is unaligned with culture or dominant interests. 
 
                                                 
6 John Caligari, ‘The Adaptive Army Post-Afghanistan: The Australian Army’s Approach Towards Force 2030’, 
Security Challenges, 7(2): 1-6, 2011, p. 2. 
7 D. Peever, R. Hill, P. Leahy, J. McDowell and L. Tanner, First Principles Review: Creating One Defence, 
(Report Commissioned by the Minister for Defence, 2015), p. 5, 25. 
8 Douglas MacGregor, Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century, (Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, Westport, CT, USA: Praeger, 1997), p. 1-5. See also Nicholas Jans and 
David Schmidtchen, ‘Culture and Organisational Behaviour at Australian Defence Headquarters’, Australian 
Defence Force Journal, 158: 23-28, Jan/Feb 2003, p. 26. 
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The literature notes that when change initiatives lack the ‘reinforce and solidify’ element, 
organisations tend to ‘go back to old ways’:9 reform requires more drive than conservatism. 
Army’s structural return to status quo ante under Hickling’s expeditionary redux is a prime 
example. Hickling also mounted several supporting efforts in defining Army’s place in 
maritime strategy, noted in Chapter 6. However, in contrast to reformist Sanderson, 
conservative Hickling’s vision aligned with Army’s culture and dominant interests, so his 
supporting efforts successfully reinforced his vision. This comparative analysis suggests 
culture’s primacy for transformational change. While other supporting efforts can reinforce 
and solidify, they may be individually insufficient without a cultural focus. 
 
7. Evaluate and Improve 
 
‘Evaluate and improve’ is A21/RTA’s enduring success and principal legacy. DSTO’s 
pioneering application of science to the RTA trials matured into the Army Experimental 
Framework;10 now federated within the ADF’s Joint Experimental Framework (JEF). The 
JEF has in turn become nested within the ADF’s entire force design process, formalised into: 
(1) concept development;11 (2) experimentation; and (3) capability analysis.12 This shows 
increasing sophistication compared with A21’s concept development, involving mainly 
A21’s small team, generating the over-prescriptive A21 hypothesis and design flaws 
previously noted. Further, Army’s ‘learning organisation’13 ethos has institutionalised in the 
Combined Arms Training Centre,14 and Modernisation and Strategic Planning Division. 
Notwithstanding deficiencies in A21’s concept development, the real value of the RTA trials 
experimentation was the evidence base it generated to support increased Army capability 
resourcing, noted in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
                                                 
9 Stephen Robbins, Bruce Millett, Ron Cacioppe and Terry Waters-Marsh, Organisational Behaviour: Leading 
and Managing in Australia and New Zealand, 3rd Edition, (Frenchs Forest, NSW, Australia: Pearson Education, 
2001), p. 719. See also Jans and Schmidtchen, ‘Culture and Organisational Behaviour at Australian Defence 
Headquarters’, p. 23. 
10 Paul Willis, Peter Dortmans, Neville Curtis and Niem Tri, Army’s Concept Framework – Exploiting Concepts 
as Agents for Change for Land Force Development, (Adelaide, SA, Australia: Proceedings, Land Warfare 
Conference 2003), p. 713. 
11 Willis et al., Army’s Conceptual Framework, p. 710. 
12 Tim McKenna and Tim McKay, Australia’s Joint Approach, Defence Science and Technology Group 
Research Report 0427, (Fisherman’s Bend, VIC, Australia: Joint and Operations Analysis Division, Defence 
Science and Technology Group, 2015), p. 53-59. 
13 Steven Talbot, ‘Learning to Add Value: Fostering Cultures of Effective Learning in the Australian Army’, 
Australian Army Journal, X(3): 158-171, 2013. 
14 Re-titled from the A21/RTA-era Combined Arms Training and Development Centre (CATDC). 
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Did A21/RTA Fail? 
Of the seven elements of successful change management, A21/RTA achieved only the 
‘evaluate and improve’ element satisfactorily. While A21/RTA’s drivers were compelling, 
and A21/RTA met its original objectives, the inability to transparently communicate A21’s 
capability game fundamentally undermined this transformational change. Failure to achieve 
the other six elements makes A21/RTA’s outcome both predictable and unsurprising. 
Evaluation of A21/RTA against the seven elements shows A21/RTA failed in both technical 
feasibility and cultural sensitivity terms, re-affirming the theory posited in Chapter 2.  
 
Lessons 
The A21/RTA case study underscores the utility of the change management elements, both 
for retrospective evaluation of previous reforms and to guide future reforms. While the seven 
elements may not be collectively exhaustive and sufficient, they are certainly necessary. 
A21/RTA’s principal lesson is that to restructure well, all seven elements must be addressed; 
and the reform must be technically feasible and culturally sensitive. 
 
Further, this Chapter’s analysis shows that technical feasibility can be soluble with sound 
concept development, experimental frameworks and resourcing enablers. However, the more 
intractable component is culture. Army’s ‘deep’15 cultural capture renders self- and national 
interests difficult to distinguish by all stakeholders, with two critical consequences. Firstly, 
culture can impair civil-military relations and political sponsorship; secondly, it represents a 
formidable challenge for transformational change initiatives. A21/RTA provides case study 
evidence of both effects.  
 
This sub-thesis demonstrates that if transformational change is to be successful, then culture 
must be considered. However, the first-order question is around when transformational 
change is warranted. If an ‘ideal’ culture is defined as protective from ill-founded and 
receptive to well-founded change, cultural capture is the deviation where cultural resistance 
manifests to even well-founded transformational change. Distinguishing these change types 
                                                 
15 ‘Deep’ capture refers to the circumstance where the agent may be unconscious of its own capture, and 
complicit in it. J. Hanson and D. Yosifon, ‘The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical 
Realism, Power Economics and Deep Capture’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 153: 129-346, 2013. 
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(which are perspective-contingent, ultimately assessable ex post)16 and responding 
appropriately requires both transparency and cultural courage. The DoA era has strong 
candidacy for further work. 
 
Legacies 
A21/RTA has two enduring legacies. First, A21/RTA’s immediate legacy of Army’s 
evidence-based approach to capability resourcing has evolved within the contemporary 
contestability environment into an enduring legacy. The second legacy is structural. While 
the immediate outcome of A21/RTA was a return to force structural status quo ante in 1999-
2000, Army’s most recent force structural experiment, PLAN BEERSHEBA17 (2013) has 
revisited several A21/RTA concepts. BEERSHEBA calls for ‘multi-role…‘like’…combat 
brigades’18 with armoured reconnaissance units resembling A21 task forces. Combat arms 
embedding and Reserve integration occurs in BEERSHEBA at higher (brigade) levels. 
However, these two concepts, and SF’s contemporary prominence,19 trace direct ancestry to 
A21, re-affirming this Chapter’s argument that multiple solutions exist for achieving 
combined arms effects. BEERSHEBA also demonstrates the posited benefits of ‘organic’ 
structures20 remain as a powerful ‘Theory of Change’21 in force design. 
 
Future Work 
This sub-thesis has demonstrated the utility of applying civilian organisational theory to 
evaluate a military force structural initiative. Provider capture’s potential compels further 
work: internally as a barrier to transformational change; and externally to analyse civil-
military relations. Candidate case studies include the next major change initiative following 
                                                 
16 For example, principal, agent and third party stakeholders may have different perspectives on an appropriate 
national military strategy (e.g. DoA); and these stakeholders may not have transparent, symmetric access to 
information. 
17 David Morrison, Chief of Army announces Plan Beersheba, 12 Dec 2012, http://www.army.gov.au/Our-
work/Speeches-and-transcripts/Plan-BEERSHEBA, accessed 04 May 2014; Craig Bickell, ‘Plan Beersheba: The 
Combined Arms Imperative Behind the Reorganisation of the Army’, Australian Army Journal, X(4): 36-52, 
2013; Robert Nutbrown, ‘Battle Plan: Chief of Army shares his vision of Australia’s future land force’, 
Australian Defence Business Review, Sep/Oct 2014, p. 13-16. 
18 Office of the Prime Minister of Australia, 2013 Defence White Paper: Plan Beersheba - Restructuring the 
Australian Army, News Release, 03 May 2013, p. 1. 
19 For example, Army’s senior leadership team now includes the Commander of Special Operations, 
acknowledging the strong role played by Special Forces in recent operational history. 
20 Annex 2-A 
21 See Chapter 2. 
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A21/RTA, Hardened and Networked Army (HNA);22 and more broadly the evolution of the 
Defence Committee process and emergence of contemporary contestability.  
 
A competent principal is one principal/agent premise. Provider capture also allows 
exploration of stakeholder views on this provocative topic,23 ultimately questioning: how is 
the national interest best-served? When is transformational change warranted in a military 
context?24 
 
Conclusion 
While A21/RTA met its original objectives, it failed in technical feasibility and cultural 
sensitivity terms with the immediate legacy of structural return to status quo ante. Evaluating 
A21 against the elements of successful change management highlights why this occurred: 
A21/RTA succeeded in only one: the ‘evaluate and improve’ element. A21/RTA’s three 
lessons are: first, all seven elements must be addressed for successful transformational 
change. Second is the importance of sound concept development and other enablers to 
increase technical feasibility. Third, culture remains the largest challenge to transformational 
change. Successful future strategies should address cultural capture, noting perspective-
contingent distinctions between well-founded and ill-founded ‘compelling drivers’ of 
transformational change; and transparency’s role in aiding this distinction. 
 
This Chapter also identified A21/RTA’s two important and enduring legacies: firstly, Army’s 
evidence-based approach to capability within Defence’s contested budget environment; and 
secondly the reprise of some A21 concepts in the recent PLAN BEERSHEBA force structure. 
These legacies show that the posited benefits of ‘organic’ structures endure as a powerful 
‘Theory of Change’ in contemporary force design; albeit expressed in more sophisticated 
concept development and contestability. If A21/RTA was a lesson in overly-prescriptive 
‘what to think’, the Army emerging from that period has an improved understanding of ‘how 
to think’.
                                                 
22 Peter Leahy, ‘Towards the Hardened and Networked Army’, Australian Army Journal, II(1): 27-36, 2004. See 
also Peter Leahy, ‘The Medium-Weight Force: Lessons Learned and Future Contributions to Coalition 
Operations’, Army, 56(9): 49-56, Sep 2006. 
23 E.g. contrasting Army’s culture (positioned as well-founded in history and doctrine) with strategic guidance 
(founded on political and other considerations).  
24 E.g. it may be hypothesised that an agent/(organisation), especially in the absence of transparent information, 
may not necessarily be the best judge of when transformational change is warranted. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
This sub-thesis presented a case study of transformational change in the Australian Army of 
the 1990s, the Army in the 21st Century (A21) and Restructuring the Army (RTA) force 
structure initiatives. Chapter 1 outlined the sub-thesis’ argument: A21/RTA faced formidable 
strategic, resourcing and cultural challenges. However A21/RTA failed to achieve most 
elements critical for successful change management, and was neither technically feasible nor 
culturally sensitive. Subsequent chapters built the key arguments supporting this conclusion. 
 
Chapter 2 presented the sub-thesis’ literature review and methodology. Seven elements of 
successful change management were identified from civilian organisational theory, against 
which subsequent chapters evaluated A21/RTA:  
 
1. Compelling change drivers; 
2. Clear, shared, credible vision; 
3. Achieving early successes; 
4. Providing change enablers (time, skills, resources, training); 
5. Achieving senior leadership buy-in and political sponsorship; 
6. Reinforcing and solidifying change with supporting efforts; and 
7. Evaluation and improvement. 
 
Chapter 2 posited that successful change management requires both technical feasibility and 
cultural sensitivity; and proposed ‘provider capture’ (the dilemma of dependent yet divergent 
interests of Army (as agent) and Government (as principal)) for interpreting civil-military 
relations. 
 
Chapter 3 examined A21’s two drivers: strategic, i.e. a ‘Defence-of-Australia’ (DoA) force 
structure; and budgetary, justifying Army’s structure within a competitive Defence budget 
environment. These drivers compelled transformational change from Army; though 
challenged A21 with reconciling emerging strategic ambiguity. While declared strategic 
guidance reinforced DoA, by 1994 interest in expeditionary capability was growing – though 
only publically admitted ‘at the margins’.  
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Chapter 4 analysed A21’s design solution, revealing A21 was a ‘capability game’. While 
apparently conforming with DoA’s low-level threat scenario, A21’s force structure was 
designed to win increased capability resources for Army (including for higher threat levels 
and non-DoA tasks). However A21’s capability game seeded several serious change 
management deficiencies that impaired the reform’s success. A21 encountered significant 
cultural resistance from Army internally. Army could not accept a force structure even 
superficially premised on DoA, and which challenged Army’s dominant cultural tribes, 
despite A21’s net capability gain. Neither could A21’s capability game be explicitly 
communicated to the wider Army. Limited transparency, and Chief of Army Lieutenant 
General John Sanderson’s directive leadership approach, did not create a clear, shared, 
credible vision; A21 lacked senior leadership buy-in and achieved only qualified political 
sponsorship externally. The trials were conceived by Government to defer investment, build a 
credible evidence base, and hedge risk. 
 
Chapter 5 studied RTA, the trials undertaken by Army and the Defence Science and 
Technology Organisation to test A21 concepts. The trials’ real value was revealed as 
generating evidence supporting increased capability resources for Army. However, several 
A21 concepts failed for technical reasons in the trials, including unit-level embedding; and 
disruptions elsewhere in Army hardened cultural resistance. Failure to achieve early 
successes in these respects undermined confidence in the reform, ultimately expressed as 
leadership change.  
 
Chapter 6 traced A21/RTA’s outcomes, contrasting the change management approach of new 
Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Frank Hickling, as Army strove to resolve strategic 
ambiguity and define an expeditionary role within a revised maritime strategy. While 
transparency, directness and intellectual tools conferred credibility on Hickling’s vision, he 
was significantly aided by his alignment with Army’s traditional culture, and by evolving 
strategic circumstances (e.g. East Timor, 1999) supporting Army’s expeditionary redux. 
Though A21/RTA was abandoned, the trials generated two immediate legacies. First, results 
were used to justify Army’s ‘clean break’ from DoA and return to conventional warfighting. 
The ironic outcome of A21/RTA was a structural return to status quo ante. Second, Army 
discovered the power of an evidence-based approach to persuade Government in a contested 
budget environment, and to inform modernisation and capability development. 
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Chapter 7 consolidated A21/RTA’s lessons for future transformational change attempts in the 
Australian Army. It found that of the seven elements of successful change management, 
A21/RTA succeeded in one: ‘evaluation and improvement’. The evidence-based approach of 
the RTA trials matured into the Army Experimental Framework, and an enduring ‘learning 
organisation’ ethos has been culturally reinforced within Army. Future transformational 
change initiatives should address all seven elements of successful change management to 
maximise success probability. Further, A21/RTA’s evidence of ‘provider capture’: (1) helps 
all parties better understand civil-military relations; (2) underscores the importance of an 
independent, evidence-based approach; and (3) emphasises the cultural challenge of 
transformational change in Army.  
 
This sub-thesis represents the first detailed academic description and evaluation of A21/RTA. 
Unique contributions to the literature include applying civilian organisational theory to a 
military context, and demonstrating ‘provider capture’ as a valuable tool for interpreting 
civil-military relations, with scope for future work. 
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